JAPAN’S “VOTE CONSOLIDATION OPERATION” AT THE INTERNATIONAL WHALING COMMISSION

“Charity is a good investment”

-- Japanese proverb, cited by Minister of Foreign Affairs Taro Aso, January 2006 in support of Japan’s programme of Overseas Development Assistance (ODA).

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Executive Summary.

The present report merges and updates three previous Third Millennium Foundation (3MF) reports: *Briefing on Japan’s ‘Vote-Buying’ strategy in the International Whaling Commission (IWC)*(2002), *Fish, Aid and PR: Winning a Majority at the International Whaling Commission* (2005), and Japan’s “Vote Consolidation Operation” at the International Whaling Commission: *Winning a Majority in St Kitts and Nevis* (2006).

Section 1 reviews the current membership of the IWC, noting that 19 developing countries (originally 24) have been recruited into the IWC by Japan in the course of a nearly decade-long campaign to gain majority control of the Commission, joining another eight states that have been Commission members for much longer. While there has long been substantial circumstantial evidence of Japan’s involvement in paying the costs associated with IWC membership for most or all of these 28 countries, revelations from two member states – Grenada and Solomon Islands – made public after the 2005 Annual Meeting have provided convincing proof of the allegations.

Section 2 also looks at how, in the case of some countries, securing their support for Japan’s position at the IWC has become one of the top items on Japan’s foreign policy agenda, suggesting the full backing of the Foreign Ministry and the Prime Minister’s office for the recruitment campaign. But the driving force for the entire enterprise comes from the fisheries bureaucrats of Japan, backed by an active body of parliamentarians primarily from the conservative right-wing of Japanese politics bringing a dose of nationalism to the effort. Virtually all of the recruited countries, with the exception of land-locked Mongolia, have a relationship with Japan in the fisheries sector, be it through bilateral aid, technical cooperation, fisheries access or trade agreements, and/or common memberships in regional and international fisheries bodies where Japan is concentrating efforts to achieve support for its whaling-related policy objectives. Fisheries aid, like all Japanese aid, remains a potent foreign policy tool for the Japanese government; more details of the Japanese fisheries aid system and who implements it are given in Section 3.

Section 4 makes further considerations regarding Japan’s Overseas Development Assistance (ODA), with a closer look at what has been called the “extortionary nature” of Japan’s fisheries aid – the accusations at the heart of the allegations of “vote-buying” – and its use as an effective tool to achieve foreign policy objectives. The insistence on large infrastructure projects, a characteristic of Japanese ODA in general, has consequences for the domestic politics and decision-making processes of the Small Island Developing States of the Eastern Caribbean and South Pacific in particular. Questions are raised concerning the suitability and effectiveness of some of these aid projects.

Section 5 traces the evolution of Japan’s recruitment drive from one seeking (unsuccessfully) to build a blocking ¼ minority vote in the IWC to stop the adoption of the Southern Ocean Whale Sanctuary in 1994 to an outright campaign beginning in the late 1990s to build a simple majority (50% +1) in Japan’s favour within the IWC. The role of prominent parliamentarians and ministers is highlighted in this context.

An integral part of the recruitment drive has been the development of the so-called “whales-eat-fish” hypothesis by the Tokyo-based Institute for Cetacean Research (ICR) and its widespread diffusion by the Government of Japan. Under this unfounded hypothesis, whales, through their consumption of marine resources, are accused of seriously competing with human fisheries and thereby threatening human “food security” throughout the world. The development of this hypothesis, and the many uses to which it is being put, are reviewed in Section 6. The “whales-eat-fish” argument has proven to be an effective lobbying tool with
which to lure new members into the IWC, particularly those, such as Pacific Island states, for which fisheries make a significant contribution to the national economy. It also now provides the main justification for Japan’s expanding scientific whaling programmes in the Antarctic and North Pacific. The paper also looks at how the “whales-eat-fish” argument is being used by Japan and Norway to lay the groundwork for a pro-whaling IWC to reject the precautionary management of any future whaling. At the same time the two whaling nations are seeking to win international acceptance that culling whales and other predators in the hopes of improving fish catches not only is acceptable but that it is a primary component of the prevailing international view of EAFM as managing fisheries in a way to ensure that healthy marine ecosystems will be restored and maintained. While Japanese officials claim that the “whales-eat-fish” argument is now being taken seriously by the international community, the fact is that it is raised only when members of the whaling group within Japan’s fisheries bureaucracy and their allies in some of the recruited countries are present at meetings of the relevant regional and international fisheries bodies. Japan has made a special effort within the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) of the United Nations, and through FAO’s Committee on Fisheries where discussions of implementation of the Code of Conduct of Responsible Fisheries and of the EAFM are held. In this context, examples of on-going Japanese-funded cetacean surveys in the coastal waters of the six OECS countries (under the auspices of FAO) and of several West African states are also examined.

The “whales-eat-fish” argument as promoted by Japan, having little scientific basis, was essentially devised for propaganda purposes and as such is one element in the long-running PR aspect of the entire recruitment campaign, as is especially evident in the six OECS countries. This issue is reviewed in section 7 as is the involvement of the “wise-use” movement, and the meaning of the recruitment drive’s slogan, “sustainable use of marine living resources”, is questioned.

In conclusion, the report asks a number of questions; most importantly of all, if Japan’s case is so strong, as its supporters in Tokyo claim, then why does it have to resort to these means?
Introduction.

Allegations of Japan’s improper use of Official Development Assistance (ODA) as a means to obtain the support of aid-recipient countries in the IWC have been made for many years but drew unprecedented attention during the 2001 IWC meeting in London following remarks made by Masayuki Komatsu, for many years Japan’s Alternate Commissioner, in an interview broadcast on Australian radio on 18 July 2001:

*Japan does not have a military power. Unlike U.S. and Australia, you may dispatch your military power to East Timor. That is not the case of Japan. Japanese means is simply diplomatic communication and ODAs. So, in order to get appreciation of Japan’s position, of course you know that it is natural that we must do, resort to those two major tools. So, I think there is nothing wrong.*

Taken as an admission of vote-buying (later denied by Komatsu), these remarks gave rise to an exceptional initiative on the part of New Zealand whose then Minister for Conservation, Sandra Lee, introduced the 2001 IWC resolution on “Transparency within the International Whaling Commission.”, citing the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the United Nations Charter, which stipulates, *inter alia*, that “No State may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any other type of measure to coerce another State in order to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights and to secure from it advantages of any kind.” New Zealand’s resolution was eventually adopted by consensus following some negotiation and re-drafting. It concludes by endorsing “the complete independence of sovereign countries to decide their own policies and freely participate in the IWC (and other international forums) without undue interference or coercion from other sovereign countries.”

This last sentence, commented Jamaican journalist and environmentalist John Maxwell in an article about the 2001 IWC meeting, embodies “a principle of course widely dishonoured. And dishonoured now, very arrogantly and publicly, by Japan.”

Former Fisheries and Environment Minister of Dominica, Atherton Martin, who resigned over his country’s vote against the South Pacific Whale Sanctuary proposal in 2000 on the grounds that the “no” vote, pushed by Japan, contravened an earlier Cabinet decision to abstain, said in a 2005 interview: “I don’t think the international legal community has yet come up with a term to describe this blatant purchasing of small country governments by Japan...[It] ... has to go down in legal history as being ... the high end of public sector extortion.”

On the eve of the 2006 IWC Meeting, the international NGO Transparency International issued a statement entitled “Vote-Trading Threatens IWC Integrity”, noting that “if these allegations are correct, it would mean that special interests would jeopardise the very purpose of the IWC, to provide for the proper conservation of whale stocks, while at the same time threatening the ability of some countries to make independent decisions.”

That there has been a concerted, organised effort by the Government and whaling/fishing industry of Japan to bring new members into the IWC is no secret; there is ample evidence in the public record to support this. What is under question is whether the new members have

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2 www.abc.net.au/4corners/content/2005/s1417263.htm.
been “won over” by Japan’s apparent altruism and persuasive arguments, as Japanese officials maintain, or did the aid received, or other inducements, oblige them, and were arguments constructed to provide a justification that otherwise wouldn’t have existed?

The Japanese recruitment campaign has concentrated on aid-recipient developing countries mostly in the wider Caribbean region (including Central America and the island states of the Lesser Antilles), francophone West Africa and the South Pacific. In 2006 Cambodia became the first from Southeast Asia.

Taking the floor during the 2005 IWC Annual Meeting in Ulsan, Republic of Korea, where Japan’s expected majority had failed to materialize, Akira Nakamae, Deputy Director of the Fisheries Agency of Japan, boasted to the assembled delegates:

As has been revealed this year, our side’s supporters are about to reach a majority soon. Some of you are so glad that some poor pro-sustainable use countries could not attend this year’s meeting. However, next year they will all participate. The reversal of history, the turning point is soon to come.

Nothing quite so grand as a “reversal of history” occurred at the IWC meeting the following year. Japan and allies were defeated on all of the policy votes at the meeting. Only on the third day, with the late arrival of the delegates from Togo and The Gambia, a simple majority (33 votes to 32, with 4 abstentions) went in favour of the whalers for the first time in more than two decades, supporting a document called the St Kitts and Nevis Declaration.

The St Kitts and Nevis Declaration summed up Japan’s overall agenda, and indicated the direction it would take with majority control of the IWC. This statement, *inter alia*, declared the moratorium to be “no longer necessary”, reiterated Japanese claims that “whales consume huge quantities of fish making the issue a matter of food security” and gave blanket approval to the process of “normalization” of the IWC, launched by the Government of Japan in 2006 and followed by an informal meeting of some 36 IWC member states in Tokyo in February 2007, boycotted by most of the IWC’s conservation- or “like-minded” members.

With a simple majority, Japan would not be able actually to overturn binding decisions such as the 1982 moratorium decision or the 1994 Southern Ocean Whale Sanctuary, but it would be able to inflict severe damage on two decades of conservation achievements by the IWC. As Alternate Commissioner Joji Morishita said to reporters during the 2005 Annual meeting in Ulsan, South Korea: “*We have a long shopping list.*”4 With a simple majority in its favour the Japan whaling alliance could, for example, modify the agenda, deleting items not to its liking, pass resolutions supporting continuation and expansion of Japan’s “scientific whaling” programmes, call upon the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna (CITES) to downlist whale species and reconsider its relationship with the IWC, and introduce a secret ballot voting procedure.

As this report goes to press, Japan’s vote recruitment campaign has so far failed to produce a reliable simple majority for Japan. The one-vote majority that was achieved, briefly, at the St Kitts and Nevis meeting was not sustained at the 2007 Annual Meeting in Anchorage, Alaska, where all of Japan’s proposals were defeated. But the vote recruitment has contributed significantly to creating the stalemate that now characterises much of the IWC’s proceedings. Increasingly it would appear that this stalemate is, temporarily at least, a “second-best”

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option that actually suits the whaling interests in Japan and the other two whaling countries, Iceland and Norway. As reported in the Japan Times in February 2007:

Inside Japan, the government’s Fisheries Agency (FA) runs its own campaign almost completely free of critical scrutiny by the media or influence from the Foreign Office or other bodies that might urge compromise. Meanwhile, lawmakers back them at zero political cost and the tiny whaling industry happily survives on subsidies. The International Whaling Commission is impotent. Such is the strength of this collective lobby in Japan – and the IWC’s impotence – that some wonder whether the deadlock may continue forever.

This report looks at the recruitment campaign as well as at what the recruited countries are actually supporting at the IWC despite their claims to be defending “the sustainable use of marine living resources”. Not only are they backing the resumption and expansion of commercial whaling by Japan, Norway and Iceland (only one of the recruited countries, St Vincent and the Grenadines, hunts whales the catching of which is regulated by the IWC), but to have that resumption occur in a context wherein whales are viewed as serious competitors with humans for fish resources, thereby justifying a rejection of the precautionary management of any future whaling called for by existing international norms and by the ruinous history of commercial whaling itself.

5 St Vincent and the Grenadines in the Eastern Caribbean, which is allowed an annual take of humpback whales under the IWC’s “aboriginal subsistence” whaling provisions.
1. IWC membership.

1.1 Countries targeted by Japan’s vote recruitment campaign.

So far, 23 states have been recruited by Japan into the Commission since the start of Japan’s campaign to gain a majority, nearly half of them from West Africa. Three of these, Belize, Guatemala and Panama, later re-aligned themselves with the “like-minded” group. In the case of Nicaragua, following a change of Government in late 2006 the Foreign Ministry announced in April 2007 that Nicaragua would no longer support whaling at the IWC but that it favours whale protection, although for economic reasons was not able to attend the 2007 IWC meeting.

The remaining 19 recruited countries have joined eight others that have been members for far longer: the six countries of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) Antigua and Barbuda, Commonwealth of Dominica, Grenada, St Kitts and Nevis, St Lucia, St Vincent and the Grenadines, the Solomon Islands in the Pacific, and Senegal in West Africa, bringing, in early 2007, the total number of developing states now members of the IWC and expected to support Japan’s position to 27.

The eleven African countries, where one of Japan’s most intensive recruitment drives is concentrated, are: Republic of Guinea (2000), Morocco (2001), Benin and Gabon (2002), Mauritania (2003) and Cote d’Ivoire (2004). The Governments of Mali, Cameroon, Gambia (the only non-francophone) and Togo all joined the IWC in the inter-sessional period between the 2004 and 2005 Annual Meetings. Mali, Gambia and Togo did not participate in the 2005 Meeting but they arrived in St Kitts and Nevis and supported Japan’s position during the 2006 Meeting. Guinea-Bissau joined the Commission on the eve of the 2007 Annual Meeting and participated in support of Japan’s position.

Solomon Islands, for years the only Pacific island state in the IWC, supporting Japan’s position since it re-joined the IWC in 1993, was followed by Palau (2002) and Tuvalu (2004). Kiribati became a member in December 2004 and Nauru followed in the days before the start of the 2005 meeting; both supported Japan on most issues. Mongolia became a member state in 2002. Cambodia, which joined in 2006, became the first member state from Southeast Asia, followed in 2007 by Laos.

Having locked in the six OECS countries, Japan’s lobby has more recently recruited other countries from Central America and the Western Caribbean, though with less success: Belize and Nicaragua in 2003, Suriname in 2004 and Guatemala in 2006. Active efforts are being undertaken to bring in El Salvador and Honduras, but neither has yet joined.

Panama was also recruited by Japan, in 2001, but following a change of government and intense public activity it later re-aligned itself with the conservation-minded countries, participating in the 2005 and 2006 Annual Meeting as a “like-minded” country. Belize, which in an initial period of IWC membership 1982-1985 strongly supported conservation measures including the commercial whaling moratorium, re-joined the Commission in 2003 and at that first meeting supported Japan. It then did not attend the 2004 and 2005 meetings. In 2006 a delegation from Belize arrived at the St Kitts and Nevis meeting with a conservation brief, allying itself with the like-minded group.

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*Senegal has been an IWC member since 1982, originally supporting conservation measures. It fell into arrears with its annual dues and for many years did not participate in meetings. With changes to the IWC’s system of calculating annual fees Senegal negotiated a pay-back schedule with the IWC in 2003 and began voting again in 2004, aligned with Japan.*
1.2 CHANGES TO MEMBERSHIP FEES.

The IWC’s 2002 Annual Meeting in Shimonoseki approved an interim financial structure reducing the annual membership dues of developing countries initially by 50%, from £21,000 (at the time about US$ 30,000) to £10,500 (US$ 19,000). The dues for 2006/7 and 2007/8 have been reduced further, to between £4,375 (around U.S. $8,500) and £8,750 (around U.S. $17,000). To the Japan Whaling Association (JWA), the reduction of the dues was one of the “bright signs” of the Shimonoseki meeting, the lower rate “paving the way for broader participation by countries interested in the sustainable use of wildlife resources.” Even so, these yearly payments are still substantial, and travel, accommodation and per diem expenses of national delegations also add substantially to the total costs. Common sense dictates that many of these countries, including eleven currently classified as “Least Developed Countries” by the United Nations⁹, would not be able to fund their own participation in the IWC, despite the reduction in fees. In the face of limited resources, one must ask whether, as non-whaling countries, they would otherwise make participation in the IWC a priority. And although the fees are now lower, many countries, such as the six members from the Eastern Caribbean, were regularly paying the much higher fees for years.

Atherton Martin of Dominica wrote in 2001: “membership in the IWC involves an annual fee of 21,567.00 Pounds Sterling [approximately US$30,000] at a time when we are in arrears on payments to several important sub-Regional, Regional and International organizations more directly linked with economic prospects for the people of Dominica.” At times this has included the United Nations itself, where for periods in recent years Dominica has lost its right to vote in the General Assembly for non-payment of approximately US$17,000 in annual dues.

1.3 WHO PAYS THEM?

Martin claimed that successive governments have failed to answer requests for information as to who pays Dominica’s fees at the IWC. Anthony Browne of The Observer (U.K.) reported in 2001 that “Japan also pays Dominica’s … annual IWC membership fee. Japan denies it, but a Dominican Minister confirmed: ‘Put it like this, we make no allocation for it in our national budget.’” An Australian TV documentary, “The Whale Wars”, broadcast in July 2005 by the Australian Broadcasting Corporation’s “Four Corners” programme, found out why there was no allocation in the national budgets of two IWC member countries, confirming a modus operandi that is almost certainly more widespread.

In the Solomon Islands, Mr Albert Wata, the former Permanent Secretary of Fisheries and for ten years Solomon Islands’ IWC Commissioner, was asked by the interviewer, “Did the Japanese pay the IWC membership fees every year?” He replied: “…yes, the Japanese pay the government’s subscriptions. They support the delegations to the meetings, in terms of meeting airfares and per diem.”

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⁸ These eleven are: Benin, Cambodia, Gambia, Rep. of Guinea, Kiribati, Mali, Mauritania, Senegal, Solomon Islands, Togo, and Tuvalu. The LDCs are states recognized by the United Nations as amongst the most vulnerable of the international community, facing “structural handicaps”. Three basic criteria are used to determine whether a country is to be classified as an LDC, one of which is a three-year average gross domestic product per capita of less than US $750.
¹² www.abc.net.au/4corners/content/2005/s1417263.htm.
In the same broadcast, Wata’s successor as Commissioner, Nelson Kile, former Minister of Fisheries, also stated “The Japanese have paid our membership – I’m not really sure but probably for ten years, I think.”

Prior to the 2005 IWC Annual Meeting Solomon Islands Prime Minister Sir Allan Kemakeza pledged to visiting Australian Environment Minister Ian Campbell that his country would abstain on any vote regarding a resumption of commercial whaling. Instead, at the IWC meeting Fisheries Minister Paul Meanu not only voted for the Japanese proposal but also agreed to co-sponsor it. A subsequent investigation was ordered by the Prime Minister and in October 2005 Minister Maenu resigned. 13

In Grenada, fraud charges were brought in March 2003 against former Minister of Fisheries Michael Baptiste in connection with money transferred into his personal account from a foreign source intended to cover Grenada’s participation in the IWC. The former minister was charged with three counts of fraudulent breach of trust relating to the three years 1997-99 when he served as Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries in the current Administration; in that capacity he also represented Grenada at meetings of the IWC.

The “Four Corners” programme made public a letter [see Annex 1] dated 19th April 2002 from the Ministry of Finance of Grenada addressed to Mr Baptiste while he was still Opposition Leader stating “Upon review of our accounts, it has been observed that the contributions from the Government of Japan to the Government of Grenada for the International Whaling Commission were not received and as such was not reflected in the said accounts for the years 1998 and 1999. However, our internal audit revealed that contributions were received for all other years prior to and following 1998 and 1999. Moreover, the Japanese have confirmed that it made contributions to the Government of Grenada for the specified periods....”

According to a year-long investigation carried out by Caribupdate14, Baptiste was accused of keeping for himself three separate payments of GBP 24,400 (sent 7th May 1998, a few weeks before the start of the IWC Annual Meeting), GBP 21,000 (sent 17th February 1999, a few months before that year’s Annual Meeting, which was held in Grenada), and a further USD 3,000 sent on 25th February that year. The two large sums closely correspond to what were then Grenada’s annual dues to the IWC (approximately GBP 21,000). No one seems to contest that the funds were sent; a central question in the case revolves around whether Baptiste received the funds with the knowledge of the Government (as he contends) or whether he pocketed the money instead of turning it over to the Government.

The funds were reported to have come from a Houston, Texas-based Japanese-American businessman, Hideuki “Harry” Wakasa, who is described in Grenada Today as “believed to be the person who provided the bulk of funds for Grenada to attend meetings of the IWC and to support Japan’s position on whaling.”15 According to the Caribupdate investigation, “Baptiste himself is reported as saying that the money ‘is sent by persons or agents’16 who are looking for governments who support their views at the International Whaling Commission.” It is also reported that in a press conference “Baptiste confessed that ‘normally he and other government representatives sometimes collected money from ‘a man’ on airports when they

14 The use of “agents” emerged from investigations surrounding alleged ‘vote-buying’ by Japan to secure the 1998 Winter Olympics for the city of Nagano. A report by the bidding committee, released by the Minshichi Shimbon, showed that nearly US$18 million was spent on Nagano’s bid to host the Games. More than half apparently went into “public relations efforts”, including entertainment, payment to agents, air and hotel fees for visiting officials from the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and for trips of Nagano officials to IOC meetings abroad. Investigations were crippled when main accounting records were destroyed. Stories reported on http://sportsillustrated.cm.com/olympics/news/1999/01/17/nagano_report/ and ...1999/01/15/nagano_records.
were on their way to represent the country. No accounts were to be given either to the
government or donors about how these sums, allegedly ‘expense related’, were spent.”

In a 1993 interview for an earlier Australian documentary, then-Fisheries Minister, later
Prime Minister, the Hon. George Brizan, was asked who pays Grenada’s participation at the
IWC and responded by saying “it was financed by private sector people” – then after a pause
adds, “and by the Government of Grenada” and refused to clarify who the private sector
people might be.17

### Box 1: MEMBERSHIP PRIORITIES.

Even if the countries were able to pay themselves, one would wonder at their choice of
priorities. In fisheries matters, for example, all six Eastern Caribbean IWC members are also
members of the Western Central Atlantic Fisheries Commission (WECAFC), an FAO regional
fisheries body established in 1973 with direct relevance to the fisheries of these states. The
WECAFC, with 33 member states altogether, including distant water fishing nations such as
Japan, also hosts a Lesser Antilles Fisheries Committee. At the Ninth Session of WECAFC,
which met in Castries, St Lucia, 27-30 September 1999, discussion was held regarding the state
of large pelagic species in the WECAFC region. The following was noted in the final report
[FAO document: WECAFC/IX/99/2E]:

28. ICCAT [International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tuna] has a
Working Group on Western Atlantic Tropical Tunas (WATT) in which the coastal
large pelagics could be considered but, with a general low level of participation in
ICCAT and in WATT by WECAFC member countries, little attention has been
given to the most important species and stocks for WECAFC countries.

29. Many of the smaller Member Countries of WECAFC have been deterred
from joining ICCAT by the expenses associated with membership fees and
attending meetings (Mahon 1996) but it is widely recognised by the WECAFC
countries that they need to participate in appropriate regional bodies in dealing
with the large pelagics, both oceanic and coastal.1

ICCAT membership fees for the countries of the Lesser Antilles would be less than current
IWC membership and considerably less than IWC membership used to be.

In another, more recent example, the Convention on Migratory Species (CMS) has appealed to
Small Island Developing States (SIDS) to become Parties, noting their importance to migratory
species as well as the benefits that would accrue to them. These include technical support and
grants for research, capacity building and conservation activities, all of which would assist SIDS
members in implementing key elements of the Mauritius Strategy and the Convention on
Biodiversity (CBD)’s future Programme of Work on Island Biodiversity. In examples given by
the CMS, membership fees for SIDS at 2005 rates would have been in the order of US$41 for
states such as Palau and US$81 for Antigua and Barbuda and St Lucia.

A 2003 World Bank “Country Financial Accountability Assessment” of the six OECS
countries noted that: “Large amounts of aid are not brought to account in the main public
accounts, due to a failure of donors and project directors to report aid receipts and
expenditures promptly to the Accountant General.”18

17 Interview with the Hon. George Brizan, The Last Whale, Youngheart Productions. The film was released in 1994; the interview
took place in late 1993, the same year that Grenada joined the IWC with the stated position to oppose the Southern Ocean Whale
Sanctuary.
18 World Bank Report: Country Financial Accountability Assessment – Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, St Kitts and
Nevis, St Lucia, St Vincent and the Grenadines, April 30, 2003.
1.4 WHAT JAPAN CLAIMS IN ITS DEFENSE.

Japan refutes accusations of “vote-buying” with a standard claim:

*Japan is the world’s largest aid donor, providing aid to over 150 countries and this aid is not linked to the policies of recipient nations on specific issues….In fact, Japanese aid is provided to a large number of countries including India, Argentina, Brazil and Kenya that are opposed to Japan’s position on whaling*19

This statement is misleading in a number of ways.

The recruitment campaign is closely linked to one specific category of Japanese aid – Grant Aid for Fisheries and its related Technical Cooperation – not to Japan’s entire Official Development Assistance (ODA) programme. It is true that in any one year more than 150 countries receive some form of Japanese ODA, but far fewer receive fisheries grant aid and most of those are now IWC members supporting Japan. All five fisheries grant aid recipients in FY 2003, for example, were IWC members supporting Japan, as have been the majority in all subsequent years. [Disbursements of fisheries grant aid for each fiscal year since 1994 are listed in the tables in Appendix 2 of this report.]

Japan cites the examples of Argentina, Brazil, India and Kenya, but the amounts of fisheries aid received by these countries over the past decade and their size and economic conditions make comparison with the small island states of the Eastern Caribbean and South Pacific in particular absurd.

There have been no fisheries grant aid agreements with Argentina, Brazil or Kenya in the past decade. In the same period India received one US$10 million fisheries grant in 1997, representing only a very small percentage of the overall Japanese grant aid (all categories) agreed with India and a much smaller proportion of overall Japanese aid considering the many millions of dollars worth of loan aid also provided. There has also been some limited fisheries-related technical cooperation, for example to Argentina and Brazil (both strong supporters of the conservation position in the IWC). In contrast, fisheries grant aid represents *more than 95%* of the total grant aid that Japan has given to each of the 6 OECS countries in the same period and it is in those countries that the correlation between the provision of Japanese fisheries aid and votes in favour of Japan’s interests in the IWC is most striking. [See tables in Appendix 3]

While the granting of a multi-million dollar fisheries complex to any of the four large countries would, in itself, be unlikely to have significant political impact, a similar project in small states such as St Kitts and Nevis, with a population of around 40,000, and Palau with a population of 20,000, can have an enormous consequence for the recipient country’s political choices. A Canadian analysis of Japan’s ODA system commented, “In many developing countries, Japanese ODA provides an important portion of the overall government budget and Japan’s decisions on the allocations of funds have an important bearing on the recipient government’s policies and programs.”20

Most importantly, the claim that Japan’s aid “is not linked to the policies of recipient nations on specific issues” is demonstrably untrue, as will be discussed later in this report. In an early example, the Report of a symposium for Pacific Island states, held in Tokyo in October 1987, recorded that a representative of the Fisheries Agency of Japan told participants: “When the Japanese Government selects the countries to which it provides fisheries grants, criteria

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include that the recipient country must have a fisheries agreement with Japan and it must take a supportive position to Japan in various international organisations.”21

Much more recently, in February 2007 the Japan Times reported an interview with Japanese Parliamentarian Yoshimasa Hayashi, a “high-flyer” active in the Liberal Democratic Party’s Parliamentary Whaling League [see section 5.3], Senior Vice-Minister of the Cabinet Office, noting that “[b]ecause foreign aid was already used, in Hayashi’s words ‘with certain conditions’, and was ‘even given to anti-whaling countries’, he and other supporters of the Parliamentary Whaling League insisted that whaling – a matter of ‘important national interest’ – should be shoved near the top of the list of conditions.”22

In Guatemala, the Fisheries and Aquaculture Management Unit of the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Food, submitted an initial report to Congress in August 2004 recommending that Guatemala join the IWC. Among the reasons given in support of this recommendation was that “…Guatemala’s IWC membership and active participation will certainly bring a variety of international cooperation opportunities with tangible benefits,” in an apparent allusion to Japanese foreign aid.

Sir Ronald Sanders, former Antigua and Barbuda High Commissioner to the U.K., wrote in June 2006 in his column for the St Kitts/Nevis Sun that “…offers of aid come with an understanding (sometimes explicit), that a payback is expected. In relation to Japan, that payback is in votes at the IWC. There should be no doubt that Antigua & Barbuda, in addition to most of the OECS, are actively exchanging aid for votes at the IWC.”23

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21 Conference Report, Symposium on South Pacific Fisheries Development, Tokyo, 28 September–3 October 1987, Overseas Fisheries Cooperation Foundation, cited in Japan’s Aid Diplomacy and the Pacific Islands, Sandra Tarte, jointly published by National Centre for Development Studies (Australian National University) and the Institute of Pacific Studies (University of the South Pacific), 1998.
2. IWC support on Japan’s foreign policy agenda.

In her 1998 analysis of Japan’s “fisheries aid diplomacy”, Dr Sandra Tarte, senior lecturer in history and politics at the University of the South Pacific in Fiji, wrote that “Japan’s ability to project power through aid depends on a complex set of factors, not least the convergence of political interests in Japan, with policy actors working together rather than at odds.” This seems to be the case in the current IWC recruitment drive. While led by the Fisheries Agency bureaucrats assisted by entities such as the Overseas Fisheries Cooperation Foundation (OFCF) and the Institute for Cetacean Research (ICR) [See section 6], the campaign is fully supported by a powerful bloc of Parliamentarians [see Section 5] as well as by the Foreign Ministry and its Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA).

In the year between the 2004 and 2005 IWC Meetings alone, for example, three official trips were undertaken to Africa by Parliamentary Secretaries for Foreign Affairs to discuss cooperation in internationals bodies including the IWC. Parliamentary Secretary Kazunori Tanaka traveled to Madagascar, Malawi and Uganda 29 August-9 September 2004 in part to “try to promote cooperative relations in the international arena on such issues as obtaining a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council [a short-term goal for Japan for the 2005-2006 period], Security Council reform [the longer term goal of obtaining a permanent seat as part of an overall reform of the Security Council structure] and the International Whaling Commission.” He was followed in January 2005 by his colleague Itsunori Onodera who called on Cameroon, Gabon and Senegal; in all countries he discussed “cooperation in the international arena”, and in Gabon paid a visit to the Owendo Communal Fisheries Centre, a project run by the Overseas Fisheries Cooperation Foundation (OFCF). Cameroon joined the IWC five months later just before the 2005 Annual Meeting. It received its first fisheries grant aid project, 400 million Yen for development of an artisanal fisheries centre, on 15 March 2005. Onodero briefly joined the Japanese delegation at the 2006 IWC meeting in St Kitts and Nevis, and was given something close to celebrity treatment by other delegation members and the Japanese press corps on his arrival at the meeting site. In February 2005 Parliamentary Secretary Katsuyuki Kawai, on a visit to the Republic of Guinea, met the President, the Foreign Minister and Minister of Fisheries and Aquaculture Ibrahim Sory Touré (also Guinea’s IWC Commissioner) who “expressed his gratitude for Japan’s cooperation...[and] the two then exchanged opinions on cooperation regarding the International Whaling Commission.”

Another indication of the extent of the Foreign Ministry’s and JICA’s involvement in the recruitment drive comes from the recent membership of land-locked Mongolia, since 2002. Mongolia, having no fisheries, does not receive fisheries grant aid, but Japan has been the largest overall aid donor to Mongolia since 1991 and its economic cooperation and aid accounts for “approximately one-third of total aid for Mongolia by foreign countries and international organizations”.

The Foreign Ministry has also hosted pre-IWC planning and briefing sessions in Tokyo for the representatives of the countries recruited by Japan; a recent example was a May 2006 gathering for delegates from at least 26 allied states in the IWC. Every year it co-hosts, with

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24 Tarte, Sandra, Japan’s Aid Diplomacy and the Pacific Islands, jointly published by the National Centre for Development Studies (Australian National University) and the Institute of Pacific Studies (University of the South Pacific), 1998.
26 Ibid.
27 Information from the Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs website: www.mofa.go.jp.
an organization called the Association for Comparative Study of Legal Cultures, an international symposium on a whaling theme. The 2007 Conference, held in March, discussed “Recent Trend of the Management of Marine Living Resources: Possibility and Limitation of Ecosystem Approaches.” These symposia are geared towards “members of foreign embassies in Tokyo, researchers, students and NGO-related persons.”

The issue is effectively backed by high enough level interests frequently to make it onto the agenda of heads of state meetings. At a summit meeting on 17 June 2004 between then Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and Mr Enrique Bolanos Geyer, at the time President of the Republic of Nicaragua, for example, Koizumi’s office reported that “At the meeting, Prime Minister Koizumi expressed his appreciation for Nicaragua’s support for the position of Japan over the issue of whaling. In response, President Bolanos took note of the recent Japan-North Korea meeting …. Further, President Bolanos requested for Japan to expand its investment into Central American countries.” One month after the Summit meeting, Nicaragua supported Japan on every issue at the 2004 IWC meeting; a week later, Japan announced the cancellation of US$118.4 million of Nicaragua’s debt. Japan was committed to providing debt relief to Nicaragua anyway through its participation in the World Bank’s Enhanced HIPC Initiative. Under this scheme Nicaragua reached its “completion point” in January 2004, the point at which creditors participating in the Initiative “commit irrevocably to debt relief”; but even with this strategic timing by Tokyo the relief decision appeared linked to Nicaragua’s performance at the IWC, and this is how it was portrayed in the Nicaraguan press.

Just two weeks before the start of the 2006 Annual Meeting, Antigua and Barbuda’s Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, the Hon. Baldwin Spencer, met with then Prime Minister Koizumi in Tokyo for the Japan-Antigua and Barbuda Summit Meeting. According to Koizumi’s office, “The summit touched on the annual meeting of the International Whaling Commission (IWC) scheduled in June. Prime Minister Koizumi asked for cooperation on the whaling issue from the standpoint of the sustainable use of living marine resources, and Prime Minister Spencer supported the idea.”

Indeed, it appears that support for Japan in the IWC is, for selected countries, now one of the issues at the top of the Japanese Government’s foreign policy agenda. For example, when the presidents of Costa Rica, Guatemala and Honduras, and the vice-presidents of El Salvador, Nicaragua, Panama and the Dominican Republic met former Prime Minister Koizumi in Tokyo on 18 August 2005 for the Japan-Central America Summit Meeting, Koizumi reported at the post-Summit press conference that “Japan and the Central American countries must cooperate in dealing with the global issues” and he specified four: “the UN reform, World Trade Organisation (WTO), International Whaling Commission (IWC) and the environment.”

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30 www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/koizumiphoto/2004/06/17nicaragua_e.html
32 Heavily Indebted Poor Countries.
33 www.worldbank.org
34 In early April 2005 conclusion of an agreement with JICA for construction of a fish trade and storage centre in Southern San Juan, Nicaragua was announced by Nicaragua’s IWC Commissioner, Miguel Mareno, director of the Nicaraguan Ministry of Promotion, Industry and Commerce’s (MIFIC) National Fisheries and Aquaculture Management Division (ADPESCA). The official Exchange of Notes for nearly 12 million Yen of grant aid for the San Juan project was signed 4 June 2005.
35 www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/koizumiphoto/2006/06/01antigua_e.html
36 www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/koizumiphoto/2005/08/18yuubes_e.html

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The whaling/fishing industry and its associated non-governmental associations also play a role in the recruitment drive although they are less in the public eye. The industry’s role was referred to in the Japanese press, for example, during Japan’s campaign against the Southern Ocean Whale Sanctuary in the early 1990s. Following the visit of Dominica’s then IWC Commissioner in March 1993 to the whaling town of Oshika in Miyagi Prefecture, where he expressed his country’s support for Japanese whaling, the Yomiuri Shim bun reported: “This is a product, also, of the ‘vote consolidation operation’ by government and industry circles together.” Sandra Tarte wrote: “The OFCF has long been used to bypass bureaucratic red tape and facilitate various special regional projects….Other channels include Japanese companies operating in the region. For example, when funding Solomon Islands’ membership of the International Whaling Commission, financial support was allegedly channeled through the Japanese joint venture partner Maruha, formerly Taiyo Gyogyo, which had operated a fish cannery in Solomon Islands since 1973.”

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37 Yomiuri Shim bun, 13 April 1993
38 Ibid.
3. Japan’s fisheries aid.

It is clear that the impetus for and strategic planning of the recruitment campaign originates within Japan’s fisheries administration in coordination with an influential and active group of parliamentarians. It is unlikely that the Government would otherwise dedicate what must be massive human and financial resources to conduct and maintain this campaign. With the exception of land-locked Mongolia, all of the new member countries have had or continue to have a fisheries relationship with Japan, be it through bilateral aid, technical cooperation, fisheries access agreements, commercial agreements and/or common memberships in regional and international fisheries bodies where Japan is concentrating efforts to achieve support for its policy objectives. Fisheries aid is one of most important diplomatic tools available to the Government and its use, particularly in the case of the six OECS countries of the Eastern Caribbean, has been a hallmark of Japan’s IWC recruitment campaign and will be further examined here.

3.1 Grant Aid for Fisheries.

Grant Aid for Fisheries is one of ten official categories of Japan’s overall grant aid programme and now represents around 3% of the overall grant aid budget. Grant Aid for Fisheries, like most other categories of Japanese grant aid, has been gradually reduced in recent years, from an average of 10 billion Yen in the 1990s to 5.6 billion Yen (roughly US$ 50 million) in Fiscal Year 2005.

Japan’s ODA in general is characterised by a heavy emphasis on infrastructure projects, making it unique among the major OECD donor countries. The fisheries grant aid programme is no exception. “Grant Aid for Fisheries…covers the construction of fisheries training and research centers, fisheries training ships, fishing ports and other facilities”. This focus on infrastructure is not without consequence, particularly in the smaller countries. [See section 5.2.]

3.2 Technical Cooperation.

Additional assistance in the fisheries sector can be provided through two other channels: (a) Japan’s Technical Cooperation programme, administered by the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) but with extensive involvement by the Fisheries Agency, and (b) through the “technical cooperation for fisheries development” programme of the Overseas Fisheries Cooperation Foundation (OFCF), a semi-governmental agency funded by the Fisheries Agency (see below). Usually when a major project is funded through fisheries grant aid it is backed up by technical cooperation.

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39 The others, according to the Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, are: Grant Aid for Underpriviledged Farmers (formerly Grant Aid for Increase of Food Production), Food Aid, Emergency Grant Aid, Cultural Grant Aid, Grant Aid for Scholarship and Research, Grant Assistance for Grassroots Human Security Projects, Non-Project Grant Aid, Grant Aid for Support of NGOs, and Grant Aid for General Projects. Source: http://web-japan.org/stat/stats/23ODA62.html. Japanese ODA also includes Loan Aid, but as fisheries projects are rarely the subject of loans it is not considered here.

40 Ibid.

41 Beaudry-Somecnsky and Chris M. Cook, IDRI, Canada, op. cit.

42 Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “A Guide to Japan’s Aid: Grant Aid Schemes in Brief”.

43 Details of technical cooperation granted to any individual country are not provided in the English-language material published by MoFA so it has not yet been possible to say what share consists of fisheries-related projects.
3.3 ORIGINS OF THE GRANT AID FOR FISHERIES PROGRAMME.

The Government of Japan launched the fisheries grant aid programme in 1973. Dr Sandra Tarte has noted in her study of Japan’s fisheries aid to the South Pacific that in its early years this programme was almost entirely focused on South Pacific island states where it was used to ensure Japanese access to the fishing zones around these countries and to assist Japanese firms in their fisheries-related joint ventures with them.44 She writes, too, of the “economic self-interest inherent in Japan’s fisheries diplomacy”, which has occasionally caused conflict with “the diplomatic imperative of creating goodwill and a positive image as an aid donor”45.

3.4 ROLE OF THE FISHERIES AGENCY OF JAPAN AND THE OVERSEAS FISHERIES COOPERATION FOUNDATION (OFCF).

Tarte reports that although the fisheries grant aid budget is formally under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), “the Fisheries Agency makes the main decisions over allocation”. In a complicated system of inter-ministerial cross-postings, the Fisheries Agency’s agenda is well safeguarded. Links between the JFA and MoFA are facilitated by a Fisheries Agency official working within MoFA’s Grant Aid Division who handles grant aid requests. “According to a Fisheries Agency official”, Tarte writes, “this secondment is the ‘secret’ to the Fisheries Agency’s ‘control’ over grant aid policy.”46

According to Tarte, the Fisheries Agency had pressed for its own aid organisation to be established, but when this proposal was not accepted the JFA established “its own channel for cooperation”, the Overseas Fisheries Cooperation Foundation (OFCF).47 The OFCF was created in 1973, the same year that the grant aid for fisheries programme was launched. It is a semi-governmental, non-profit organisation funded almost entirely by the Fisheries Agency. The OFCF was “established as a joint initiative of the Fisheries Agency and industry groups, to subsidise cooperation between Japan’s distant-water fishing fleets or trading companies and coastal states.”48

The OFCF has gradually taken on a role similar to JICA through its technical cooperation programme. Recipient countries can request OFCF assistance directly or through private Japanese companies, but the requests must be approved by the Fisheries Agency.49

The OFCF’s technical cooperation for fisheries development programme was started in the late 1980s and is intended only for countries with which Japan has bilateral fisheries relations, which would explain why there has been little involvement of the OFCF in the six Eastern Caribbean states, none of which has a fisheries agreement with Japan. Like fisheries grant aid generally, the OFCF programme is intended “to contribute to securement [sic] of fishing rights and interests of Japan.”50

There are several categories of OFCF technical cooperation. “Project-type technical cooperation” involves sending Japanese experts to recipient countries, provision of equipment and materials and training. These projects are carried out in the recipient countries and usually last for 3 to 5 years, although they can be extended for longer periods. In another programme, the OFCF also hosts “overseas fisheries trainees”, bringing students from aid-recipient countries for one of seven training courses, in areas such as fish processing, aquaculture, fishing methods and fishing vessel repair. A third programme involves the

41 Tarte, p. 24.
42 Tarte, p. 6.
43 Tarte, p. 55.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
recruitment and training of Japanese fisheries experts to be dispatched to aid-recipient countries to help implement Japanese fisheries aid projects.

The OFCF also runs a project called “Promotion of exchange visits of key fishery personnel”. According to the OFCF, the purpose of this programme is to “invite key fisheries personnel from countries concerned to deepen mutual understanding by providing a firsthand look at Japanese fisheries facilities and organizing meetings with leading personnel from the Fisheries Agency of Japan and the Japanese fishing industry.” Visits are usually for one or two weeks and are made at OFCF’s expense. This programme has been identified as one of the key components of Japan’s recruitment drive as it facilitates the cultivation of individuals groomed and rehearsed to espouse Japan’s policies at home, in the IWC and often in other international bodies as well. Fisheries ministers and senior fisheries officials from the targeted recipient countries are regularly brought to Japan under this programme where they are given special treatment and are schooled in Japan’s policies. In the preparations for the 1993 IWC meeting in Kyoto, when Japan was intent on blocking France’s proposal for the Southern Ocean Whale Sanctuary, this OFCF programme was specifically named in the Japanese press as being part of the lobbying efforts. Said the Yomiuri Shimbun: “behind the stage of the IWC meeting, the actual international politics are in a whirl. Fisheries Agency officials went to places like Pacific Ocean island countries and countries of the Caribbean this year, and those countries’ representatives are now coming to Japan one after another on the invitation of the Overseas Fisheries Cooperation Foundation and others.”

Atherton Martin of Dominica told the BBC in a November 2000 interview: “We are aware that there are several senior members of the fisheries divisions throughout the Caribbean who have developed a ‘special relationship’ with Japan. They travel to Japan. They are on the receiving end of enormous amounts of information.” Anthony Browne, writing in May 2001 in “The Observer” (UK), reported that “Many senior politicians and officials are wooed to Japan on all-expense paid trips. Dominica’s Ministers have enjoyed a string of overseas trips with lavish VIP treatment normally reserved for royalty. [Lloyd] Pascal … [then] Fisheries Minister, has been on two trips to Japan in the last year.”

Gabon’s then Minister of Fisheries, Dr Robert Onouviet, signed a fisheries agreement during an OFCF-sponsored visit to Tokyo in 28 March-3 April 2000 allowing Japanese long liners to fish for tuna inside Gabon’s maritime zone (beyond 12 miles), and on the same occasion Japan agreed to support development of Gabon’s artisanal fisheries sector. An exchange of notes for construction of an artisanal fisheries centre at Port Gentil was signed later that year. Gabon’s Council of Ministers approved Gabon’s adherence to the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW) – and thus its membership in the IWC – on 4 April 2002, on the recommendation of the Fisheries Minister.

In a more recent example, the Vice-Minister of Natural Resources and Tourism for Tanzania [not an IWC member, as this report goes to press], accompanied by other “high-ranking officials”, was invited to Japan in early 2007 by the OFCF. During a meeting with the Director of the Fisheries Agency it is reported that the two officials discussed the “sustainable utilization of whales” and the Vice-Minister stated that Tanzania would “like to join the IWC before this year’s annual meeting if things go well.”

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51 Yomiuri Shimbun, 13 April 1993.
52 BBC “Newnight”, transcript of interview with Atherton Martin, November 2000.
53 The Observer (U.K.), Anthony Browne op. cit.
3.5 THE FISHERIES GRANT AID PROCESS.

Official information available from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs explains that all grant aid must be “request-based”, that is, that the aid cycle must begin with a request from the potential recipient government. But, as reported by Tarte and others, the requests are often initiated directly by the Japanese Government and/or by private Japanese companies. In the case of fisheries grant aid, the Fisheries Agency “seeks to control all project identification work… [in order] to maintain a close link between aid and its fisheries interests overseas.”56 This work is undertaken by the OFCF, which is “entrusted by the Japanese Government (Fisheries Agency) to conduct project finding, which is to be carried out by the Government…”57 Private consulting firms are also sometimes engaged in the process. In the area of fisheries aid, the Overseas Agro-Fishing Consultants Co., Ltd. (OAFIC) of Tokyo, for example, is often used in the project identification process as well as in other aspects, such as feasibility studies, design and supervision of the projects once they are underway.

A request for grant aid, once formulated, is then sent through the relevant Japanese diplomatic mission to the Grant Aid Division within the Economic Cooperation Bureau (ECB) of MoFA. In the case of the Eastern Caribbean states, the relevant Japanese mission is the embassy based in Trinidad and Tobago. Japan has embassies also in Guatemala and Nicaragua (Belize is represented through the Embassy in Mexico), in a number of West African countries, including Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire (which also represents Benin and Togo), Gabon, Republic of Guinea, Morocco and Senegal (representing also Gambia, Mali and Mauritania), as well as in the South Pacific, including Marshall Islands, Palau and Solomon Islands. Kiribati, Nauru and Tuvalu are represented through the Embassy in Fiji. Japanese Embassies are also found in Cambodia and Mongolia. Officials of the Fisheries Agency are sometimes posted to embassies in countries where there are important fisheries interests.58

The ECB is divided into regions, and the head of each regional division usually receives the relevant request. It is up to that person to liaise with the relevant ministries and government agencies. In the case of fisheries aid requests the relevant agency is the Fisheries Agency. It is normal for each regional division to lobby for “its” countries, as do the different ministries. The project then passes through a screening committee within MoFA’s Grant Aid Division that decides whether or not to proceed with a “basic design study” (in the case of a country that has received aid before). JICA is responsible for the study but in the case of a fisheries project the team leader and members of the study team would be fisheries officials. It is the responsibility of this team to estimate project costs, after which MoFA must obtain funding approval from the Ministry of Finance. Only at that point can the final negotiations over a draft Exchange of Notes take place with the recipient country. The Project is then sent to the Japanese Cabinet for approval, which is usually a formality, and the Exchange of Notes can then be signed. It is normally at this point that the project becomes public knowledge. Tarte reports that the time between submission of a request for grant aid to execution of the project can be three or more years, although “if there is strong interest in promoting aid relations with a recipient, political support in Japan may expedite a project.”59

Funds are usually paid out throughout the duration of the project, typically beginning with a payment of 30%. Projects are expected to be completed in one year, but can, exceptionally, be extended for longer, in which case they are often divided into year-long “phases”. Primary contracts for construction projects, such as the building of fisheries complexes, are required to be given to Japanese companies, which may then offer sub-contracts to local enterprises.

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56 Tarte, p. 40.
57 www.ofcf.or.jp/English/3/3-4.html
4. Further considerations regarding Japan’s overseas development assistance (ODA).

4.1 Fisheries aid as strategic policy tool.

In an April 2006 Associated Press story, Kaoru Tsurita, a spokesman for the Japanese Embassy in Trinidad and Tobago, said that Japan doesn’t buy votes. “Our aid,” he is quoted as saying, “is not tied to policy.”60 But in January 2006 Japanese media reported that, by decision of then Prime Minister Koizumi and his Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), “Japan is forming a committee to oversee foreign aid, and make it more of a strategic tool in achieving its foreign policy goals... [Former] Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and the ruling Liberal Democratic Party made the decision Sunday, giving it the working name of ‘the external economic cooperation strategic council.’”61 The panel “aims to shift more power to politicians from bureaucrats in devising plans for disbursing ODA, which has become an important tool in the pursuit of foreign policy goals,” sources said.62 The committee “will be expected to devise ways to use aid effectively in accomplishing such objectives as attaining permanent membership in the U.N. Security Council.”63 Various reasons have been given for Japan’s insistence on the whaling issue, and the disproportionately large amount of financial and political resources that it commits to fighting for an industry that has and would continue to have only a tiny role in the Japanese economy. Japanese officials such as Joji Morishita often point to a matter of principle, claiming that “Once the principle of treating wildlife as sustainable resource is compromised, it would be a domino effect in which our right to exploit other fish and animal products would be infringed upon.”64

But inevitably the declining state of world fisheries has, in the past decade or more, gradually pushed fisheries issues onto the international environmental and wildlife conservation agendas, just as the near-destruction of the world’s great whale populations by commercial whaling did for the whaling issue. And finding fisheries issues placed in an environmental context clearly worries Japan’s fishing interests.

In its attempt to reshape the international agenda to one more supportive of Japan’s national interests, Japan has turned to developing countries, arguing that they must work together to “defend” the principle of “sustainable use” of marine resources. And in this process Japan has again used its fisheries aid to help it. Tarte wrote, regarding the eventually successful UN efforts against the destructive practice of high seas driftnet fishing, that “[a]t the height of the driftnet controversy, allegations of aid pressure were prominent in media reports (see, for example, The Fiji Times, 31.07.1989:11)65 She also cites a statement from one of Japan’s daily fisheries newspapers, the Minato Shim bun, noting that “[a]t the time of the 1989 South Pacific Forum meeting, there was some expectation, according to Japanese media reports, that Pacific island countries would not introduce ‘firm measures’ against driftnetting because of the

62 Kyodo News Service, 16 January 2006, “Japan plans strategic panel to achieve foreign policy goals”.
64 Asahi Shim bun, 29.11.2002, “Japanese whaling policy leads many observers to wonder what motivates the Japanese to continue hunting whales at the risk of antagonizing Western countries”, by Takashi Kanamitsu.
65 Tarte, p. 140
importance of Japan’s aid to the region. This aid afforded certain ‘protection’ of Japan’s interests.”

JICA itself now describes the benefits of the Fisheries Grant Aid programme as such: “Grant aid for fisheries has also contributed to a global increase in the number of countries understanding Japan’s position...An example of this can be seen with the Caribbean island countries where the provision of grant aid for fisheries has enabled these countries, surrounded by sea, to use fishing as a large source of income in addition to tourism and banana production. As a result, these countries understood and promoted for international cooperation for sustainable use and conservation of marine living resources.”

As explained by Tarte, “[i]n the early 1970s, a special category of grant aid for fisheries was introduced to secure access for Japanese fleets to developing country fishing zones, as well as to support the operations of Japanese firms in fisheries-related joint ventures with developing countries.” But Japanese fisheries aid has evolved over the years and recently has acquired a new objective. Tarte wrote:

*Fisheries or marine sector aid acquired a new role, beginning in the 1990s, of building support for Japan in environmental areas. This was in the face of growing pressure on Japan’s fishing operations, beginning with the drift-net fishing controversy in 1989. Using aid to build diplomatic support for Japan in fisheries (and related) areas has come to rival the traditional role of aid, which was to facilitate access for fishing operations in coastal states’ EEZs.*

*It is no secret that a key political objective of Japan’s aid to the Pacific island region is to secure support for Japan’s position in international forums on those issues of national importance. The island states form a valuable cluster of votes, especially at the United Nations, and the region is regularly lobbied to support Japan’s candidature for such things as a seat on the UN Security Council.”*

The same can be said of the Caribbean, where Japan (through the Foreign Ministry) has held annual consultations with the now 15-member Caribbean Community (CARICOM, including all six OECS countries, Belize and Suriname) since 1993. The report of the Fourth Consultation, held in September 1996 in Barbados, concluded that “Japan...clearly recognize[s] the importance of thirteen votes [CARICOM had 13 members at the time] cast en bloc in international organizations and are determined to court that vote, especially in relation to their long-term goal of securing permanent membership of the UN Security Council.”

Japan has made similar calculations regarding African states. The 2006 edition of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Diplomatic Bluebook notes that “Japan is proactively carrying out discussions with and encouraging African countries to cooperate to realize its own ideas. There are 53 countries in Africa...they carry considerable weight in the decision-making at international fora, where in many cases voting is carried out on a one-country-one-vote basis.” The report continues, “Japan is working to build cooperative relations with Africa as the continent could be a powerful partner for Japanese diplomacy in the international community...In the June [2005] meeting of the International Whaling Commission (IWC), most African member states shared Japan’s position to support sustainable whaling.”

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68 Tarte 1998.
69 Tarte 2002.
70 www.mofa.go.jp.
CARICOM as such has not yet been involved in the IWC or the whaling issue, nor do the six OECS countries speak on behalf of the Caribbean as a whole although they often claim to. An editorial published in the Jamaica Observer immediately after the St Kitts and Nevis IWC meeting commented, “We do not get the sense that these six countries consulted with Caricom before casting their votes on this issue. If that is so, we would like to know why. For we have always held that if the Caribbean is to be recognized and respected internationally, the region must speak as a united voice on issues affecting us.”

Apart from the vexing issue of the shipment of spent nuclear fuel, plutonium and High-Level radioactive wastes through the Caribbean Sea along the route from Europe to Japan, which CARICOM regularly but unsuccessfully protests in its Consultations with Japan, positive relations continue to grow between the two sides. The new CARICOM Headquarters building in Georgetown, Guyana, inaugurated in February 2005, was built with the help of a large grant from the Government of Japan. In January 2007 Japan appointed its Ambassador to Trinidad and Tobago (covering also the six OECS countries), Koichiro Seki, as its first Plenipotentiary Representative to the Caribbean Community.

At the Seventh CARICOM-Japan Consultation, which took place 8-9 November 1999 in Georgetown, Guyana, “the Japanese Side mentioned the importance of closer cooperation with CARICOM Member States in international fora such as the International Whaling Commission (IWC)”, as well as encouraging CARICOM members to support Japan for the Security Council seat. That meeting occurred as Japan’s latest recruitment drive was in full swing. Within a few years Belize and Suriname were to have joined the IWC, and efforts were underway in Guyana and Jamaica.

The First Japan-CARICOM Ministerial Level Meeting (involving Foreign Ministers) took place in Tokyo in November 2000, where a “New Framework for Japan-CARICOM Cooperation for the Twenty-First Century” was agreed. Subsequently “Japan decided to make its governmental contribution from the fiscal 2001 budget, amounting to 100,000 US dollars, to the Japan-CARICOM Friendship and Cooperation Fund to support projects to strengthen friendly and cooperative relations between Japan and the CARICOM countries. Additional donations to the Fund from Japan's private sector have been made.” The Fund allows Japan “to provide technical assistance to CARICOM Member States which would not otherwise qualify for assistance under the usual conditions of Japan’s development assistance programme.”

The Eleventh Japan-CARICOM Consultation took place in Tokyo, 16-17 February 2006. The meeting, inter alia, finalised preparations for the Second Ministerial-level meeting, to be hosted by Antigua and Barbuda probably in late 2007. According to the Final Communiqué of this Consultation, the meeting discussed a Joint Action Plan for consideration by the upcoming Ministerial-level meeting. Participants agreed that the Action Plan would be based on two “critical pillars”: “Partnership for Stability and Development” and “Enhancement of Cooperation in International Fora”. This latter phrase is usually shorthand for support for reform of the U.N. Security Council including a Permanent Seat for Japan, support of Japan in the IWC and mutual support in meetings of the World Trade Organisation (WTO).

72 www.mofa.go.jp/region/latin/caricom/coop0202.html
In the area of fisheries assistance, Japan is working with CARICOM fisheries officials and staff to develop a “Fisheries Master Plan” to provide support to the Caribbean Regional Fisheries Mechanism (CRFM) headquartered in Belize. Concurrently Japan has been funding and providing technical support to a controversial five-year “ecosystem” study under the auspices of FAO focusing on marine mammal – fisheries interactions in the Lesser Antilles [see section 6.5], the results of which “will be provided as draft ecosystem-based fisheries management plans.” All six OECS countries, as well as Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago are participating in the project. It is not clear whether the outcome of this project will have any bearing on the Japanese-led “Master Plan” for the entire region.

Professor Tatsuro Matsuoka of Kagoshima Fisheries University was for a while leader of the Project Formulation Study Team dispatched by JICA in September, 2003 “to analyze the fisheries sector, to propose a tentative direction of a Development Study to be conducted by Japan for the sector, and to pursue … JICA’s technical cooperation for the sector in CARICOM…member states.” He explained that the Caribbean region “is not popular in Japan but it has a range of implication[s] in Japan’s technical cooperation.” Noting that Japan “seeks a possibility of regional approaches in technical cooperation for its higher efficiency”, and that CARICOM was in need of a regional approach to fisheries, Prof. Matsuoka wrote that “The CARICOM region is, therefore, one of the typical regions suitable to potential regional technical cooperation because of its nature.” He added: “It is also well known that some Caribbean countries have subsisten[ce] whaling that is similar to those in Japan.”

4.2 INFRINGEMENT OF SOVEREIGNTY.

It is the sometimes extortionary nature of Japan’s fisheries aid diplomacy that lies at the heart of accusations of vote-buying.

Tarte has noted, for example, the “tendency among some policymakers and fisheries industry officials…simply to pressure countries to support Japan in international fora, using aid as a negative sanction.” She notes that “Pacific Island countries have … experienced the negative effects of political intervention in Japan’s aid decision-making. On one level this refers to the use of aid to threaten, punish or cajole states. All countries in the region, from the largest (Papua New Guinea) to the smallest (Tuvalu), have at times experienced these pressures, especially in respect to fisheries access agreements.” In Papua New Guinea, for example, in 1987 negotiations between the Japanese and PNG on renewal of access agreements broke down. As it was reported in a 2001 article, “The two sides at that time were unable to resolve issues, particularly the level of access fees. Mr Ganararo [then Minister of Fisheries and Marine Resources] said, as a result, PNG had foregone considerable revenue from access fees as well as Japanese aid to the fisheries sector, during the past 13 years.”

An early example of this sort of pressure in the IWC context came from Seychelles in the Indian Ocean. Seychelles joined the IWC in 1979, where it made its successful proposal, with support from the entire Indian Ocean region, for establishment of the Indian Ocean Whale Sanctuary. It also supported many other conservation measures that year. In 1980, following a request for financial assistance from Japan to develop its fisheries, the Seychelles Government

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73 Report of 12th Session, Western Central Atlantic Fishery Commission (WECAFC), Port-of-Spain, 25-28 October 2005, WECAFC/XII/05/7E.
74 Matsuoka, Tatsuro, Professor, Faculty of Fisheries, “Regional Fisheries Technical Cooperation in Caribbean Region”, www.kagoshima-u.ac.jp/pub/newsletter2/page2.html.
75 Tarte, p.140 and p. 15.
was officially informed by Japan’s Ambassador to Kenya, Senkuro Saiki, that a grant would not be possible unless Seychelles modified its position at the IWC.

Ambassador Saiki wrote to the Seychelles Minister of Planning and Development, Dr M. J. Ferrari, on 14 November 1980, in correspondence that was later made public in the Seychelles press and reprinted in full in a Hong Kong newspaper:

I have the honour to refer to your letter dated October 23, 1980, in which you inquired as to whether the Japanese Government is prepared to finance a fisheries research/training vessel project in Seychelles….However, the fact of the matter is that my Government is having difficulties in coordinating divergent views concerning the extension of such a grant to your country. In particular, the fishery industries in Japan strongly oppose the grant in view of your country’s stand at IWC. Therefore, in view of this, all I can say at this time is that if in future your Government should change its attitude at IWC towards Japan, there would be a possibility of my Government extending the grant to Seychelles.

Minister Ferrari responded on 28 November 1980:

My Government was shocked by the attitude that consideration of this project was linked to our stand at the IWC. The Seychelles Government considers that it is undignified for a nation to try to impose its views on another through economic cooperation and also equally undignified for a nation to accept conditions contrary to what it believes in order to receive assistance from another country. Such a situation does not represent cooperation but domination.79

Two years later, Seychelles was offered £20 million in aid by the Government of Japan if it would withdraw its proposal for the moratorium on commercial whaling and dismiss its delegation. Seychelles refused and the moratorium was adopted.80 Seychelles eventually withdrew from the IWC in 1994.

Although there have been few glimpses into the negotiation process within the recipient countries, political figures from the South Pacific and the Caribbean have recently confirmed that Japanese emissaries have insisted on tying discussions of future aid to the recipient countries’ position on whaling.

Tongan MP Samiu Vaipulu, for example, interviewed on Australia’s “The World Today” programme during the 2001 IWC meeting (Tonga is not an IWC member), stated that “There was a team that came into Tonga last year and I was chosen from our Parliament to meet them, with the Speaker. And in the agenda they had whaling and Japanese grant as one item. To which I objected.”81

Atherton Martin of Dominica reported Japan taking the same approach there while he was Minister. “The Japanese Ambassador,” he told The Observer, “had flown in from Trinidad to talk about whaling, but insisted on tying the subject to aid.” As Martin answered that Dominica’s priority was renewable energy, the ambassador stared out of the window, and simply said, ‘Fisheries’.”82

More evidence of Japan’s pressure on Dominica came to light following Martin’s resignation in 2000 as Fisheries Minister. What happened to lead to Martin’s resignation was described in The Times (U.K.): “Mr Martin was overruled at the meeting by his Prime Minister, Roosevelt (Rosie) Douglas, who instructed the Dominican delegation to vote with Japan – a move which violated his Cabinet’s agreement to abstain. Mr Martin said that Japanese officials had visited

79 Correspondence reprinted in the South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), 4 June 1982, “BLACKMAIL! Japan’s Last Desperate Tactic” by Peter Humphrey.
80 The Observer (U.K.), 25 July 1982. “Japan Offered Aid Deal of £20m in Bid to Kill Whaling Ban”, by Geoffrey Lean.
82 The Observer, Browne, op. cit.
the Prime Minister and had threatened to withdraw aid for a new fisheries complex if Dominica abstained on the critical [South Pacific] sanctuary issue. Japan had given Dominica, which has a population of 70,000, about £4.5 million for fisheries facilities since joining the IWC, and Japan paid its registration fees at the commission, he said. He said five other islands – Grenada, St Vincent, St Lucia, Antigua, St Kitts and Nevis – had also ‘succumbed to the same extortionary tactics of Japan.’ ‘Frankly, they [the Japanese] are relentless, very pushy and aggressive and I think a lot of our governments cave in,’ he said.83

In an interview on BBC’s Newsnight in November that year, Martin confirmed: “They announced that if they couldn’t get Dominica to come along with them, they would have to place Dominican projects under review. If that is not an extortion by the Japanese Government, I don’t know what it is. They are saying, ‘You either go with us or we pull the aid.’”

In an interview with the Australian “Four Corners” programme in 2005, Martin later explained: ‘I felt that, if it was that easy for a foreign government to walk into my country and with the promise of aid to get a cabinet decision to be reversed in complete defiance of the elements of trust and comradeship that exists in a cabinet, that is not a process that I wanted to be a part of because I felt it was unfair to me as an individual, to the institution of government and, most importantly, it was unfair to the people of Dominica.”84

That Japan would have behaved in the way described by Martin was essentially confirmed by Antigua and Barbuda’s former IWC Commissioner, Daven Joseph, at a political meeting in Dominica before the 2001 IWC meeting: “Dominica will lose an opportunity for development if you go there and vote for that whale sanctuary or sit on the fence.”85

The Caribbean Media Corporation reported on 21 November 2001, in a story headlined “Antigua gets 17m dollars [U.S.] in aid from Japan thanks to support for whaling”, that when asked if Antigua’s vote for Japan’s position at the International Whaling Commission was a factor in the country receiving the grant aid, then Planning Minister Gaston Browne replied: ‘If we were to antagonize them I imagine that they would not be so anxious to assist us”86.

Indeed, although the fisheries complexes began to appear in other OECS states in the mid-1980s, no fisheries aid was granted to Antigua and Barbuda, a member of the IWC since 1981, until it had changed positions and delegation members and began supporting Japan in 1996. [See aid tables in Appendix 3.]

Antigua and Barbuda’s then Prime Minister, Lester Bird, went further in an interview with the CANA News Service in July 2001, saying “Quite frankly, I make no bones about it…if we are able to support the Japanese, and the quid pro quo is that they are going to give us some assistance, I am not going to be a hypocrite; that is part of why we do so.”87

As the fisheries aid projects tend to be high-visibility, multi-million dollar structures, in the smaller countries in particular decisions about their location inevitably can become enmeshed in domestic politics. This is evident in the fact that the choice of location for these complexes is frequently within the political constituency of either the Prime Minister or another important government official, reflecting at times the choice of the politicians themselves to favour these large-scale projects over less visible forms of assistance such as scholarships and

83 Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 2005, op. cit.
84 AP Worldstream, 3 June 2001, “Dominica’s leader under pressure to reject whale sanctuary”.
training programmes. *The Observer* reported that fisheries complexes were offered to three successive Dominican Prime Ministers in their constituencies.68

Explained Atherton Martin: “In the mid-nineties, Japanese aid allowed the construction of a fisheries complex in the constituency held by the then sitting Prime Minister, Hon. Mary Eugenia Charles. Japanese aid for the construction of a second fisheries complex was promised to Prime Minister Edison James in the late nineties [that complex was not built when promised as the James’ Administration wavered in its support for Japan at the IWC; it was eventually the subject of grant aid in 2002, by which time Dominica was fully realigned with Japan]. Japanese grant aid was then promised to the late Prime Minister Roosevelt Douglas. The facility was to be built in Mr Douglas’ constituency. There is a pattern here of aid and the promise of aid, for projects that move around depending on the location of the Prime Minister’s constituency and not according to any reasoned plan for the development of the fisheries sector.”69

This was one of the tactics used in Japan’s failed attempt to bring Jamaica into the IWC for the 1999 Annual Meeting in Grenada. The matter had gone so far that Jamaica had even been assigned a place at the delegates’ tables and a pigeon-hole for its meeting documents. John Maxwell wrote in the *Jamaica Observer* immediately after the meeting: “The Japanese have recently completed a fishing complex in the constituency of Jamaica’s Prime Minister, and were apparently informed by our Fisheries Department that Jamaica’s vote would be available shortly. Unfortunately the Fisheries Underground neglected to check with either Mr Patterson [at the time Prime Minister] or Mr Mullings [then] our Foreign Minister who, unlike their counterparts in Antigua, St Lucia and Co., actually decide foreign policy.”90

Less than two weeks before the 2001 IWC meeting, St Kitts and Nevis signed an Exchange of Notes with the Japanese Government for construction of a fisheries complex at New Town, Basseterre. The agreement was hailed in the ruling Labour Party’s brosheet, the *Labour Spokesman*, as a “fulfilment of [the Labour Party’s] 2000 Election promise to provide the fishermen of East Basseterre, Old Road, Dieppe Bay and other fishing communities in St Kitts with modern fishing facilities.” It was further explained that the project had been initiated by the country’s then Minister of Environment, Dr Earl Asim Martin, Member of Parliament for this constituency, who had “collaborated with his Cabinet Colleagues to ensure that it was included in its expanded form in the 2000 General Election Manifesto of the Labour Party.”91 Thus the offer of a Japanese-funded fisheries complex became a national politician’s promise to the voters, implying a pre-existing commitment with Japan used to influence the national elections results.

Another striking example again comes from Dominica. In late May 2001, nearly two months before the IWC Annual Meeting in London, Dominica’s Prime Minister Pierre Charles had said in a radio interview that Dominica’s vote at the IWC meeting “will only be known at the meeting itself.”, in contrast with other Eastern Caribbean governments that were already declaring their intention to oppose the Australia/New Zealand proposal for a South Pacific Whale Sanctuary.92 He also indicated that he intended to appoint the High Commissioner in London to represent Dominica at the London meeting, rather than the Fisheries Minister, Lloyd Pascal, who had replaced Atherton Martin following Martin’s resignation in 2000. Charles’ statement sparked off an intense row within the Prime Minister’s Labour Party

68 *The Observer*, Browne, op. cit.
through its constituency branch in Portsmouth, future site of a Japanese-funded fisheries complex.

As reported in the St Vincent Herald, the Portsmouth branch passed a resolution urging the Prime Minister to support Japan in its opposition to the Sanctuary proposal and to re-instate Pascal as IWC Commissioner. “The meeting was held over fears that a change in government’s previous pro-whaling stance could jeopardize Japan-funded fisheries projects earmarked for the northern town of Portsmouth and the north-eastern village of Marigot. Expressing a similar concern, the opposition United Workers Party (UWP) announced Wednesday that it plans to hold a public forum in Marigot this week to discuss the matter. Opposition Leader Edison James, who represents the Marigot constituency, has accused the government of being insensitive to the needs of Dominicans. ‘This is not really a Portsmouth issue, but it is a national issue, and indeed the people of Marigot and the entire north east are deeply interested in this’, James told the Caribbean news agency. James has blamed the ‘vacillation’ of government for a delay in the start of work on the fisheries complex in his constituency, which he claimed should have started in April last week.”92 Edison James was quoted in another article as saying “… We have a relationship with Japan, and we must allow them to come good on these promises before we take a decision otherwise.”94

Daven Joseph of Antigua and Barbuda, as has been noted elsewhere in this report, was also present at the constituency meeting in Dominica. He enumerated the advantages that have accrued to his country since it joined forces with Japan at the IWC: “Antigua had been benefiting since 1996 from major Japan-funded projects, including a fisheries complex and a bus terminal, with feasibility studies in progress for a new sewerage system for St John’s. However, he claimed that Dominica’s problem in receiving Japanese aid stemmed from the wavering position of successive governments.”95

In the end, Dominica did vote against the South Pacific sanctuary proposal at the London IWC meeting and the vote was cast by Lloyd Pascal, Dominica’s Commissioner though no longer Fisheries Minister. The week before the IWC Meeting the Prime Minister and his new Fisheries Minister, Vince Henderson, paid a seven-day state visit to Japan. As a result of the trip it was reported that a “Technical Mission from Japan will visit Dominica before the end of March 2002 to look into the feasibility of funding a Fisheries Project for Portsmouth… The Dominican leader has described as ‘warm’ his country’s friendship with Japan…”96

Months before Kiribati attended its first IWC meeting, in 2005, its Opposition leadership claimed that “Japanese diplomats are about to pressure the country’s president in a bid to end a global ban on whaling,” Brian Orme, a spokesperson for Kiribati’s Opposition Leader Dr Harry Tong, “claim[ed] the president will be offered cash in return for support.” Orme went on to say, “Japan adopts the same attitude as Taiwan does – if you look at the countries that are supporting the commercial fishing for whales like Tuvalu, Solomon Islands, they undoubtedly buy their support; I don’t think they even deny that.”97

It has been noted by many observers how the IWC representatives of the aid-recipient countries are kept under close watch by Japanese delegation members and associates during IWC meetings. Wrote The Observer: “At the IWC meetings, Japan follows through its tactics by chaperoning the island’s officials. ‘They do not allow them free for a moment – not even at cocktail parties. It’s disgusting, it’s appalling. It’s beyond colonial,’ said [Atherton] Martin.”98

92 St Vincent Herald, 4 June 2001.
93 St Vincent Herald, 1 June 2001.
94 Ibid.
97 The Observer (U.K.), Browne, op. cit.
John Maxwell attended a press conference offered by the Eastern Caribbean IWC Commissioners on the opening day of the 2001 IWC meeting. Although, he noted, the speakers used the opportunity to reject accusations of vote-buying, “the independent, autonomous Caribbean states held their press conference in the Japanese meeting room, closely shepherded by their handlers.”

4.3 INAPPROPRIATE DEVELOPMENT.

With Japan so intent on securing allegiance from these countries in the IWC, many questions have been raised about the real need for and effectiveness of some of the major infrastructure projects that have been provided.

The Japanese aid to the six OECS countries was subject to an NGO-sponsored review in 2002 by a Martinique-based economist, Bernard Petitjean Roget.100 “What makes the Japanese aid exceptional,” wrote Petitjean Roget, “is the fact that it has been concentrated on one single sector, with 22 fisheries infrastructure projects being financed in these islands using these funds.” He continued, “The fishing industry in these islands…is one of the most traditional industries of these island societies. It is often more a safe sector for full-time work. According to the islands, this sector represents between 1% and 2% of the GDP. The effects of this massive aid should, therefore, be spectacular in terms of the development achieved.” But in the course of his investigation, he found that “the results of this aid package on the fishing industry of these islands are far from convincing.”

As far as the evolution of the tonnages caught is concerned, the rare statistics show contradictory results. In some islands the size of the catches has regularly decreased, while in others it has increased. Consequently, there is no correlation between the setting up of fisheries infrastructures using Japanese aid and the size of the catches. A more detailed analysis showed that, in reality, there is an indirect link. The creation of fisheries infrastructures has enabled an improvement in the size of the catches in those areas where investments were also made in modern fishing vessels, but this has also had the effect of marginalizing the populations of fishermen from the traditional sector. There has, however, been a slight value-added improvement, as a result of the presence of preservation facilities, together with an improvement in terms of sanitation regarding the presentation of fish for sale on a bed of ice. Furthermore, the analysis showed that it is not possible for these investments to pay for themselves solely on the basis of services from the fishing industry…..Additional investment is needed in modern fishing vessels and in the training of manpower. The Japanese aid programme does not take this into consideration…..

The analysis also reveals that

even though a specialized company, OAFIC101, was entrusted with the task of conducting a global strategic study, no sociological study was ever carried out on the populations concerned from the fishing industry, on their needs, their behaviour and their capacity to adapt to the change. As a result the failure of the policy was easily predictable. So we are then left with the effects of these large investments on the economies of these islands. Given the manner in which these aid packages have been managed, it is unlikely that the ‘local added value’

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101 The Overseas Agro-Fisheries Consultants Co., based in Tokyo.
financed by the aid exceeds 38-40% of the declared amount of that aid. Indeed, this figure is probably less, as there is, unfortunately, every reason to believe that part of the aid includes a special budget intended to ‘reward the laudable efforts of those who give their support to the project’ and to silence those whose consciences are opposed to such practices.

Petitjean Roget also reported that “[t]he Japanese aid to the fishing industry shows markedly different characteristics from the aid granted by the EU [the largest donor to the region].

Whereas the Japanese aid was negotiated bilaterally on an ad hoc basis between an economic superpower and each of these small countries, the EU is a multilateral package negotiated as part of a general convention linking the EU to all of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP). Consequently the Japanese aid package is targeted exclusively not merely at the fishing industry as a whole, but more especially at the financing of infrastructure for the fishing ports.”

In the South Pacific, Tarte notes, “The insistence that aid be centred on large-scale infrastructure projects means that the benefits of Japan’s aid may not be easily translated throughout society. Large-scale projects often create untenable cost burdens for the island states. In some cases projects end up as ‘white elephants’ especially if there is no back-up support…. While aid contracts might be lucrative from the perspective of the suppliers, they are not necessarily value for money (or even useful) from the perspective of the recipient.”

Leslie Pierre, publisher of The Grenadian Voice, also speaks of “white elephant fishing complexes sprinkled throughout the islands.” His report contends that “some of them have proved too costly to the Governments because of the use of outdated technology in some cases, causing the operation of them to be expensive, especially in respect of electricity consumption for refrigeration...”

The BBC reported in November 2000 that on St Vincent, “the Japanese-built fish complex has been empty for more than four years. Local fishermen use it to store model yachts.”

In an analysis of the situation in Dominica, Polly Pattullo wrote in The Guardian in July 2001 that “Japan’s first ‘gift’ to Dominica was a fisheries complex in Roseau, the island’s capital, at a cost of $12m (£8m). It is a highly visible status symbol. In 1999, however, its ground floor was swamped by a hurricane and expensive equipment was wrecked. While its supporters argue that fish landings have increased, others say the complex is inappropriate. They say it is mainly used as office space, that it has contributed to the silting up of the nearby Roseau River and that some of its equipment, including three refrigerated lorries, has never been used. Dr Lennox Honeychurch, a Dominican anthropologist, says, ‘In contrast, for example, to the project at Bioche [a fisheries cooperative supported by British aid], a lot of aid projects are top-down and lack consultation.’ Japanese-type complexes, he says, fail to take account of traditional patterns of local trade and diminish the status of the fishermen.”

Sir Ronald Sanders of Antigua and Barbuda commented in 2006 in the St Kitts/Nevis Sun: “…I do not believe the construction of fishery developments that remain white elephants, but which may meet domestic political objectives, are the actions of a responsible state within the international community.”

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102 Ibid.
103 Tarte, p. 15.0
105 BBC “Newsnight”, transcript of broadcast November 2000, Robert Piggott presenter.
107 Sanders, op. cit.
In the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee’s (DAC) peer review of Japan’s ODA, published in December 2003, Japan was cautioned that: “[i]n implementing the ODA Charter, Japan should highlight that the primary objective of ODA is for the development of the recipient country and should ensure that narrower national interests do not over-ride this objective.”\textsuperscript{108}

Indeed, in the face of budget cuts and uncertain public support in Japan for its large ODA programme, Japan’s Foreign Minister, Taro Aso, in a January 2006 speech argued: “It could certainly be said that ODA is implemented as ‘Sympathy is not merely for others’ sake (‘Your kindness will be rewarded in the end’) or ‘Charity is a good investment,’ as the Japanese proverb says, and that ODA will serve no good if implemented without a warm-hearted concern for others. \textbf{However, it must not be forgotten that in the end ODA is implemented for Japan’s own sake.}\textsuperscript{109}

Island officials have also sought to broaden the base of Japan’s support beyond the single-minded pursuit of construction of fisheries complexes that has characterized Japan’s grant aid to date. In one example, where the two heads of government seem to be talking at cross-purposes, St Vincent and the Grenadines Prime Minister Ralph Gonsalves, at a Summit Meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi in Tokyo on 2 March 2004, “expressed his gratitude for the economic cooperation provided by Japan in areas including marine products, and his wish to further broaden bilateral relations.” But Koizumi’s reply merely indicated that St Vincent and the Grenadines should expect only more fisheries aid: “Both of our countries have beautiful nature and are blessed with marine resources. Japan would like to cooperate with Saint Vincent and the Grenadines in areas including sustainable utilization of living marine resources” – Japan’s euphemistic term that refers to the whaling issue.\textsuperscript{110} The agreement for a fisheries aid grant of 555 million Yen (U.S.$4.79 million) for construction of the Owia Fishery Centre was signed between the two governments in November 2006; construction is expected to start in the second half of 2007.\textsuperscript{111}

Assistance in areas other than fisheries has come to the six OECS countries through Japanese Technical Cooperation, and through the Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteers (JOCV) and dispatch of experts programmes; a number of small-scale projects have been supported through Japan’s Grant Assistance for Grassroots Human Security Projects programme as well. But these are tiny amounts in comparison with the grant aid devoted in each island to the construction of fisheries complexes. In St Kitts and Nevis, for example, the four projects that have been funded there in the period 1998-2005 under the Grassroots Human Security scheme totaled U.S.$ 152,911 and an early, one-off grant in 1993 for Cultural Activities came to U.S.$ 385,000. Altogether, these grants represent just 3.7\% of the overall grant aid given to St Kitts and Nevis since Japan began providing it, the other 96.3\% being given for the construction of two fisheries complexes, totaling more than U.S.$14 million.\textsuperscript{112} In all of the other OECS countries the statistics are similar; in every case the fisheries grant aid represents more than 95\% of the overall assistance.

\textsuperscript{109} Speech by Minister for Foreign Affairs Taro Aso – ‘ODA: Sympathy is Not Merely for Others’ Sake’, 19 January 2006, Japan National Press Club, \texttt{www.mofa.go.jp}.
\textsuperscript{110} From the website of the PM of Japan, \texttt{www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/koizumiphoto/2004/03/02st_vincent_e.html}.
\textsuperscript{111} St Vincent and the Grenadines, 2007 Budget Address by Dr The Hon. Ralph E. Gonsalves, Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, 11 December 2006.
\textsuperscript{112} \texttt{http://www.it.emb-japan.go.jp/st-kitts-nevis/economic-cooperation.htm}. 
4.4 EXCEPTIONS MADE FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES.

Under Japan’s ODA programme, in order to be eligible for grant aid, a recipient country’s per capita income level must not exceed a certain upper limit. Several of the fisheries grant aid recipients in the IWC, including Eastern Caribbean countries and some of the West African states such as Gabon and Morocco, are well above that limit and yet Japan is prepared to make exceptions for them; why? Dr Tarte explains, “Countries that receive grant aid even though they exceed the per capita income level are a special case and political arguments tend to be important. These may include diplomatic benefits (such as votes in international fora) and the value to Japan of resources such as fisheries (aid to acquire access).”

The same is reported by Petitjean Roget in his analysis of the OECS states. “Caribbean islands substantially exceed the upper limit in terms of per capita GDP for countries eligible for aid….However the use of the aid fund for fishing-related purposes allows more flexible criteria, where the upper limits can be substantially exceeded. This can easily be seen with the example of an allocation of aid to three complexes in Antigua, where the per capita GDP is way above the stipulated upper limit.” In fact, when the new Director of the Caribbean Division of Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs Yasuo Minemura and Assistant Director Midori Yamashita met the new Antiguan Prime Minister the Hon. Baldwin Spencer in August 2004, “it was pointed out by the Antiguan leader that the country’s per capita income should not become an obstacle to deeper cooperation.” The Antiguan government’s release reporting on the meeting also noted that “the officials also looked at how they can cooperate in various international fora, concentrating on how Japan and Antigua and Barbuda can give mutual support on key issues.”

In an analysis of Gabon’s fisheries sector, the IZF, created in 1998 by the Commission de l’Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine (UEMOA) and by the Secretariat Exécutif de la Communauté Économique et Monétaire de l’Afrique Centrale (CEMAC) on the initiative of all the Finance and Economy Ministries of the Zone Franc CFA (14 countries), refers to the fisheries agreement concluded in 2000 between Gabon and the Federation of Japan Tuna Fisheries Cooperative Associations and states that “This accord (which is little used but has been made law) and above all Gabon’s involvement towards Japan in various marine resource agreements justified the provision by Japan of significant grant aid to Gabon to which it could not normally lay claim in that it is a country with an intermediate level of income.”

113 Tarte 1998.
114 Petitjean Roget, op. cit.
116 www.izf.net; information provided to IZF in November 2003.
5. Changing the membership of the IWC: from blocking vote to majority.

5.1 Building a minority blocking vote.

Japan worked actively, and with considerable but not total success, to change the policies and delegations of several developing countries that had joined the IWC in the late 1970s/early 1980s in support of whale conservation, including the worldwide moratorium on commercial whaling that was eventually adopted in 1982. [See example of Seychelles in Section 4.2.]

But the first serious recruitment drive began in the early 1990s, with the objective to create a ¼ minority blocking vote to stop France’s proposal for creation of a Southern Ocean Whale Sanctuary, first deliberated by the IWC at its 1992 Annual Meeting. Two weeks after the 1993 Annual Meeting in Kyoto, where the Sanctuary proposal had received the support of a simple majority of members (not enough for formal adoption), Japan’s then Minister of Fisheries Masami Tanabu was reported in the Japanese press as saying “Now it is appreciated that to block things like the Antarctic sanctuary we need to increase our friends in the IWC.”

Three more Eastern Caribbean island states joined the IWC in this period, the Commonwealth of Dominica and St Kitts and Nevis in 1992 and Grenada in 1993; also in 1993 Solomon Islands returned to the IWC after a hiatus of several years and has supported Japan’s position ever since. While Dominica and Grenada participated actively to oppose the Sanctuary and support Japan on other issues, St Kitts and Nevis had a delegate at the 1992 meeting but he did not participate in the voting and it wasn’t until 1998 that St Kitts and Nevis was again represented at an IWC Annual Meeting. Like Antigua and Barbuda, it did not begin to receive fisheries grant aid from Japan until after its change of position, with the first grant, for construction of a fisheries complex at Basseterre, arriving in 2000.

BOX 2: St Kitts and Nevis: “Japanese pay-off for a whaling vote”.

In St Kitts and Nevis, proponents of Nevisian secession from St Kitts (as Anguilla 30 years earlier) cite as the most serious grievance against the central government the failure to share aid monies more equitably with Nevis. As a prime example, they refer to Japan’s fisheries aid to St Kitts. As a leading proponent of Nevisian secession, Dr Everson Hull, PhD., a Professor of Economics at Howard University in Washington, D.C., wrote in the St Kitts and Nevis Democrat in February 2004: “What is more than a little troubling is that there appears to be an unwillingness to come to grips with, and acknowledge, the reasons why Anguillans, then, and Nevisians, now, have said that they do not wish to be governed by a central government in Basseterre [capital city of St Kitts]...no one of the opponents to Independence for Nevis was willing to face up to, and denounce, a political system that allows St Kitts to grab all $25 million of a Japanese pay-off for a whaling vote that was jointly offered by both St Kitts and Nevis.”

In the end, the blocking vote did not hold together and a modified Southern Ocean Sanctuary, jointly presented by France, Mexico and Chile, was adopted with an overwhelming majority by the IWC’s 1994 Annual Meeting; only Japan voted against the proposal. St Lucia left the meeting before the vote was taken and the others abstained.

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117 Kanagawa Shimbun, 25 May 1993
From 1994 to 1998 no new developing countries joined the IWC in support of Japan, although after 15 years of championing marine conservation issues, and whale conservation in particular, Antigua and Barbuda changed policy and Commissioner in time for the 1996 Annual Meeting. The country received its first ever Japanese fisheries grant aid project in 1997.

**5.2 THE CAMPAIGN FOR A MAJORITY.**

Already in the early 1990s there were clearly those within the fisheries administration of Japan that had in mind a goal larger than simply holding on to a blocking minority of votes. Four days after the end of the 1992 meeting, the Director of the Fisheries Agency of Japan “revealed an initiative to urge the participation of developing countries in order to reform the management of the IWC.” During a visit by a Norwegian delegation in June 1993, for example, an official of the Fisheries Agency, Takanori Ohashi, reportedly told his guests that Japan was organizing an “offensive demarche…in order to change the composition of the IWC.” *We need nine more votes.* he continued, and named six target countries: Kiribati, Papua New Guinea and Tonga in the Pacific, and Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand in Asia. Ohashi went on to state his expectation that “in three years the situation within the IWC would have become better and for that reason there was no basis for Norway or Japan to leave the IWC.”

The project has taken far longer than Ohashi outlined, but whatever were the internal obstacles to its coming into force obviously were lifted about five years later when the composition of the IWC began to change with the activation of St Kitts and Nevis’ idle membership and a steady influx of developing countries thereafter, joining the IWC to oppose the creation of whale sanctuaries in waters other than their own, and to support a resumption of Japanese commercial whaling and an expansion of Japanese scientific whaling. This influx has coincided with the development and diffusion of the “whales-eat-fish” argument by the ICR and the Government of Japan, and was accompanied by indications of new-found optimism within Japan’s whaling circles.

In 1998, the IWC had 35 active member states, with 11-12 voting with Japan and 22-23 opposed, depending on the individual issues. With the IWC’s ¾ majority rule for the adoption of binding decisions, in which each “no” vote effectively cancels three “yes” votes, Japan would have needed to aim for another 55 or so new members, if the numbers of conservation-minded countries did not also increase, in order to obtain a ¾ majority in its favour. From a logistical point of view alone that task would have been daunting. It was clearly more feasible to aim for a simple majority, 50% +1, requiring, at the time, approximately 13 more states to join on Japan’s side. That number has increased as conservation-minded states have also joined the Commission in the meantime.

In October 1998, the “first new vessel in 26 years commissioned as a whale catcher”, the 720-ton *Yushin Maru*, was launched. The President of Kyodo Senpaku Ltd, the vessel’s owner, commented that the *Yushin Maru* “will be able to contribute to *eco-harmonized whaling*”, which he described as “a concept for a new era of whaling combined with resource and ecosystem monitoring.”

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119 In May 1995 a Tongan citizen, Mr Tasi Afeka, living in Japan and acting in the name of his company, MACA Pacific, submitted a proposal to the Tongan Government calling for an annual catch of 50 humpback, 200 sperm and 100 minke whales; “modern whaling equipment including harpoons, and whaling grenades”, was to be imported. The proposal was rejected. Tonga hunted humpback whales until 1979, when the King decreed a moratorium. [Source: New Zealand Herald, 24 May 1995.]
120 *Aftenposten*, 15 June 1993: “Japan wants to expand the IWC” by Gunnar Filseth.
The then Director of the Institute for Cetacean Research (ICR), Dr Seiji Ohsumi, spoke in similar terms at a press conference held on 27 January 1999, referring to a number of developments that in his view were indications of a “bold new concept of whaling for the 21st Century.”122 He also made a first reference to cetaceans consuming “five times” more fish than humans. This was obviously a reference to a paper he and ICR colleague T. Tamura were to circulate at the IWC Scientific Committee meeting four months later and which was to become the foundation of the “whales-eat-fish” campaign. [See section 6.]

5.2.1 Support of Parliamentarians.
One essential feature of the campaign has been the active involvement of an influential group of pro-whaling Parliamentarians, from both Houses of Japan’s Diet and from most political parties. MPs from the two largest, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Democratic Party (DP), have organized themselves into Leagues: the LDP’s Parliamentary League in Support of Whaling, members of which include Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Foreign Minister Taro Aso123, and the DP’s Parliamentary Council to Address Whaling Issues. The Japan Times reported in February 2007: “Much as Japan’s politicians champion logic and science in the service of their cause, however, it is clear that nationalism is one of the pillars that prop up the campaign. Many of the most active pro-whalers are on the right of the political spectrum, and the vast majority of the [Parliamentary Whaling League] has no electoral or commercial ties to whaling. In fact, only about 10 percent come from districts with a direct connection to the whaling issue.”124 Keiji Takeuchi, veteran science writer for the main Japanese daily the Asahi Shimbun, commented, “The whole whaling issue is just a sort of parlor game in which petty nationalism flourishes.”125 The Japan Times added: “In this context, the sheer political energy expended on the prowhaling campaign begins to make some sense: Japan can demonstrate its diplomatic clout and show it is not completely deferential in the foreign-political arena, particularly to the U.S. In other words, whaling allows Japan to safely let off steam in the international arena – without any significant political risk.”126

The Parliamentarians’ role began to emerge around the time of the IWC’s 51st Annual Meeting in May 1999 in Grenada, the first time the IWC had met in the Caribbean region. The Japanese delegation that year had five Parliamentarians among its members, an unusually high number for an international meeting of this status. The presence of the MPs on the Japanese delegation was significant enough to lead outgoing Japanese Ambassador, Yasuhiko Tanaka, signing an agreement in Grenada in July 1999 for a US$2.9 million grant for the Melville Street Municipal Fish Market, to remark that “the most memorable thing for him in recent times was Grenada’s hosting of the 51st session of the International Whaling Commission in May which was attended by 5 members of Japan’s House of Representatives”.127 Since then Japan’s IWC delegations have regularly included significant numbers of MPs; at the 2004 Annual Meeting in Sorrento, for example, there were eight including Vice Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Eiko Kanata.128 Japan’s Alternate Commissioner to the IWC, Joji Morishita, mentioned in a 2005 interview in the

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122 Minato Shimbun, 29.01.1999. Dr Ohsumi referred in particular to two regional initiatives, the “epoch-making” October 1998 informal consultation among the IWC representatives of China, Japan Republic of Korea and Russia (at OFCF headquarters) and the July 1998 Japan-sponsored meeting in St Lucia to prepare an Eastern Caribbean “cetacean research and management system”, the organization now known as ECCO – the Eastern Caribbean Cetacean Commission.
124 Ibid.
125 Ibid.
126 Ibid.
course of that year’s IWC meeting, “Yesterday we had 22 [parliamentary] members coming from Japan and they are requesting us to think about such options as withdrawing from this organization or unilaterally resuming whaling within a 200-mile zone.” He continued, “I know that’s a very strong suggestion, but the government just cannot ignore those recommendations from parliamentary members…”

President of the LDP’s Whaling League, Shunichi Suzuki, told a visiting Korean delegation in October 2004 that “the League places emphasis on diplomatic efforts by its members. Whenever the members of the League visit overseas, they try to seize the opportunity to promote understanding of sustainable use of marine living resources, including whales.”

More recently, Suzuki was quoted in the JWA News of September 2005 as telling a meeting of the LDP League that “if the pro-use bloc succeeds in obtaining a simple majority, the atmosphere in the IWC will change for their favor.” The article went on to report that “Many of the Diet members present at the meeting voiced their view that stepped-up efforts in the area of diplomacy by individual Diet members are needed to further expand the number of countries supporting the sustainable use of whale resources.”

In a recent example, Cameroon’s Prime Minister Ephraim Inoni met visiting LDP Whaling League member Daishiro Yamagiwa, accompanied by Japanese Ambassador Masaki Kunieda, in July 2006 to discuss “how the resources generated from whaling can be used to ensure food security and development.” In a press conference following the meeting, MP Yamagiwa, who presented himself to journalists as a “whaling expert”, was asked “how relevant [is] whaling to Cameroon, considering that whales are not found along the Cameroon coast. Hon. Yamagiwa said, whales eat a lot of maritime creatures and also represent a great economic asset. As such, Cameroon was concerned with how revenue derived from whaling could be useful to its economy.” Hon. Yamagiwa also met the Minister Delegate at the Ministry of External Relations in charge of Relations with the Commonwealth, Dion Ngute Joseph. “The Minister…expressed gratitude to the Japanese government for constructing the artisan fishing centre in Kribi and prayed that the same gesture be extended to Limbe in the South West Province and Lagdo in the North Province. In response, Hon. Yamagiwa stated the readiness of his country to diversify areas of cooperation with Cameroon.”

The Parliamentarians are also active through the Japanese chapter of an organization called the Sustainable Use Parliamentarians Union (SUPU), an international coalition of politicians formed by a wise-use organization, the International Foundation for the Conservation of Natural Resources, a spin-off of former CITES Secretary-General Eugene Lapointe’s International Wildlife Management Consortium (IWMC). The founding meeting of SUPU took place in New Zealand in November 2000, held in conjunction with the 3rd General Assembly of the World Council of Whalers. The Japanese branch of SUPU, comprised of more than 90 Diet Members from seven major parties, chaired by the leader of the LDP in the House of Councilors, Yutaka Takeyama, was established in April 2002, one month before the IWC met in Shimonoseki. SUPU meetings are held on various occasions; sessions regularly take place on the sidelines at IWC Annual Meetings, for example.

130 JWA News, No. 11, January 2005.
133 Ibid.
135 IHT/Asahi Shimbun, 3 May 2002.
The Japanese Parliamentarians take advantage of international conferences in Japan and meetings with officials and Parliamentarians of other countries to press their pro-whaling message through the formal structure of SUPU meetings. The Third Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD), which brought together heads of state and government, ministers and officials from all African countries in Tokyo 29 September – 1 October 2003 in Tokyo, was one such occasion. SUPU-Japan organised a side meeting with African delegates to “exchange views on sustainable use of natural resources…at a welcome reception held in a Tokyo hotel on October 1.….The reception…was attended by seven members of SUPU-Japan, including its chairman… and representatives from 20 African countries. In his welcome speech, Takeyama…called on African delegates to join SUPU, stressing the need for parliamentarians throughout the world to unite to promote the concept of sustainable use of the resources.”137

Yet another grouping of Parliamentarians appears to have been launched during the 2007 IWC Annual Meeting by St Kitts and Nevis Minister of Fisheries, Cedric Liburd, who, in an official Government release, was said to be “spearheading the formation of a new global body of parliamentarians committed to the principle of the sustainable use of the world’s marine resources.”138 According to the release, “a range of countries in Africa, the Caribbean, Europe, Asia, Latin America and the Pacific have lodged their support for the parliamentary group.” The release continues: “Interestingly, the potential member-states of the parliamentary body belong to the pro-whaling or pro-sustainable use group within the IWC and regularly vote for the resumption [of] sustainable use of the world’s whale stocks.”

At the 1999 Grenada IWC meeting, one Japanese MP on the delegation, Tokuichiro Tamazawa, at that time President of the LDP’s Whaling League, told a press conference a few weeks after that meeting that support for Japan’s position from the six OECS countries “[was the] result of Diet Members’ diplomatic efforts for many years. From now on we will work on Morocco and many countries by practical use of ODA.”138 In October 1999 Tamazawa was appointed Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) where he served until the following year.

Another MP appointed to a senior position in the Ministry in the same period, Hiroaki Kameya, an LDP member of the Upper House, the House of Councilors, from Miyagi Prefecture (location of Ayukawa and other coastal whaling towns) became a Vice Minister in July 1998. He was to use his position actively in pursuit of more voting support for Japan in the IWC and, unusually, recounted his efforts on several occasions to the Japanese press.139

Immediately after the Grenada meeting Vice-Minister Kameya traveled to Trinidad and Tobago, already identified within Japan as a possible candidate for IWC membership, as well as to allies St Lucia and St Vincent and the Grenadines.140 A week later Kameya returned to Japan and gave a press conference on June 2nd, at which it was reported that he “revealed a plan for Japan to use its official development assistance (ODA) program as measures to promote fisheries, for example, increasing of the number of countries that favor whaling.” The vice minister is reported as saying, “There are at least 10 countries, including countries in

136 Ibid.
139 See http://whales.greenpeace.org/reports/Briefing_rigging.PDF.
140 Trinidad & Tobago has long been a target of the Japanese recruitment drive. It is the seat of the Japanese Embassy representing all of the Eastern Caribbean island states that are now in the IWC, and for years Japan has funded the Caribbean Fisheries Training Centre in Chaguaramas.
the Caribbean Sea, which would support our position.’ He thus indicated,” continues the article, “that the government would ask aid-recipient countries to support Japan’s views [in the IWC].”141 In a story carried on the Kyodo wire service the same day, Kameya was also reported as saying: “Because anti-whaling countries’ attitudes are stubborn, it is judged that it is more advantageous for future negotiations to dig up supporting votes by increasing member countries than by trying to split opposing votes.”

On June 11th a fisheries newspaper reported that Kameya, in a meeting with pro-whaling parliamentarians from the LDP’s Whaling League the previous day (the same meeting addressed by Tamazawa), had set a target of an additional 13 countries joining and named Morocco as a possible new member, also Trinidad and Tobago, Fiji, Zimbabwe and South Pacific countries. The Democratic Party’s whaling league also met around the same time and it, too, “confirmed to expand pro-whaling countries.”142

On August 17th, it was reported in the fisheries press that Kameya had departed for Zimbabwe, Namibia and the Republic of Guinea to “explain Japan’s position of whaling and the IWC and CITES and appeal to then to take united steps”. On August 30, he was quoted in the same paper on his return from Africa, saying: “I requested the three nations to join the IWC from a perspective of sustainable use of marine resources including whales. All agreed. The Prime Minister of Guinea showed his will to join by the next year’s meeting.” Guinea’s Foreign Minister and its Fisheries Minister (Sidibe), in turn, also made an official trip to Tokyo that same month.143

In October that year, Japan turned up with large observer team (spread among four delegations: the JFA, OFCF, JICA and the Federation of Japan Tuna Fisheries Co-operative Associations) to the Fourth Session of a relatively new African regional fisheries body, the Ministerial Conference for Fisheries Cooperation among African States Bordering the Atlantic Ocean (ATLAFCO in English, COMHAFAT in French – see section 5.4 below for more information). Twenty-two Atlantic coast African states, from Morocco south to Namibia are members of this regional organisation, headquartered in Morocco. Guinea was President of the Conference in 1999 and during the course of the 1999 meeting indicated its intention to join the IWC.

The Japanese delegation in 1999 was led by Minoru Morimoto, Japan’s IWC Commissioner and Deputy Director General of the Fisheries Agency, who in his address to the meeting informed the assembled fisheries ministers and officials that he had “specially undertaken this long voyage” to participate in this conference based on information from Minister Kameya following his August 1999 trip to Guinea.

Early in his speech he emphasized the importance of the Japanese market for fishery products on a global scale and specifically for the Atlantic coast African countries, from which, he said, 90,000 tonnes of fisheries products were imported in 1998 for a value of 53 billion Yen or US$450 million. “This,” he reminded the assembled officials, “leads me to tell you that the Japanese market for maritime products is extremely important and indispensable for you all.”

As additional enticement for their support, Morimoto then outlined the entire Japanese fisheries aid programme and particularly emphasized the OFCF’s programme to arrange visits to Japan for senior officials involved in fisheries management, specifying “ministers,

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142 Combined extracts from Suisan Keizai and Minato Shimbun, 11 June 1999.
vice-ministers, director-generals, heads of professional associations” – a fair summary of his audience that day.144

Guinea joined the IWC in time for the 2000 meeting and cast the same vote as Japan every time it voted. Guinea had received fisheries aid in 1998; following its decision to join the IWC it has received three more fisheries grant aid projects, in FY 2001, 2002 and 2006. It has maintained a tuna long-line fisheries agreement with the Japanese Tuna and Bonito Association since 1995. Morocco joined in 2001 and voted with Japan except for some tactical abstentions. Zimbabwe attended as an observer in 2000 and Namibia in 2001 but neither has returned since.

The St Lucia Star reported in August 2001 that “It is expected that more African countries will join the IWC by the time the organization holds its 2002 annual meeting in Japan.” This was indeed the case. Two more francophone West African states, Benin and Gabon, joined the IWC just before the IWC’s 2002 Annual Meeting in Shimonoseki, Japan, where they participated in the Japanese-led bloc that stymied adoption of a quota for bowhead whales for the indigenous peoples of Alaska and Siberia. Two months after the Shimonoseki meeting, the Vice President of the OFCF, Matsuyoshi Moriya, was in Gabon to sign a 70-million Yen agreement with that country’s newly appointed Fisheries Minister, Emile Douumba, leader of the Gabonese delegation to Shimonoseki, for the rehabilitation of the fisheries center of Owendo. At the signing ceremony Matsuyoshi said, “Our Foundation continues to carry out projects in the field of fisheries, but only in those countries with which Japan maintains particularly close relations. Two months ago, in an international conference, thanks to the cooperation of your country, Japan was able to obtain unhelped for results”, in a clear reference to the Shimonoseki IWC meeting and the blocking of the bowhead quota.145

In November 2002 an 8-person Japanese delegation, including JICA representatives and private consultants, led by a Mr Katoh of the Fisheries Agency visited the Regional Support Union in Benin of the Sustainable Fisheries Livelihood Programme in that country. The delegation spent more than a month in the country (6 Nov. - 11 Dec.) to draw up a proposal to improve the fisheries port of Cotonou.146 An Exchange of Notes for a 287 million Yen grant for the Cotonou project was eventually signed between the Japanese and Beninois governments on 14 January 2005.

**BOX 3: Japan at work in African regional fisheries body.**

Japan works at a bilateral level in West Africa, particularly with those states with which it has fisheries agreements. These include Gabon, Gambia, Guinea, Mauritania, Morocco and Senegal. Because of the fisheries agreements the OFCF can also be active in these countries, and it is the OFCF’s Director of International Relations, Yoshihiro Takagi, who is seen most closely following the African IWC delegates at IWC Annual Meetings.

But Japan is also setting up a wider base through its involvement in ATLAFCO. France and Japan are by far the most important individual donors to the organisation which also receives support from FAO, the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) and various multilateral development banks, but Japan has a much larger presence in the organization than France. Currently the Ministerial Conference benefits from three tripartite fisheries cooperation programmes, the parties being Japan, Morocco and Other African states.

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144 Allocations de M. Minouru Morimoto a l’occasion de la Quatrième Session de la Conférence Ministerielle sur la Coopération Halieutique des Pays Riverains de l’Océan Atlantique.
(until recently francophone only). These programmes have been expanded to include Algeria and Tunisia which are not members of ATLAFCO. While the Cooperation Française is an official partner of ATLAFCO, three Japanese agencies/institutions are also partners: the Fisheries Agency of Japan, the OFCF and JICA. France is usually represented at the ATLAFCO’s sessions by one observer, Japan sent 8 observers spread among four delegations to the 4th session in Guinea in 1999; at the 5th session in Gabon in October 2001 there were 10 Japanese observers representing seven delegations, including the Fisheries Agency (represented by IWC Commissioner Morimoto), the OFCF, the Japan Fisheries Association, JICA and the ICR.

Surprisingly, Daven Joseph, then IWC Commissioner for Antigua and Barbuda, and Horace Walters of St Lucia, Programme Coordinator for the Eastern Caribbean Cetacean Commission (ECCO)147, also appeared as observers at the 2001 session and the Bureau meeting that preceded it, in May 2001 in Rabat.148 The report of the Bureau session records that “the representatives of guest countries (Japan, St Lucia, Antigua and Barbuda) presented the meeting with their concerns relative to the negotiations within the International Whaling Commission (IWC) and the International Agreement on the Trade in Threatened Species” (i.e. CITES).

In this same Bureau meeting, the West African organization was invited “to take part in the Ministerial Meeting scheduled for 2002 in the Caribbean,” and the Bureau recommended that this be accepted by the full Conference. No details of the proposed meeting were given. In the report of the October 2001 5th Ministerial session, it was noted that “[t]he Conference accepts the invitation to the Conference to participate in the meeting on the sustainable use of resources to be held in the Caribbean in 2002.” This could possibly be a reference to the media symposium held in April 2002 in Antigua and Barbuda organized by Tele-Press Associates, but if so no African delegates were reported as being at that gathering.

At its May meeting the Bureau also “took note of the initiative to establish trilateral cooperation between Member States of the Conference, Japan and Caribbean states,” but it is not known what might have come of this initiative. In addition the Bureau “asked Japan to make presentations on the results of its scientific research during the next Ministerial Meeting.” This was a reference to the ICR’s investigations of whale-fisheries interactions through its scientific whaling programmes and a scientist from the ICR made such a presentation to the 5th session later that year.

The final report of the 5th Ministerial Conference does not openly endorse Japan’s position but does not reject it either. It states: “The Conference considers the issue of competition between cetaceans and the other commercially interesting fish stocks must be treated with objectivity, while highlighting the necessity for the sustainable use of living marine resources based on scientific evidence and economic and social considerations.”

A Bureau meeting was held in January 2004 in Dakar, Senegal, with JICA and OFCF present as observers. According to the report of the ICCAT observer, the meeting “urged the member

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147 ECCO is a Japanese-funded pro-whaling organization based in St Lucia.
148 Daven Joseph was identified in an article by Caribbean journalist Tony Best reporting on the 2004 IWC meeting in Sorrento as “scientific adviser to Caribbean and African nations.” www.ctenews.com/tbest_news_07152004a.html.
states to adhere to and to participate actively in the work of international organizations where the principles and rules for the utilization of the living marine resources are discussed....”

What is striking is that in other West African fisheries organisations, such as the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission (SRFC/CSRP in French) based in Senegal and FAO’s Fishery Committee for the Eastern Central Atlantic (CECAF), in which many of the member states of ATLAFCO, and the IWC, participate, cetacean-fisheries interactions are given no priority at all; in fact, they are not even discussed. Japan is a member of CECAF but does not participate in the meetings; it is not a member of the SRFC. Representatives from the Eastern Caribbean states also do not appear at the meetings of these organisations.

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Coinciding with the influx of developing countries into the IWC to build a majority for Japan has been the development of the “whales-eat-fish” argument and the whaling lobby’s efforts to introduce it into other international and regional bodies, at times aided by many of these same countries. Briefly put, the “whales-eat-fish” argument purports that cetaceans consume far more fish than commercial fisheries, that as a result they are in competition with and have a deleterious effect on human fisheries, and that by reducing the numbers of whales through commercial whaling more fish would therefore be made available for human consumption. Although not new, the argument has become inextricably linked to the recruitment drive, providing an important lobbying tool in approaching the countries being recruited, especially fishing nations, as well as a justification for many of them to participate in an otherwise costly and perhaps low-priority organization. Within Japan itself it helps to maintain the political support and levels of funding to sustain the recruitment drive and is used in attempt to increase an otherwise flagging domestic public support for whaling and for the consumption of whale meat. [See section 6.1]

As the whaling lobby within the Japanese Government launched its drive to recruit a majority, the ICR played its part by drafting two papers, one a global review (“Estimation of total food consumption by cetaceans in the world’s oceans” by T. Tamura and Seiji Ohsumi, circulated to the IWC Scientific Committee in 1999) the other a regional review (“Regional Assessments of Prey Consumption by marine cetaceans in the world”, also by Tamura and Ohsumi, submitted to the IWC Scientific Committee in 2000). The main conclusion of the global review, that “approximately three to five hundred million tons of marine food resources are consumed annually by cetaceans, some 3 to 6 times more than are fished for human consumption”, has become one of the main sound bites of the entire campaign, being repeated over and over again by the delegates from Japan and from the recruited countries, and reproduced in government briefing material sent to all countries approached by Japan. It was included in the first draft of the 2006 “St Kitts and Nevis Declaration” as “fact” but was deleted in the final version. While the argument makes good PR it does not stand up to scientific scrutiny.

In an analysis of the two papers Dr Sidney Holt, former director of the FAO Division of Fishery Resources and Operations and member of the IWC Scientific Committee for more than 30 years, argues that Tamura and Ohsumi:

have been selective and careless with respect to the published data they have used, that their methodology is deeply flawed, and that their results and conclusions are wholly misleading; they have conned us. These documents, on which Japanese whaling policy is now publicly justified, are worthless. Worthless, that is, as contributions to rational discussion of relationships between whales and fisheries. But certainly not worthless in underpinning the Japanese Government’s public relations campaign of disinformation on that subject. Furthermore, since the ICR is both responsible for the circulation and political use of the two documents, and for the planning, conduct and evaluation of Japan’s ‘scientific whaling’ activities (which have made a very limited contribution to the information about whale diets

150 The “whales-eat-fish” argument refers to the propaganda campaign run by the Government of Japan. There have been serious investigations underway for years in other bodies, such as the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) looking at predator-prey relations generally but they are still very far from being able to put these studies into practical management schemes, partly because they are controversial and give inconclusive or even contradictory results.
The two ICR papers in fact have never been published in a scientific journal nor have they been subject to an independent peer review. The first paper, the “global review” wasn’t even formally submitted to the IWC Scientific Committee for discussion; it was only made available as an information paper and thus was not considered by the meeting. A modified, but uncorrected, version of the Tamura and Ohsumi paper of 2000 was submitted under Tamura’s name to the Conference on Responsible Fisheries in the Marine Ecosystem convened in Reykjavik, Iceland, in October 2001 under the sponsorship of the Government of Iceland and FAO. [For more on this conference see section 6.4.1.] The paper was subsequently published in the compilation of submitted but not refereed papers entitled “Responsible Fisheries in the Marine Ecosystem” edited by M. Sinclair and G. Valdmasson, issued under the joint imprint of FAO and a commercial publisher: CABI Publishing. The paper was not seriously discussed in Reykjavik since the conference was mainly concerned with political matters, and the book does not even record “proceedings” in the normal sense but only the so-called Reykjavik Declaration that was drafted and adopted at this conference.

At the 2001 IWC meeting, on the initiative of Japan and the U.S., the Commission agreed by resolution that the Scientific Committee should convene an intersessional workshop to consider the question of whale-fisheries interactions; St Lucia offered to host the meeting, sometime before the 2002 Annual Meeting. St Lucia also reported this fact to the October 2001 meeting of the Western and Central Atlantic Fisheries Commission (WECAFC), a regional fisheries body set up under FAO. Yet by the time of the 2002 IWC Annual Meeting, St Lucia had withdrawn its proposal to host the meeting and Japan, despite having been one of the initiators, refused to participate in it. Thus the Modelling Workshop on Cetacean-Fishery Competition went ahead, in La Jolla, California, in June 2002 without Japan and with none of the Caribbean IWC members. Among its main conclusions was that “the reality is that for no system at present are we in a position, in terms of data availability and model development, to be able to provide quantitatively predictive management advice on the impact of cetaceans on fisheries or fisheries on cetaceans.”

The whales-eat-fish argument is also important in that it now provides the main justification for the continuation and expansion (in species and numbers killed) of Japan’s two scientific whaling programmes, something that the recruited countries most faithfully support, as well as for the scientific whaling programme of Iceland. [See section 6.2]

Perhaps most importantly of all for Japan, if it can gain international acceptance of its claims that cetaceans are competing with fisheries and thus pose a threat to “food security” in the world, then there would be no need to respect precautionary management of whale stocks as the objective of whaling would be to reduce whale numbers significantly. Already it has been the principal argument used by Norwegian fisheries authorities and Parliament in calling, in 2004, for dramatic increases in Norway’s annual minke whale catches, regardless of what a precautionary procedure for sustainable management would allow, as part of Norway’s new policy on marine mammals. [See sections 6.3 and 6.4]

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Japan’s fisheries lobby, hit by restrictions and fleet reductions, and stung by the closure of the high seas drift net fishery more than a decade ago and concerned by more recent developments (such as successful efforts within the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) to list fish species on its appendices, including the great white shark, basking shark and humphead wrasse), is also using this argument to build a bloc of support to defend its fisheries, including but not limited to whaling, against the “environmental agenda”, as will be examined in section 6.5.

This report is not the place to probe deeper into absurd claims that “whales are eating our fish and threaten our fisheries.” In many regions fish stocks have been diminished by excessive fishing and attempts are made to blame anything, including marine mammals, except the real culprits – humans. That some whales and dolphins consume some fishes, among many other dietary items, is true and has been known for a century or more. But that observation is a far from being evidence that they significantly affect commercial fish stocks, as has repeatedly been explained by scientists.

Dr Daniel Pauly and Kristin Kaschner of the Fisheries Centre, University of British Columbia, presented preliminary results of their examination of this question in a side event during the 2004 IWC Annual Meeting. Their paper concluded that

there is no evidence that food competition is a global problem, even when uncertainties associated with the available information are considered. Consequently there is no basis to blame marine mammals for the crisis world fisheries are facing today. There is even less support for the suggestion that we could solve any of these urgent problems, caused by a long history of mismanagement of fisheries, by reducing marine mammal populations.

6.1 A TOOL FOR LOBBYING.

As a lobbying tool to convince or provide a justification for aid-recipient countries to join the IWC, the campaign has been used extensively in countries where fisheries are important, and no more so than in the Pacific island states. Although the first ICR paper was circulated at the IWC in 1999, already in 1998 the argument was the centrepiece of Japan’s attempts to stir up opposition among Pacific island states to the Australian and New Zealand proposal for a South Pacific Whale Sanctuary, being presented to the 29th South Pacific Forum (SPF) meeting in Micronesia for regional consultation and endorsement before being taken to the IWC. After the close of the SPF meeting it was revealed that Japan had sent an official communiqué to Forum members via the Forum Secretariat ten days before the start of the meeting asking them to oppose the proposal. The communiqué argued primarily that “excessive and unnecessary protection” of whales would “heavily damage [the] balance of the marine ecosystem and be destructive for fisheries activities in the region.” The document concluded: “Japan wishes to seek the strong support from all South Pacific Coastal States to oppose such sanctuaries and is pleased to invite every state to join our effort to correct the distorted situation surrounding the sustainable use of natural resources for the benefit of human beings…” At the SPF meeting Palau, which joined the IWC in 2002, tried at the last moment to introduce a proposal that would have allowed the Forum’s Dialogue Partners, which include Japan, the right to veto any such expression of support but was defeated.

153 A number of scientific and technical papers have dealt with this issue. References to a few are given in this report (e.g. Pauly and Kaschner, 2004; Holt 2006; Cokeron, 2006). Readers are also referred to: Yodzis, Peter, “Must Top Predators be culled for the sake of fisheries?”, Trends in Ecology and Evolution vol. 16, no. 2, 2001.
Nevertheless, the propaganda campaign can claim some success, with the entry of four Pacific island states into the IWC since 2004. In justifying Nauru’s decision to join the IWC in 2005 and its subsequent support for Japan’s position, for example, Ambassador Marlene Moses, Nauru’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations, was cited in an official release as saying: “Some whale species have the potential to devastate our tuna stocks, and, as a country whose food security and economy relies heavily on fishing, it is our responsibility to ensure the sustainability of our people’s livelihoods.”155

The tuna fishery is indeed essential to Nauru’s economy. Nauru’s EEZ is described in a 2005 report by the Nauru Fisheries and Marine Resources Authority as having “continuously yielded high level of [tuna] catches from all the major purse seine fleets that are licensed to fish in its waters.”156 Chief among these are Japan and Taiwan (with 32 purse-seiners each) and Republic of Korea with 27. The dominant species are skipjack tuna followed by yellowfin and bigeye.

The tuna catches from the waters around Nauru are part of one of the largest commercial fisheries in the world, the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO) tuna fishery. According to a press release issued in October 2005 by the newly formed Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC), the WCPO fishery records catches of 2 million metric tonnes annually with a value of US$2 billion on global markets.157 According to the WCPFC, “the catch is taken largely by distant water fishing nations licensed to fish in the region and, increasingly, by the domestic fisheries of Pacific Island nations [especially Philippines and Indonesia]. For many of the Pacific Island countries, tuna represents the only significant economic resource and domestic fisheries and/or access fees paid by fishing nations are of crucial economic importance.”

Just one month after the release of Ambassador Moses’ remarks about the “threat” posed by whales to this fishery, the Scientific Committee of the WCPFC met for the first time, in New Caledonia, where it brought together scientific experts and managers from the entire Pacific region to review the available information concerning the tuna stocks of the area. A release issued by the WCPFC reported: “The assessments for both yellowfin and bigeye tuna concluded that current levels of fishing effort and catch in the WCPO are likely to be excessive, with exploitation rates exceeding internationally accepted limits. If current levels of fishing effort continue, it is expected that these tuna stocks will continue to decline to the extent that, within five years, they will be overfished….The assessments for skipjack and south Pacific albacore were more optimistic, indicating that current levels of catch are sustainable.”158 To accuse whales of threatening the tuna stocks in the region is clearly ludicrous.

The Government of Japan/Fisheries Agency hosted the first ever global conference on the state of tuna stocks in January 2007 in Kobe, bringing together the member and cooperating non-member states of the five main regional tuna fisheries management organizations (RFMOs).159 According to the final report, “it was agreed that in general global fishing capacity for tuna is too high and should not increase, and be reduced as appropriate, while

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158WCPFC, op. cit.
159 Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC), International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tuna (ICCAT), Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC), Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC), Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT).
recognizing the aspirations of developing states, particularly small island developing states and territories, for the development of their fisheries industry.”

The conference was opened by Mr Toshiro Shirasu, Director-General of the Fisheries Agency of Japan. In his statement he summarized the challenges facing the international management of tuna fishing:

As one of the major fishing and market countries for tunas, Japan participates in this Meeting with a strong sense of urgency. … [W]e have a grave concern over the future of tuna resources. Most of tuna species in the world has already been fully or over exploited, while the number of tuna fishing vessels in the world is ever increasing. We are facing daunting tasks to establish conservation and management measures and, thereby, to achieve sustainable use of tuna resources through RFMOs. This includes a controversial issue of how to balance between the interests of historical fishers and developing opportunities of new fishers. In addition, vessels move globally from one ocean to another and from one resource to another, while fishing activities are managed through respective RFMOs, which is ‘regional’ by definition. Furthermore, IUU fishing vessels have yet to be eliminated, despite enormous international efforts to combat with them to date.

In the light of the urgency of Nauru’s 2005 claims about whales threatening to “devastate” Nauru’s tuna stocks, it is remarkable that no effort was made at this venue to further that argument if the situation is indeed so serious. But the whaling group from within the Fisheries Agency was in scarce evidence at the tuna meeting and with one exception, Kiribati, the delegates of the IWC’s Pacific island members were not those that participate in the IWC. The only reference to species interactions in the Report comes in one of the agreed Courses of Action:

Implementation of the precautionary approach and an ecosystem-based approach to fisheries management including improved data collection on incidental by-catch and non-target species and establishment of measures to minimize the adverse effect of fishing for highly migratory fish species on ecologically related species…

Kiribati, which joined the IWC is December 2004, is another Pacific island state that has been influenced by the arguments. Sandra Tarte notes that “[o]f the Pacific island countries, Kiribati is one of the most dependent on access fees and related fisheries activities. It also receives the highest level of fisheries aid [from Japan] in the region.” As an example of how the whales-eat-fish lobby work is done, scientists onboard a private research vessel, the Odyssey, on a cruise of the Pacific in 2001, reported the following:

At a recent Fisheries meeting in Japan ([JARP] II-in August and September 2000) the Japanese Fisheries Agency gave delegates from all nations written material and pictures depicting whales as serious food competitors of squid and blue-fish tuna. The information was compiled by the Fisheries Agency of the Government of Japan, and included photographs of the stomach contents of a dead sperm whale, containing a large quantity of squid.

From our discussions with members of the fisheries department in Kiribati, it is clear that Kiribati is trying to start a commercial squid fishery in its territorial waters. A Kiribati Fisheries officer who was present at the meeting in Japan, ([JARP] II) implied that he is concerned that Kiribati’s potentially profitable squid fishery may be threatened by the presence

160 Dr Sandra Tarte in Turning the Tide: Towards a Pacific Solution to Conditional Aid, Greenpeace 2002.
of sperm whales. During our time in Kiribati, both Government Officials and Fisheries employees made reference to whales competing with humans for fish, as well as to the potential Japanese interest in whaling in their territorial waters. This is a direct result of the propaganda by whaling nations. It is disturbing because it is so misleading. The annual production of squid on which sperm whales are known to feed, has been estimated to be roughly equal to the total weight of all fish caught by human fishers each year. However, there are many species of squid, and people have yet to succeed in making a viable commercial catch of the squid species on which the whales principally feed. In fact, we cannot even sample those species, except by removing them from the stomachs of whales. It would be hard, therefore, to imagine a major predator that competes less with humans for the squid species that interest us than sperm whales do.163

The argument is also promoted widely at home by the IWC delegates from the OECS countries. A BBC documentary produced in 2002 gave a rare glimpse into one of the Japanese-funded media briefings hosted each year in one of the OECS countries.162 [See Section 7] The ICR’s glossy photos of fish taken from whale stomachs in the course of its scientific whaling activities were at the centre of presentations by OECS whaling advocates and by Dr Dan Goodman, an adviser to the ICR. Horace Walters of the Eastern Caribbean Conservation Commission (ECCO) told the assembled reporters “The whale is the biggest consumer of our fish. The fish we want to feed our people, the whales are eating them.” No evidence was given. Nor could it be: there is none. What there is is a dearth of knowledge about the status of fish stocks in the region, with all the consequences that this has for fisheries management in the area. According to an FAO/WECAFC report, “The Status of Fisheries Resources in the Western Central Atlantic Region” (including the Caribbean Sea), prepared for the WECAFC session in October 2003, “…there is very high uncertainty about the status of even the more important fisheries resources of the region. The situation puts many of the resources, and the fisheries dependent upon them, at risk through over-exploitation.” At the same time, ill-informed or deliberately misleading comments such as Walters’ are left uncorrected by the propagandists because the false information serves its purpose.

Unfortunately, as in the Pacific, the endless repetition of these claims is having its effects; see, for example, this statement from an article in the newspaper of the leading Opposition party of St Kitts and Nevis (the People’s Action Movement) critical of how the Government is managing the fish market given it by Japan: “We are grateful to Japan who is donating millions to many Caribbean islands for the establishment of such [multi-million dollar complexes]. Sure, they want something in return - the pro-whaling vote - a vote we can give with a clear conscience since the preponderance of whales in these waters is becoming a threat to our fishing resources.”163

The 2002 BBC documentary also shows how the argument is used for domestic purposes in Japan, where the whaling lobby at the Fisheries Agency and the ICR is concerned to promote whale meat sales and an interest in “whaling culture”, especially among young people in Japan. Dr Ohsumi himself tells the interviewer, shortly before the 2002 Shimonoseki meeting, that “having the meeting in Japan is a great PR opportunity to gain the Japanese people’s understanding of the whaling issue.” In the month before the 2002 meeting, three campaigning vans were dispatched by the Fisheries Agency offices in Tokyo to spread the pro-whaling message throughout Japan and collect signatures for a petition supporting whaling; the main message they broadcast again and again through their loud-speakers was

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163 http://www.pbs.org/odyssey/odyssey/20010217_log_transcript.html, report by Drs Genevieve Johnson and Roger Payne.
“Recently competition between the fishing industry and whales has become serious in many places. We believe the culling of whales is necessary to protect the Japanese fishing industry.” T-shirts and posters bearing the slogan “Whales increase, Fishes decrease – People are in trouble!!” were also widely distributed.

6.2 JUSTIFYING SCIENTIFIC WHALING AND ITS EXPANSION.

The report from Kiribati in the previous section refers to the presentation of “JARPN II” at a fisheries meeting in Japan. JARPN II is the second of Japan’s scientific whaling programmes in the North Pacific, and, like the first JARPN and the past and present Antarctic programmes (JARPA and JARPA II), is one of the items supported absolutely unwaveringly by the Japanese-recruited countries in the IWC.

JARPN began in 1994 with a feasibility study for annual catches of 100 minke whales (±10%) and one objective: “to clarify the stock structure of minke whales in the northwestern North Pacific.” By 1999, in its final year, an additional objective had been added: “to determine the feeding ecology of minke whales in the North Pacific.” In 2000, Japan came to the IWC with a proposal for a two-year feasibility study for a new North Pacific programme, JARPN II, expanded to include an annual take of 50 Bryde’s whales and 10 sperm whales. In this new programme, the study of feeding ecology had become the highest priority. With the feasibility study concluded, to no one’s surprise Japan confirmed that the proposed research programme was, indeed, “feasible” and the full proposal was presented to the IWC in 2002, with an increase in the annual take of minke whales (from 100 to 150), 50 Bryde’s, 10 sperm whales, and the addition of catches of 50 sei whales, for an indefinite period. In 2004 Japan raised the catch limit for minke whales to 220.

JARPN II was harshly criticized within the IWC Scientific Committee that year. Some months later, an unprecedented letter signed by seventeen members of the Scientific Committee was published in the journal of the American Institute of Biological Sciences, *Bioscience*, criticizing the design, structure and content of the JARPN II programme. The scientists wrote that “Overall, JARPN II presumes, on an almost *a priori* basis, that whales (not humans) are primarily responsible for worldwide declines in fish stocks and ignores the immense complexities inherent in marine ecosystems. In short, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that JARPN II exists to ‘demonstrate’ – all data to the contrary notwithstanding – that whales eat too much fish and therefore should be culled by more whaling.”

Japan’s other, long-term scientific whaling programme, JARPA, ran for 18 years and ended with the 2004/2005 Antarctic whaling season; however, a proposal for a new, expanded JARPA II programme was submitted to the IWC in 2005. JARPA II involves more than doubling the annual catches of minke whales (from 440 to 850 ±10%) with catches additionally of 50 fin whales (10 in the first two years of the programme) and, beginning with the 2007/08 pelagic season, of 50 humpback whales. Despite a 2005 IWC resolution calling on Japan not to start new research until an independent, comprehensive review of the original JARPA (which took place in December 2006) had been completed, JARPA II went ahead for the 2005/06 season, killing 853 minke whales and 10 fin whales as planned. The 2006/07 season was interrupted by a fire on board the factory ship *Nisshin Maru* and the death of one crewman; eventually the fleet returned to Japan well before the end of the season.

164 *Bioscience*, journal of the American Institute of Biological Sciences, March 2003, Vol. 53, no. 3.
Four members of the IWC Scientific Committee, writing in the scientific journal Nature, noted that although no time limit is set for JARPA II, “in an equivalent 18-year period [to JARPA] Japan can be expected to take about 17,000 minke whales, 820 fin whales and 800 humpback whales from the Southern Ocean.” This is yet another face of the “whales-eat-fish” argument.

A notable addition to Japan’s aims is to manipulate the ecosystem through selective culling of certain species, with the explicit intention of reducing interspecific competition and thus promoting population growth in the most economically valuable species (such as blue whales). At the heart of Japan’s new proposal is their hypothesis that whales are competing directly for a limited resource (krill). Ignoring the fact that current whale populations, and thus their collective consumption of prey, remain at fractions of pre-whaling levels, Japan postulates that the recovery of depleted blue whales will be negatively affected by population increases of humpback, fin and minke whales (although data on abundance and population trends for all species are highly uncertain or non-existent). This hypothesis has been proposed using primarily unreviewed and unpublished data collected during the first 18-year phase of scientific whaling. Moreover, Japan proposes using a crude ecosystem approach to examine this hypothesis. This includes constructing simplistic models of competition among whale species, and inadequately measuring other components of the Southern Ocean ecosystem including krill abundance and habitat features.

Shortly before the JARPA II proposal was submitted to the IWC in 2005, a newsletter of the Japanese Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, MAFF Update, explained that the purpose of the new research was “to study the Antarctic ecosystem with a central focus on whales, and to develop more appropriate whale management schemes.” More “appropriate” than what? The only management “scheme” that has been considered by the IWC is that developed by the IWC Scientific Committee and accepted by the Commission (the Revised Management Procedure).

**6.3 LAYING THE GROUNDS FOR FUTURE UNSUSTAINABLE WHALING.**

In fact, what has emerged most clearly in the IWC is that the whaling countries, Japan and Norway in particular, are intent on dismantling the conservative management regime that has been under development by the IWC since adoption of the moratorium, should there ever be a decision by the IWC to authorize a resumption of commercial whaling. But they will only be able to do that if they have a simple majority of support behind them. Now that that goal appears within reach, both countries are becoming more open about their intentions, and both made explicit statements to this effect at the 2004 IWC meeting in Sorrento.

Norway’s interest in particular centers on the Catch Limit Algorithm, the mathematical formula for calculating catch limits that lies at the heart of the Revised Management Procedure (RMP). The RMP, including the CLA, was accepted and endorsed by the Commission in a 1994 resolution, but because it was not adopted as binding with a ¾ majority (a majority of countries preferring to wait until completion of the RMS in order to adopt the entire package) it could be changed by another simple-majority-backed resolution.

166 The hypothesis that minke whales are preventing the recovery of blue whales has long been maintained by Japan but has found no support. This is yet another face of the “whales-eat-fish” argument.
167 MAFF Update, 22 April 2005, n. 583.
in future. When the CLA was under development by the IWC, the Commission was asked by the Scientific Committee to decide to which of three, sometimes conflicting objectives it wanted to give the priority. The three objectives were: (1) maximizing cumulative catches throughout the management period, (2) preventing the risk of depletion, and (3) providing stable catches over time. The Commission chose objective two – preventing depletion – as its priority, with the consequence that the most conservative parameter values of those offered by the Scientific Committee and other features were agreed, contrary to the wishes of the whaling countries which favoured the other management objectives.

At the 2004 Annual Meeting of the Scientific Committee, Norway announced that it intended to develop and propose a change to the RMP’s CLA for minke whales in the North Atlantic and it has since submitted its proposal to the IWC Scientific Committee. As Norway later explained to the Commission, there were two reasons for its decision:

(1) the current CLA “gives inappropriately small catch limits”168 and

(2) “when the RMP was developed in the 1980s, the precautionary principle was interpreted ‘one-sidedly’. It was important to ensure against over exploitation of whale resources. Under a future ecosystem-based management, the precautionary principle must be interpreted ‘two-sidedly’ in the sense that it is important to avoid not only to harvest too many whales, but also not to harvest too few, given the plausible resultant impacts on sustainable fishery yields.”169

Also in Sorrento, under the agenda item “Future Sustainable Whaling” included at the request of Japan, Japan also signaled its intention to seek revision of the RMP. In a presentation entitled “The centennial of Antarctic whaling – from the history of over-harvesting to the creation of new sustainable whaling”, Japan noted that “it might be necessary to improve the RMP to enhance these three factors [the three management objectives] in order to achieve optimum utilization of whale resources.” The Japanese presentation went on to say: “Using whale management as a core to the ecosystem approach to the management of ocean resources, the potential for optimum utilization of whales and other marine living resources can be enhanced.”

A January 2005 article in the JWA News, reporting on the results of the JARPN II programme in 2004, gave a further indication of Japan’s intentions: “Based on the findings both in the offshore and coastal areas, the Japanese Government intends to develop a new management scheme (ecosystem-based comprehensive management scheme) envisaging not only cetacean resources but all fishery resources in the future.”170 At the 2006 IWC meeting, Japan presented a paper on the “normalization” of the IWC, in which it suggested that “under a ‘normalized’ IWC, all whaling activities should be appropriately managed using an RMP-like or other appropriate methodology for calculating sustainable harvesting quotass.” 171

As will be seen in the next section, Japan is in fact taking its agenda into the heart of international discussions of the evolving Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries Management (EAFM) and, together with Norway, is working to distort the EAFM’s further development.

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168 In fact, Norway has been applying a modified version of the CLA for years to calculate its self-imposed catch limits for minke whaling under objection to the moratorium, begun in 1993. Its modification has never been put to the same rigorous implementation testing by the Scientific Committee as the accepted version.


6.4 “WHALES-EAT-FISH” IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA: THE ECOSYSTEM APPROACH TO FISHERIES MANAGEMENT.

The whaling group within the Fisheries Agency, comprised at the time most noticeably of Masayuki Komatsu, for years its Chief International Negotiator, and Minoru Morimoto, its Deputy Director General, began to spread the “whales-eat-fish” argument internationally as an integral part of the campaign to build a simple majority in the IWC, with the ICR providing the paper work. More recently they have been assisted by others such as Joji Morishita and Akira Nakamae, both Alternate Commissioners for Japan at recent IWC meetings. While individuals such as Mr Komatsu might claim, as he did during the IWC meeting in 2000, that “the question of cetacean-fishery interactions has become a major issue throughout the world” and is now “…an important issue in the context of food security,” this is simply not true.\(^\text{172}\) When the whales-eat-fish issue has been raised in international and regional bodies it is because it has been put there by the whaling lobby from within the Fisheries Agency – and by this small group of advocates in particular – with such predictability that one need only look at a participants’ list to know whether or not the issue would be on the agenda in any particular body.

They have brought it into specific regional and international bodies, in particular:

- the Convention for the Conservation and Management of Pollock Resources in the Central Bering Sea during the years Komatsu led the Japanese delegation,
- the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) during the years Komatsu served as Chairman,
- the Ministerial Conference on Fisheries Cooperation among African States Bordering the Atlantic Ocean (ATLAFCO) with Morimoto leading the Japanese observer delegation,
- the Asia-Pacific Economic Commission in 1999 when both Komatsu and Minister Kameya were on the Japanese delegation to APEC’s Fisheries Working Group,
- the Association of Pacific Island Legislators (APIL) in 2002 when APIL’s General Assembly took place in Palau and Japan, represented by Nakamae, was invited for the first time as an observer,
- through the Caribbean IWC Commissioners, into the Western Central Atlantic Fisheries Commission (WECAFC), the latter as part of the general effort to engage the
- UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) and its Committee on Fisheries (COFI, chaired by Komatsu in 2001; others from the Fisheries Agency’s whaling section in subsequent years.

\(^{172}\) IWC Chairman’s Report, 52nd Annual Meeting, 2000.
6.4.1 FAO and the Committee on Fisheries (COFI).

Of all of these organisations, success in FAO is probably what matters most to Japan. While FAO projects funded by donors might bear that donor’s own agenda, they come with the *imprimatur* of FAO and thus appear all the more credible and objective. Japan holds an influential position in the FAO Fisheries Department as a major bilateral donor to FAO’s fisheries programme.

Japan has been the donor for a number of trust funds run under FAO’s Government Cooperation Programme, another way for Japan to exert its influence and carry forward its agenda within the framework of FAO. One of these trust funds, GCP/INT/643/JPN “Sustainable Contribution of Fisheries to Food Security”, which was initially intended to run for three years from July 1996, then was extended to December 2002, was created to address concerns such as “economic, social and cultural aspects of fisheries and fish consumption”, and “multi-species fisheries management”. This trust fund was put into effect the year following the 1995 Kyoto Summit on the Sustainable Contribution of Fisheries to Food Security, another initiative of the Government of Japan with the support of FAO.

Another is GCP/INT/823/JPN “Responsible Fisheries for Small Island Developing States”. Dr Sandra Tarte reported, “[i]n a more recent move (allegedly at the instigation of negotiator and senior Fisheries Agency bureaucrat Komatsu), Japan has established a special Small Island Developing States fund with the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) worth U.S. $1.5 million. Ostensibly, this is to be used to assist small island states in the implementation of the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries. But according to FAO sources, this is really a ‘slush fund’ to be used by Japan for certain purposes that its aid system cannot accommodate. This includes funding participation of island state delegations at international meetings.”173

More recently Japan has funded project GCP/INT/920/JPN, “Capacity Building for an Ecosystem Approach: Considering Interactions, including with Marine Mammals (Project GCP/INT/920/JPN). According to its description, this project is “intended to provide extended capacity building for EAF to selected countries (Brazil, Papua New Guinea and member countries of the South West Indian Ocean Fisheries Commission174) mainly through smaller scale pilot studies and workshops examining the needs and priorities for EAF.” The period of this project is 2004-2009, with a contribution from Japan of U.S. $970,000.

The Food and Agriculture Organisation’s Committee on Fisheries (COFI) meets every two years at FAO headquarters in Rome. More than 100 states members of FAO and observers participate in the sessions. According to FAO, “the Committee presently constitutes the only global inter-governmental forum where major international fisheries and aquaculture problems and issues are examined and recommendations addressed to governments, regional fishery bodies, NGOs, fishworkers, FAO and international community, periodically on a world-wide basis.”175 Under the auspices of COFI two major international fisheries agreements were negotiated, the voluntary Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (1995) and the UN Agreement on Straddling Stocks.

173 Tarte (2002).
174 These include Comoros, Kenya, Madagascar, Maldives, Mozambique, Seychelles, Somalia, Tanzania and Yemen. The SWIOFC was established in November 2004 and held its first meeting in April 2005. It is an advisory body concerned with the coastal fishery resources of member states.
175 www.fao.org
The marine mammal-fisheries interaction discussion in COFI falls within COFI’s consideration of the Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries Management (EAFM). The Ecosystem Approach (or Ecosystem-Based Fisheries Management (EBFM) as it is sometimes called) “reverses the order of management priorities so that the objective of sustaining ecosystem structure and function supersedes the objective of maximizing fisheries yields.”

Professor Tony Pitcher of the Fisheries Centre at the University of British Columbia, Canada, wrote in a foreword to a 1998 FAO-sponsored workshop on the subject:

Contrary to the previous view that fishing has hardly had any effect on either the structure of composition of marine ecosystems, it is gradually being realized that the historical impacts of fishing have been large, dramatic and difficult to reverse. Fishing has seriously depleted biodiversity within and among species, reduced trophic linkages, caused local extinctions and compromised the economic value of marine resources. Fisheries scientists are only just beginning to recognize that these questions are the most important of our day, since without quantitative evaluations of ecosystem changes under alternative fishing policies, we will be powerless to reverse trends that, in the face of modern fishing gear technology, will likely result, within a generation, in the devastation of our oceans.

EAFM-related issues are addressed in several articles of the Code of Conduct and have been the subject of various conferences and declarations. In October 2001 the Government of Iceland, supported by FAO and the Government of Norway, hosted the Reykjavik Conference on Responsible Fisheries, particularly in support of Article 6 of the Code (“General Principles”). The Government of Japan abstained when the conference adopted the “Reykjavik Declaration” because the text “did not specifically mention the interrelationship between fisheries and marine mammals.” The Plan of Implementation agreed at the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg “encourage[d] the application by 2010 of the ecosystem approach” in fisheries, as well as inviting states to ratify or accede to and implement UNCLOS “which provides the overall legal framework for ocean activities” and to promote the implementation of Chapter 17 of Agenda 21.

UNCLOS and Agenda 21 both contain important provisions regarding the conservation of whales and management of whaling, whales being given special status both as highly migratory species (UNCLOS Article 64) and as marine mammals (Articles 65 and 120) under which a state or international organisation may “prohibit, limit or regulate the exploitation of marine mammals more strictly than provided for in this Part” (that is, more strictly than “optimum utilization”). UNCLOS paragraphs 61(4) and 119(1)(b) require fisheries for prey species to be regulated “with a view to maintaining or restoring populations of such associated or dependent species [that is, predators on the harvested species] above levels at which their reproduction may become seriously threatened.” This principle is strongly supported also in various articles of the Code of Conduct. [See Annex 2] The Japanese and Norwegian insistence on the idea of “ecosystem manipulation”, that is, removal of the predators in the hope of increasing the yields of commercial fisheries, is not only contrary to these principles of international law but has never been shown to be practicable.
Nevertheless, in Norway this view was adopted officially in May 2004 as part of a new policy on marine mammals, in which “ecosystem-based management shall use resource-ecological arguments as the basis for determining the size of marine mammal populations.” Peter Corkeron, writing in the June 2006 issue of *Conservation Biology*, argues that this approach, deriving from a policy of multispecies fisheries management (MSFM) as devised by Norwegian scientists more than a decade earlier, “appears to maintain the traditional order of management priorities – maximizing yields from industrial fisheries has priority over maintaining Japan’s Security, an initiative of the Government of Japan with support from FAO.” Corkeron further explains: “Actions to date suggest that using ‘resource-ecological arguments as the basis for establishing objectives for determining the size of marine mammal populations’ implies reducing the sizes or of halting increases in the sizes of populations of interest. This suggests that the “ecosystem” aspect of the new policy relates to attempts to manipulate ecosystems (in their current state) in the hopes of maximizing fisheries yields….Thus, using hunts to stabilize or reduce the size of marine mammal populations is the primary component of Norway’s new policy.” Corkeron points out that “culling is not generally discussed as an aspect of EBFM.” Predator culls are described in scientific literature as a “tangential issue” in EBFM, he argues, with the consequence that what is the primary component of multispecies fisheries management in Norway’s policy is actually tangential to EBFM. Corkeron concludes:

*If the conceptual boundaries of ecosystem-based fisheries management are stretched to include culling as a primary component, then science will have been applied poorly to policy, the tangential will have become mainstream, and ecosystem-based fishery management could fail before it has been implemented internationally.*\(^{182}\)

Japan’s own efforts to reshape the EAFM debate in COFI and FAO is supported only by Norway, Iceland and a group of developing countries that for the most part are among those that have joined the IWC to support Japan’s agenda there.

Japan made a first effort at the 23rd session of COFI, 15-19 February 1999, at which Morimoto was elected First Vice Chairman, and Komatsu was on the Japanese delegation together with representatives of the OFCF, the ICR and the wise use NGO Global Guardian Trust. At that meeting COFI “noted the progress in the application of the Kyoto Declaration and Plan of Action\(^{183}\) and expressed the need to assess better the cultural and socio-economic aspects of fisheries in relation to food security. The Committee agreed that greater consideration should be given to the development of more appropriate ecosystem approaches to fisheries development and management, optimally in collaboration with both FAO and non-FAO regional fisheries bodies.”\(^{184}\)

While that recommendation advanced the ecosystem approach generally it did nothing specific to boost the whaling lobby’s agenda. They tried again at FAO a month later, this time through Vice-Minister Kameya, who led the Japanese delegation to the FAO Ministerial-level meeting on the Implementation of the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries Practices, which met in Rome on 10-11 March 1999. The fisheries meeting was attended by ministers and representatives from 129 countries. Vice-Minister Kameya emphasized four points during the fisheries meeting, one of which was: “the importance of comprehensive management of the marine ecosystem, including cetaceans and other marine mammals.” On

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\(^{181}\) Corkeron, 2006, op. cit.

\(^{182}\) Ibid.

\(^{183}\) The Declaration was agreed at the December 1995 Kyoto Summit on the Sustainable Contribution of Fisheries to Food Security, an initiative of the Government of Japan with support from FAO.

the last day of the meeting the Rome Declaration on the Implementation of the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries was adopted. Among its points was that “Comprehensive management of the marine ecosystem should be taken into account in conservation and management of fisheries resources”, but Kameya’s specific reference to “cetaceans or other marine mammals” was not included. At COFI’s 24th session in 2001, the whaling lobby finally scored a coup when Mr Komatsu was elected chairman of the session and was able to force through a disputed recommendation to FAO to “conduct studies on the relationship between marine mammals and fisheries.” But during that same discussion, the COFI report shows that “Other Members, however, commented on the issues and complexity of ecosystem-based fisheries management, urging that caution be exercised in drawing definitive conclusions with respect to the impact of predator/prey relationships on fisheries as a number of environmental and human factors also contributed to the status of particular fisheries.”

This outcome of the 2001 COFI meeting, an apparent endorsement by FAO/COFI of Japan’s thesis that whales compete with human fish consumption, is frequently referred to in Japanese government and industry briefing material and reports to give legitimacy to their claims. In a briefing paper entitled “The Facts about Whales and Fish Stocks”, Japan’s ICR, for example, notes that “the matter of competition between marine mammals and fisheries is now of serious concern for nations dependent on fisheries as well as for a number of global and regional fisheries management organizations including the United Nations’ Food and Agriculture Organisation”. FAO’s apparent support has also been cited as a justification for Japan’s newest scientific whaling programme in the North Pacific, JARPN II.

Determined to press the matter even further, Japan arrived at the 25th session of COFI in February 2003, this time without Komatsu but armed with its PR material regarding JARPN II and the photographs of fish spilling out of the stomachs of harpooned whales, which were presented to delegates by Joji Morishita the day before EAFM was to be discussed. More importantly, Japan arrived with a well-organised group of mostly Caribbean and African countries, almost all from the Japan-supporting bloc in the IWC, to back it up, fresh from a secret strategy session only two weeks earlier in Tokyo to which, reportedly, representatives of some 40 developing countries had been invited to discuss COFI, CITES and the IWC. A common theme of these interventions was that whales and marine mammals generally pose a threat to the “food security” of these nations by their consumption of fish. Trinidad and Tobago’s delegate, William Benjamin, an adviser to the Ministry of Food Production and Marine Resources (who was to play another role in a year’s time – see section 8), was the first to speak, not only informing the meeting that whales are threatening the food security of Trinidad and Tobago but also thanking Japan for its “generosity and genuine concern for the peoples of the Caribbean”. Supporting statements were made by Antigua and Barbuda, Benin, Cameroon, Dominica, Republic of Guinea, Mauritania, St Kitts and Nevis, St Lucia, St Vincent and the Grenadines and Seychelles, with one exception a familiar roster from the IWC. Many of these gave their full endorsement to the continuation of studies and to FAO’s continuing involvement in the issue.

186 This recommendation emerged from a session of the Drafting Committee. When discussed by the full meeting, a number of countries objected as they did not support the recommendation, but Komatsu as Chair would not allow any changes to be made.
187 “Given the increasing importance of and interest in competition between marine mammals and fisheries with strong support from international organizations, including the …FAO, JARPN II focuses on feeding ecology and ecosystem studies.” MAFF Update, n. 479, 22 November 2002.
188 This meeting was reportedly sponsored by the OFCF; delegates’ travel expenses and accommodation would have been handled through that organisation.
But despite the obvious prior preparation and organization of these coordinated interventions, the Japanese attempt to hijack the EAFM debate did not succeed. Strong opposition came from the delegations of Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the USA; the EU commented that predator-prey relations are only a “very small part” of what is meant by an ecosystem approach to management. Objections were made to the various references made in FAO’s Draft Guidelines on EAFM to “ecosystem manipulation”, the culling of top predators, and to the language used in the Draft Guidelines regarding the precautionary approach which, it was argued, was not consistent with the precautionary approach language used in the Code of Conduct. South Africa also argued that the ecosystem approach “goes well beyond” predator-prey relations and possible impacts of predation by mammals. Other interventions, for example by Argentina, India, Indonesia, Malaysia and Peru, did not address the “whales-eat-fish” issue at all, but instead called attention to a variety of other issues such as problems associated with coral reefs, mangroves and the effects on the marine ecosystem of climate change.

The Report of the 2003 COFI meeting said:

91. Many Members reconfirmed their strong support for paragraph 39 of the report of the Twenty-fourth Session of COFI. Researches on the subject of interactions between marine mammals and fisheries were described. Many members supported the need for continuing research and the further development of ecosystem models while other Members noted that EAF was wider than just predator/prey relations and possible mammal impacts. Some Members expressed the view that low priority be given to predator/prey relations, and their impact on fish resources, as opposed to other aspects of relevance, such as reduced bycatch, habitat protection, land-based impacts, climatic changes, etc. Some Members noted the primacy of the International Whaling Commission with respect to the role of whales in the marine environment and the strongly held view that discussions on whales in COFI detracted from the more important fisheries issues such as IUU [Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated] fishing.

At COFI’s 26th session, held in Rome 7-11 March 2005, the EAFM was not on the agenda (although its further development is foreseen in FAO’s two-year work programme). The delegate of Japan raised the matter in Japan’s Opening Statement, saying that it was not satisfied with the way the agenda had been put together and indicating that it would raise EAFM under Any Other Business. Japan’s eventual intervention, citing again the estimations from the ICR papers, was supported by the delegates (who also serve as their countries’ IWC representatives) from Nicaragua, St Kitts (Daven Joseph of Antigua and Barbuda), Grenada, Dominica, Morocco, St Lucia and Iceland, most of whom said little else during the week. Japan gave notice that it wanted the item to be placed on the agenda for the next COFI session, in early 2007. Grenada called on FAO to hold a technical consultation on this matter with a report to be made to the 2007 session, though there was no agreement on this. The St Lucian delegate thanked FAO for the study now underway in Caribbean region, but commented that there was a problem with certain approaches being taken within that project “which we hope to resolve with the project coordinator”. Other delegates disagreed with Japan’s statements regarding the putative impact of whales on fish stocks and reiterated their belief that this was a matter for the IWC to address, not COFI. Interventions by two NGOs drew further attention to the weaknesses in Japan’s arguments.
At COFI’s 27th session, 5-9 March 2007, EAFM was back on the agenda. The Secretariat’s background document for this agenda item contained, in its paragraph 46, a summary list of “the broad ecological issues that must be addressed and reconciled in managing fisheries within an ecosystem approach”. The list included “direct impacts of the ecosystem on fisheries” but neither of the two examples given for this aspect dealt in specific terms with predator-prey relations. This “omission” was criticized by St Kitts and Nevis from the floor, and the delegate requested that FAO include progress reports on this issue in future documents. The Secretariat replied that it was, in fact, included in the 2007 document. The delegate of Grenada requested FAO assistance in the form of regional workshops and St Lucia’s representative spoke in support. The observer from the North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission (NAMMCO) reported that NAMMCO has researched the role of marine mammals in the ecosystem and has developed management procedures accordingly. Japan did not speak.

The exchange between St Kitts and Nevis and the FAO Secretariat over the wording of the background document was included in the draft final report of the COFI Conference in a rather inflated version:

“Concern was expressed by some Members that FAO was neglecting the potential importance of predator-prey relationships in an ecosystem approach. The Secretariat confirmed that food web interactions were a consideration in EAF, as indicated in paragraph 46 of COFI/2007/8 and demonstrated in field projects, and that the relative priority of the different issues needed to be evaluated on a case by case basis.”

Grenada’s request for FAO assistance through regional workshops was also reflected in the final draft report. This latter appears to be designed in part to provide the political mandate for the FAO Department of Fisheries to continue the work on marine mammals/fisheries interactions through regional projects and workshops. This coincides with increasing indications that FAO is reluctant to become embroiled in the politization of this issue that has been evident in recent years. This was also the sense of several interventions by COFI member states at the 2005 COFI session when they requested that the matter be left to the IWC and kept out of COFI.

6.5 LESSER ANTILLES PELAGIC ECOSYSTEM (LAPE) PROJECT.

The 2003 COFI discussion brought to light two Japanese-funded regional studies of cetacean-fisheries interactions. The first, in the Lesser Antilles of the Eastern Caribbean, had already been alluded to at the 10th Session of WECAC in October 2001, though no details were given at that time. As one of FAO’s Government Cooperation Projects, GCP/RLA/140/JPN, the “Scientific Basis for Ecosystem-based Management in the Lesser Antilles including Interactions with Marine Mammals and other Top Predators (June 2002-June 2007) is currently underway in the region and is now also referred to as the Lesser Antilles Pelagic Ecosystem Project (LAPE). States participating are IWC members Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, St Kitts and Nevis, St Lucia, and St Vincent and the Grenadines; Barbados has also joined the Project and Trinidad and Tobago is described as giving its “active collaboration”. Japan as donor for the project is providing logistical and institutional support, including training, laboratory facilities and the use of a Japanese research vessel for sightings surveys.

190 FAO Project Information Sheet, Lesser Antilles Pelagic Ecosystem Project.
Japan, through the ICR and the National Research Institute of Far Seas Fisheries/Fisheries Research Agency (NRIFRS), was already engaged in annual cetacean sightings surveys in the coastal waters of individual OECS countries, intended to obtain information on the distribution of cetaceans with particular emphasis of humpback and sperm whales. In April 2001 and again in March 2002, surveys took place in the waters of St Vincent and the Grenadines and Grenada, with pre-survey planning meetings in Dominica and St Lucia.191 Hidehiyoshi Yoshida, then of the ICR, participated. A July 2003 survey in the coastal waters of Dominica, Grenada, St Lucia and St Vincent and the Grenadines included “scientists of each country under the sponsorship of the NRIF and ICR;” Yoshida joined the survey around Grenada.192 This project appears to have developed from discussions in late 2000/early 2001 at FAO Headquarters in Rome with representatives of the Government of Japan over plans to extend to Antigua and Barbuda, St Kitts and Nevis and Grenada the cetacean sightings surveys that had been carried out in Dominica, St Lucia and St Vincent and the Grenadines in early 2000 with the help of the ICR. Investigations into cetacean-fisheries interactions were to be part of the extended programme.193

The project was finalized in 2002 following meetings in the Eastern Caribbean states between fisheries officials of the participating countries and Japanese scientists. A reference to the project was included in a background document prepared for the 2003 COFI conference and some of the participating states referred to it in their statements to that meeting. The project became operational in late 2003.194

The July 2005 edition of the Caribbean Regional Fisheries Mechanism (CRFM) News gives details of the various phases of the LAPE Project, which it describes as seeking to “reveal the feeding relationships between pelagic top predators in the waters surrounding the Lesser Antilles. From this study, researchers hope to create ecosystem models to aid in the effective management of pelagic fishery resources.”

According to the CRFM News, the current phase focuses on stomach content sampling. In February 2005 Japanese marine ecologist Dr Hiroshi Ohizumi provided training in stomach removal and content analysis to a training session held at a Project-sponsored facility at the Department of Fisheries in St Lucia, attended by fisheries officers from some of the participating countries. Stomachs are taken from animals killed in the existing small cetacean fisheries in the islands and from stranded animals. Aware of possible concerns about the programme, FAO has developed a Cetacean Policy which states, *inter alia*, that “No project activities will include any lethal sampling of cetaceans.”

An earlier phase of the LAPE Project included large and small cetacean sightings surveys. The large-scale survey ranged from Trinidad and Tobago to the south northwards to St Kitts. The small-scale survey remained in a 12 nautical mile region around St Lucia. The CRFM News reported that “Despite poor weather conditions at times, both surveys produced sightings of several different kinds of cetaceans, including humpback whales, sperm whales and many types of dolphins.” The survey was also reported to the IWC in the Government of Japan’s 2005 *Progress Report* to the IWC Scientific Committee.195 The survey was carried out from 17 April to 14 May 2005, using the Japanese research vessel *Shoman Maru*. All eight Caribbean fisheries officers and assistants (one each from St Lucia, St Kitts and Nevis, Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Dominica and

194 FAO op. cit.
Grenada) participated, and were joined by Dr Yoshida, now of the NRIFS. The month-long survey covered 1274.9 nautical miles, and sightings were reported of 4 humpback whales, 4 sperm whales and 5 Bryde’s whales; the Japanese report to the IWC does not give details of the other cetacean species that were sighted.

St Lucia’s Chief Fisheries Officer, Vaughn Charles, informed journalists at a pre-IWC media symposium in St Kitts in May 2005 that the data being collected under this project “will play a critical role in solidifying the Caribbean’s position at international fora such as …CITES and the …IWC.”196 Since the OECs position at CITES and IWC is by now well-known, this statement increases concerns that it has been pre-determined that the outcome of this study will further Japan’s OECs-supported agenda. A caption to a highly simplified example of an oceanic food web shown in the CRFM News article, for example, referred to earlier repeats this highly controversial and unsubstantiated hypothesis as fact: “From the web we can see how the population of any one species can be affected by an increase or decrease of another. For example, increased numbers of whales would lead to decreased numbers of cod, herring or groupers (their prey).”197

In fact, one of the concerns regarding this project is that marine mammals (cetaceans) have been singled out in advance in accordance with the political agenda of Japan, the main donor. In this case there is a danger that such an unbalanced coverage of the ecosystem could lead to the development of inappropriate management strategies caused by exclusive focus on one factor that may not be one of the key factors affecting fisheries in the ecosystem. In the debate in the FAO Council that followed the 2001 COFI meeting, “it was made clear that any study conducted by FAO on ecosystem considerations in fisheries must be a balanced and holistic assessment and must not, in particular, be solely on interactions between marine mammals and fisheries.”198

Japan’s investment in this five-year project must have been considerable199, yet questions could be asked as to whether the same investment could not have been more usefully directed to helping the Eastern Caribbean countries face the real fisheries problems before them. In a press release issued in March 2005 on the occasion of the JICA study team’s meeting with CARICOM officials to develop a fisheries Master Plan for the CARICOM region, CARICOM Secretary-General Edwin Carrington, for example, pointed to several factors impeding the use of fisheries resources to contribute to sustainable development. These included: “limited research capacity, lack of harvesting and processing technology, inadequate marketing and trade arrangements for fish and fishery products, as well as a scarcity of financial resources.”200 Marine mammal-fisheries interactions do not appear among them.

Recently some of the IWC delegates from the OECs countries have hinted at possible plans for whaling in their own countries. In November 2006 St Kitts and Nevis Fisheries Minister Cedric Liburd was quoted as saying that he “supports fully the need for the Caribbean to engage in the whaling industry for the development and benefit of its tourism sector…”201 At the 2005 IWC Annual Meeting, during discussion of the aboriginal/subsistence whaling quota of humpback whales for St Vincent and the Grenadines, Dominica’s Commissioner “Noting

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198 FAO, Cetacean Policy, LAPE Project.
199 According to ECCO, Japan donated US$4.1 million for this project. Source: JWA News, No. 9, April 2004.
that a group of native Carib Indians reside in Dominica who in the past have utilized cetaceans as a critical component of their diet, Dominica looked forward to further enhancement of the stock so that some day it may be able to reinstate the cultural, social and economic benefits that can be derived from aboriginal subsistence takes.” On the other hand, regional scholars have strongly refuted the argument of a Caribbean whaling tradition. As reported by the Eastern Caribbean Coalition for Environmental Awareness (ECCEA) in a 1997 report, “a monograph of the subject was presented to some 200 archaeologists at the International Association of Caribbean Archaeology (IACA)’s 16th biennial conference in Guadeloupe, in July 1995. Following discussions, it was unanimously concluded that pre-Colombians of the Antilles had never hunted cetaceans.”

Colin Murdoch, Alternate Commissioner for Antigua and Barbuda and Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was reported by the BBC during the 2005 Ulsan meeting to have said that “a resumption of whaling would open up new opportunities for local fishermen.” In the same news story, Daven Joseph was quoted as saying “The key point is that if commercial whaling is resumed, then countries in the Caribbean would be given a quota. Even though we might not catch whales ourselves, we could then sell the quota, like we do our quota under ICCAT (the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tuna).” [It is unclear to what this last remark refers since none of the OECS countries is a member of ICCAT.] Joseph is also quoted as speculating that “Apart from local consumption, there is the issue of export, and we have Guadeloupe nearby which can be a gateway to France, for example”, although this would be both illegal under CITES, EU and French legislation for certain species and quite unlikely. The Government of France announced at the 2006 IWC meeting its project establishing a marine mammal sanctuary in the EEZ of the French Antilles, including Guadeloupe and Martinique, as part of its wider policy of support for the Specially Protected Areas and Wildlife (SPAW) Protocol of the 1983 Cartagena Convention and creation of marine mammal sanctuaries in other regions of the world.

There are directed small cetacean fisheries in St Lucia and St Vincent and the Grenadines, of which short-finned pilot whales are the main target. In addition, opportunistic hunts of various small cetacean species from fishing boats operating in Dominica and Grenada as well as St Lucia and St Vincent and the Grenadines have also been reported; stranded animals are also occasionally consumed. Although the IWC does not regulate these catches nor has it taken steps to do so, there being a long-standing lack of agreement among member states on this matter, the OECS countries have stopped reporting their small cetacean statistics to the IWC’s Small Cetacean Sub-Committee of the Scientific Committee in coordination with Japan since 2000. The ICR has been working with the fisheries administrations of these countries to investigate possibilities to maintain and further develop these cetacean fisheries. In 1998, for example, the ICR organized a meeting of scientists and fisheries administrators from the six OECS countries in Castries, St Lucia, the purpose being, according to the Japanese fisheries press, “to raise the small-scale coastal whaling in the Caribbean nations to an industry that supports the diet of island localities through proper resource management.”

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Japan has of course always supported the Bequian fishery for humpback whales in the IWC, the only cetacean hunt in the Caribbean that is under IWC regulation, and in June 2005 donated nearly US$90,000 to the Bequia Indigenous Whalers Association for the Restoration of Semple Cay Whaling Station on the island, under its Grant Assistance for Grass-roots Human Security Projects programme. In an official release about the grant, made available through the Japanese Embassy in Trinidad and Tobago, it was reported that the grant was expected to cover “major construction and purchases for the whaling station, such as the construction of a storage shed and a fencing ramp; a processing and marketing area for the whales; a landing jetty for visitors; the provision of a generator for nightly operations; and, a power pump for washing and cleaning the facilities.”206

6.6 WEST AFRICAN SURVEYS.

The representative from the Republic of Guinea, also Guinea’s IWC Commissioner, supported Japan’s presentation at COFI 2003 and called attention to research into marine mammal-fisheries interactions along the West African coastlines of Guinea, Senegal, Guinea-Bissau, Benin, Cape Verde and Gabon, funded by Japan in December 2002.

Japan coordinates this cetacean work through the Conakry-based Centre National des Sciences Halieutiques de Boussoura in Guinea.207 From 1 August to 28 September 2001, the ICR hosted a training workshop in Japan for representatives from six West African states (Cape Verde, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Republic of Guinea and Senegal) in the practice and theory of cetacean sightings and identification. Participants spent time at the ICR headquarters in Tokyo, on board the research vessel Kyo-Maru No. 1, and at the National Research Institute of Far Seas Fisheries, in Shimizu. This was in preparation for a sightings cruise that took place under the auspices of the Government of Guinea and the ICR, in the Gulf of Guinea in December 2002, using the Senegalese research vessel ITAF DEME.208

Another three surveys have been conducted since then. In the January 2006 survey, run by the NRIFS and the ICR, a researcher from Sierra Leone, not at the moment an IWC member state, participated for the first time; other countries represented were Guinea, Mauritania, Senegal, Cote d’Ivoire, Togo, Benin and Cameroon.209 In 618.8 n. miles 36 cetacean schools were recorded, including 3 Bryde’s whales and 57 sperm whales. This survey, like the others before it, was intended to “accumulate further information on distribution and density of cetaceans off the western North Africa” in coastal waters. Japanese institutions involved in the various surveys have been the ICR, the NRIFS, Kyodo Senpaku Kaisya Ltd (the company that charters the vessels and crews used by the ICR for the two scientific whaling programmes) and the OFCF. These three most recent surveys have all used the Guinean research vessel General Lansana Conte, built with an 881 million Yen grant from Japan.

In March 2006, the monthly newsletter of the Japan Fisheries Association, Isaribi (expressing the “Views and Opinions of Japan’s Fisheries Industry”), published an article entitled “Voices of African Countries on the Whaling Issue.” Claiming to sum up the African position at the IWC, the article states the following, with reference to the West African sightings surveys:

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207 www.cnshb.org.gn
In African coastal countries, in effect, we are improving our production of fish by concentrating our efforts to the fisheries sector. Expensive species are exported to the markets of developed countries (USA, EU and Japan) while local inhabitants must be content with the small pelagic species (mackerel, horse mackerel, sardine, etc) which can be harvested in large quantities. But the fact that we witness very often, along the coastline of our continent, appearances of a large number of cetaceans including dolphins makes us easily imagine that the resources of these small pelagic species are partly but steadily consumed by those cetaceans. In order for us to get rid of such a negative impact by whales on our fish resources, it is urgent to implement a series of research programs. For this purpose, only Japan is helping us effectively for the time being (i.e. cetacean research programs by means of sightseeing surveys off the coast of West Africa, in particular the Republic of Guinea). In case the research discovers and proves the negative impact of whales on fish resources, we would like to reserve our right to catch whales in a sustainable manner for ourselves and our future generations who might have the necessity of exploiting whale resources. If we can rationally use certain abundant resources of whale species which eat so much fish, we can kill two birds with one stone: we can protect fish resources against the attacks by whales and we can get direct benefits from whale products.

Pauly and Karschner wrote in their 2004 report:

The very attempt to substitute predators such as marine mammals with fisheries leads to food web disruptions and adjustments that often preclude the harvesting of the former’s prey by humans. Thus, the last decade, which has seen the ‘fishing down’ of marine food webs, has not led to increased marine fisheries catches; indeed, global fisheries catches have been declining since the late 1980s despite the depletion of large predatory fish throughout the oceans by fisheries. Moreover, it is the continuation of present fisheries management approaches and the export of fisheries products from developing to developed countries – not marine mammals – that endanger human food security.

Solving the problems of global fisheries and human hunger are big challenges that will involve the best that humankind can contribute. These problems, however, will not be resolved by divisive, politically driven schemes such as the culling of marine mammals.

It is also worth recalling that most of the West African IWC members are also Parties to the Convention on Migratory Species (CMS), some for many more years than they have been members of the IWC. These include: Cameroon (1983), Benin and Senegal (1986), Mali (1987), Morocco (1993), Togo (1996), Mauritania (1998), Gambia (2001) and Cote d’Ivoire (2003). As Parties they are committed to “endeavour to provide immediate protection for migratory species included in Appendix I”: these include sperm, humpback, blue, fin and sei whales. Migratory species “that have an unfavourable conservation status or would benefit significantly from international cooperation organized by tailored agreements are listed in Appendix II.” These include many species of dolphins and porpoises, Baird’s beaked whale, minke and Bryde’s whales.

The Seventh Conference of Parties to the CMS, meeting in Bonn 18-24 September 2002, adopted a recommendation concerning Regional Coordination for Small Cetaceans and Sirensians of Central and West Africa. This recommendation, aimed at creating a regional memorandum of understanding, notes that “coastal communities of the Atlantic Ocean and...”

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210 ISARIBI, No. 49, March 2006. Published by the Japan Fisheries Association, www.suisankai.or.jp.
those living along inland waters value these small cetaceans and sirenians for their heritage, economic, scientific, tourism and educational value as a significant component of the world’s biodiversity” and is “aware that threats to these species, notably destruction or modification of habitats by the development of coastal areas and of riverbanks of inland waters, pollution, agriculture, increasing mortality and by-catch could if not properly managed, lead to further decline in their populations.” A scientific symposium and meeting are scheduled for autumn 2007 under the auspices of CMS to discuss the further development of this agreement; meanwhile, the Japanese-funded cetacean surveys continue.
7. Whaling, public relations and the wise-use movement.

The recruitment campaign has run for the longest in the OECS countries, and there it is distinguished by a significant emphasis on public relations work. It is no accident that the main “handler” of the Caribbean delegates at IWC meetings for years was, in fact, Alan Macnow, director of the PR firm Tele-Press Associates of New York.

The hallmarks of the PR campaign in the Caribbean region are the annual media briefings purporting to be objective briefings on issues related to the IWC to which journalists are invited, usually by the host government, with all expenses paid. In fact, as a number of journalists have found over the years, the meetings serve only to promote the propaganda offered by Japanese and OECS whaling advocates. For the media symposium held in Antigua and Barbuda in 2002 and partially recorded by the BBC, “all flights, food accommodation and incidental expenses [were] paid by the Japan Whaling Association.” 

Peter Espeut, Executive Director of the Caribbean Coastal Area Management Foundation based in Clarendon, Jamaica, writing in his weekly column in the Jamaica Gleaner, described what happened in the run-up to the 1999 IWC meeting in Grenada, the first ever to take place in the Caribbean. “On the Sunday before the IWC meeting, they held a ‘Media Symposium’ for some 40 journalists they had flown to Grenada (including a Gleaner staff reporter), where only the pro-whaling point-of-view was put forward, mostly with OECS speakers. The Caribbean position was made out to be the same as the OECS position, and the journalists were misled, and then quickly flown home before they could attend the IWC meeting or talk to anyone else. This was expensive, but it paid off, for at least in The Gleaner, two pro-whaling stories were run and no anti-whaling ones.”

The 2005 media briefing took place near the end of May 2005 in St Kitts and was devoted to “media sensitisation”. An account of the briefing was published on the website of the Government of St Lucia. PR Watch, reporting on the activities of Tele-Press Associates in 2001, identifies the Government of St Lucia as a client of TPA, along with, of course, the JFA, the OFCF and various other fisheries industry-related bodies in Japan.

The 2005 press briefing was a lower level affair than the one in 2004, hosted by the Government of Trinidad and Tobago and ECCO, and even involving the President of the country. The 2004 conference was clearly aimed at recruiting Trinidad and Tobago into the IWC; Guyana and Jamaica were also singled out as targets. Its driving force and organizer in Trinidad and Tobago was William Benjamin, who had informed the FAO’s COFI meeting one year earlier on behalf of his Government that whales were a threat to his country’s “food security” and also thanked the Government of Japan for its “generosity” to the region.

In his column in the Trinidad Express, Professor Julian Kenny, for 30 years Professor of Zoology at the St Augustine (Trinidad) campus of the University of the West Indies and a former Chairman of the Board of Management of Trinidad and Tobago’s Institute of Marine Affairs, wrote: “I was in fact at the last minute invited to make a 15-minute presentation at the second afternoon session but once I saw the programme and the persona, I realized what it was all about, getting Trinidad and Tobago to join the International Whaling Commission,
obviously to vote for the country that funded the symposium. It was not about science and I declined.”

He later explained: “Sustainable development is the thing these days. Not so long ago there was a two-day symposium organised by the Japanese funded whaling lobby in CARICOM entitled "Sustainable use of renewable resources". The symposium involved in part the President of the country, two ministers of government responsible for agriculture and the environment and various other public officials. Actually the symposium was really a manipulation of the political processes of the country by the international whaling lobby that wants to return to the past. But sustainable development is not just a buzz word—it is adopted in the laws of this country.”

John Fuller, former IWC Commissioner for Antigua and Barbuda during the years that it strongly supported conservation measures in the IWC, in a radio programme in 2005 expressed his scepticism regarding Japan’s, and the OECS’, commitment to “sustainable utilization” in the IWC: “All of it is just a bogus, fake, nonsensical argument to support the Japanese…Sustainable use – give me a break – it is all just paying back Japan for the money they spent.”

Despite the pro-whaling theme of the 2004 symposium, Ann-Marie Jobity, Trinidad and Tobago’s Director of Fisheries, when addressing the meeting said that it was not her country’s policy to join the IWC.

For Caribbean countries, it may be argued the focus of whaling is not food security or to satisfy nutritional needs, and only in a few cases is it cultural. Seven CARICOM states are members of the IWC. Donor funding, in particular to the fisheries sector, is linked to this membership and support of a particular position. Aid from proponents for the resumption of commercial whaling may many times compel a country to make decisions that are not in their national interest.

Trinidad and Tobago is not a whaling country and hence, at this time, we would be interested in the work of the IWC mainly from a conservation standpoint and the promotion of non-consumptive use. Membership of the IWC is therefore not considered a priority at this time. Membership can be revisited if this country has sufficient reason to be concerned that the IWC requires additional support in respect of achieving its mandate.

It emerged during the symposium that the Cabinet had approved Trinidad and Tobago’s participation in the Japanese-funded FAO project on marine mammal-fisheries interactions in the Lesser Antilles [see section 6.4.1]. Journalist Mark Meredith wrote: “A senior Fisheries source told me the project would be executed by the United Nations FAO…, but that there was no budgetary allocation from Government. Funding would come from Japan.”

The Trinidad and Tobago symposium also highlighted the anti-NGO flavour of these gatherings, reflecting even more so the agenda of the sponsors. Meredith’s account of the symposium in the Trinidad & Tobago Express referred to comments by a delegate from the Trinidad and Tobago-based NGO, the Caribbean Network for Integrated Rural Development (CNIRD): "For those who have had ears to hear at this meeting it is quite evident what the

219 Meredith, op. cit.
220 Ibid.
real agenda has been. It is unfortunate that in the process of trying to satisfy that agenda we have been willing to put at risk the positive and productive relationship of both governments and NGOs in the Caribbean, which we have fought so hard for for years, working so hard to develop and establish. The amount of time we have spent NGO-bashing, could have been much better spent devising strategy or possible solutions.221

7.1 ROLE OF THE WISE-USE MOVEMENT.

The “NGO-bashing” that is particularly evident in statements and media events related to the OECS countries is indicative of the involvement of the “wise-use” movement. Prof. David Lavigne of the University of Guelph, Canada, wrote in 2006: “Since the early 1980s there has been a backlash against the environmental and conservation movements and, particularly, against the gains they extracted between 1960 and the early 1980s. This backlash…has been orchestrated by those who wish to exploit nature and natural resources solely for short-term economic gain. Thus was born the ‘wise-use’ movement….This ‘anti-environmental movement’ describes itself as ‘an informal amalgamation of individuals and groups’ that ‘fights for private property, individual liberties, and free enterprise against environmental oppression.’… Their ultimate goal, says American Ron Arnold – the movement’s self-proclaimed founder – is: ‘to destroy, to eradicate the environmental movement. We want to be able to exploit the environment for private gain, absolutely. And we want people to understand that this is a noble goal.’”222 Originating in the U.S., the movement has sought to expand internationally and particularly in the context of international conservation agreements. It has been helped considerably in this by organizations such as the IWMC, mentioned earlier in this report.

Whaling has for long been one of the emblematic issues of the environmental movement, making it the inevitable target of the “wise use” movement, whose hand shows very clearly in what is happening in the IWC.

Section 6 of this document reported how many of the new IWC members help justify their participation in what must otherwise not be a priority organization for them through the whales-eat-fish campaign. But they also justify their at times impassioned support for a resumption of commercial whaling in terms of “defending the principle sustainable use of marine living resources”, echoing the language of recent international agreements and conferences.

The wise-use movement has made a practice of co-opting the language of traditional conservation and turning it to its own ends. The whaling issue is no exception, and in fact some of the contradictory use of terminology in evidence during debates between the whaling countries and conservation-minded countries at IWC meetings is testimony to this. “Sustainable use” in the wise-use lexicon translates into “commercial consumptive use”, with no relation to biological sustainability.223 A recently published review of the whaling issue notes that “[I]n 1966, the exploitation of whales has been almost universally biologically unsustainable.”224 The paper further notes that “[T]he whaling experience suggests that the kind of management required to ensure biological sustainability may not be politically sustainable.” (This is clear, for example, in Norway’s decision years ago to abandon the most

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221 Trinidad & Tobago Express, 12 April 2004, “NGOs come in for blows”, by Mark Meredith.
223 Cooke, Justin and Vassili Papastavrou. “Sustainable Use of Oceanic Wildlife: What Lessons can be Learned from Commercial Whaling?” in Ibid.
conservative options selected by the IWC in its development of the RMP.) “This finding calls the conventional paradigm of managed sustainable use into question.”224

While Japan and its recruited allies rally under the banner of “sustainable use of marine living resources”, when put into a wise-use context the rallying cry takes on quite a different meaning. Although the St Kitts and Nevis Declaration draws attention to the fact that the IWC has “adopted a robust and risk-averse procedure (RMP) for calculating quotas for abundant stocks of baleen whales in 2004”, the fact is that neither Japan nor Norway have chosen to limit their current catches to levels specified in the RMP. Instead they continue to increase their catches on some populations to well above the levels that would be permitted under the RMP. In the absence of any willingness to abide by the accepted procedure questions must be asked about exactly what the “sustainable use” enthusiasts are supporting. Prof. Lavigne wrote: “For decades, it has been recognized that those species which people use as commodities are inherently at risk of population depletion or elimination, and that ‘wildlife conservation is incompatible with global markets and private ownership.’ Today, these are the very ideals that are being promoted by the ‘wise-use’ movement to achieve its version of sustainable (read unsustainable) use.”225

The wise-use movement has its own reasons for wanting to defeat the commercial whaling moratorium and to see the more traditional conservation values that have held the upper hand in the IWC for more than two decades fail. The movement’s agenda, however, dovetails easily with that of Japan, and a close working relationship between them is clear. The activities of these private organizations are rarely publicized and so are difficult to trace, but they are believed to be significant. Eugene Lapointe’s IWMC has already been mentioned elsewhere in this report. The Sustainable Use Parliamentarians Union, which involves politicians and administrators from many countries, had its origins in the IWMC. The IWMC brings these officials together on various occasions to further promote and organize the attack on the conservation side at the IWC (as well as at CITES and in other fora). In early 2007, for example, the IWMC hosted a seminar in Dakar, Senegal for West African countries that addressed, inter alia, the whaling issue. An active wise-use organization in Japan, the Global Guardian Trust (GGT), provides a similar service. Grenada’s Government Information Service reported in June 2004 that Fisheries Minister Bowen had just departed for Japan where he would represent Grenada at a “Pre-IWC Symposium on Sustainable Use of Living Marine Resources” in Tokyo, 3-5 June and would also attend a “sustainable use meeting” sponsored by the wise use organization Global Guardian Trust, to be held in Nagato City, 5-6 June.226 GGT’s Director, Dr Yoshio Kaneko, is listed on the IWMC website as its 2nd Vice President. He was chosen to serve as Moderator at the 2006 Japan Foreign Ministry Symposium on “Recent Trend of the Management of Marine Living Resources: Sustainable Use and Application of Precautionary Approach”. Alan Macnow’s PR firm, Tele-Press Associates, whose clients include the Japan Whaling Association, the OFCF and the Government of St Lucia, is also known to advocate the wise-use cause and has engaged in some of the most virulent attacks on environmental NGOs over the years.227

224 Ibid.
7.2 TRAINING SESSIONS.

The PR work takes another form as well, in the training and preparation of delegates for their performances at the IWC, and in COFI and CITES as well. Individual officials are regularly brought to Japan under the OFCF “exchange” programme, as was reported earlier. But through the OFCF larger organizational meetings are also held in Japan, usually in great secrecy. One of these was the meeting held in February 2003 to prepare for the COFI session and upcoming IWC meeting. Unconfirmed reports say that the meeting was attended by representatives of 40 developing countries.

Another coordination meeting took place 15-16 May 2003. A news release from the Government of Grenada, dated 14 May 2003, reported the participation of Grenada’s then Minister for Agriculture, Lands, Forestry and Fisheries, Claris Charles, in what was billed as a “Symposium on Sustainable Use of Marine Resources” but could more appropriately have been called a training session. The news release listed the benefits that would come from Grenada’s participation in this symposium, including to “strengthen the capacity of Grenada to better negotiate and represent its interest regionally and internationally in the management and development of its resources”, to “allow countries promoting sustainable use of marine resources to formulate a common strategy” and to “allow countries to enhance their capacity to represent themselves at the upcoming International Whaling Commission meeting.”

Another such gathering was reported by the Antigua Sun in 2006: “Countries supporting the sustainable use of marine resources will gather in Tokyo, Japan to discuss issues to be tabled at the [IWC’s] 58th annual general meeting….Ambassador Anthony Liverpool, Antigua & Barbuda’s Commissioner at the [IWC] and alternate commissioner Joanne Massiah, minister responsible for marine resources, will participate in the 11-12 May [2006] meeting convened by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan.”

228 Antigua Sun, 2006, op. cit.
8. Conclusions.

Mr Komatsu and others in the whaling group of Japan have said on many occasions, as he did to the BBC in 2002, that “reason is on our side and science is demonstrating that what Japan is asserting is the right thing.” They also assert that the developing countries that have joined the IWC have done so because they have been persuaded by Japan’s arguments. Said Komatsu in an article published after the 2002 IWC meeting: “The reason for the increase in the number of supporting countries for the cause of Japan is that Japan’s position based on scientific evidence has been accepted internationally.”

If this is so, one wonders then why Japan’s extraordinary attention and cost devoted to rehearsing and training delegates of other countries prior to international meetings?

If there is no financial assistance coming from Japan to pay these countries’ ways to the IWC and their membership fees, why then do some of these governments stay out of organisations of direct relevance to their economic development, such as ICCAT in the case of the OECS, on the grounds that membership is too expensive, and yet participate actively in the IWC which costs more, only to support the resumption and expansion of an economic activity pursued not by their own nationals but by three developed countries, Japan, Norway and Iceland?

If Japan’s “whales-eat-fish” argument is so convincing, why has the work on which it is based never been subject to independent scientific review and debate? Why is the “whales-eat-fish” issue only raised at fisheries meetings when members of the Japanese whaling lobby are present? Why would Japan, one of the world’s largest fishing nations, want to portray whales as threats to commercial fisheries in the context of international discussions of “ecosystem based fisheries management” and how to curtail the over-fishing that is now plaguing the world’s fishing industry?

Is it really in the interest of the recruited countries to be convinced to take a stand against the principles contained in international legal instruments to which they adhere, such as UNCLOS, and international agreements such as Agenda 21 and the Code of Conduct with regard to the conservation of whales and the management of whaling?

Would an economic superpower like Japan, in one-on-one negotiations with economically vulnerable countries to which it is a major donor, really never use its aid or promises of aid to pressure or coerce to obtain a quid pro quo?

Most simply, a question asked by Peter Espeut: “If the Japanese case is so strong, why do they have to resort to these means to gain support?”

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228 BBC, 2002, Whale Hunters op. cit.
ANNEX 1: Grenada Letter confirming Japanese IWC funding.

19th April, 2002.

Mr. Michael Baptiste
Leader of the Opposition
Office of the Leader of the Opposition
H.A. Blaize Street
ST. GEORGE’S.

Dear sir,

SECOND COPY:

RE: JAPAN’S CONTRIBUTIONS TO INTERNATIONAL WHALING COMMISSION

Upon review of our accounts, it has been observed that the contributions from the Government of Japan to the Government of Grenada for the International Whaling Commission were not received and as such was not reflected in the said accounts for the years 1998 and 1999. However, our internal audit revealed that contributions were received for all other years prior to and following 1998 and 1999.

Moreover, the Japanese have confirmed that it made contributions to the Government of Grenada for the specified periods.

In light of the fact that you held the portfolio of Minister for Agriculture, Lands and Fisheries during the period 1998 to 1999, you are kindly requested to assist the Office of the Accountant General with information on Japan’s Contributions to the Government of Grenada for the International Whaling Commission for the stated period.

Thank you for your kind co-operation.

Yours sincerely,

PATRICIA ANTOINE
ACCOUNTANT GENERAL

CC: Permanent Secretary, Finance

ANNEX 2: Japan’s fisheries grant aid agreements, 1994-2006.

All information is taken from the official statistics of Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Japan’s fiscal year runs from 1 April to 31 March. Details of the fisheries grant aid projects below are in the tables on the following pages; all of these involved an official Exchange of Notes. Current IWC member or observer countries are shown in italics.

FY 2006 Fisheries Grant Aid recipients:
6 countries  
Total amount 4,870 million Yen (average grant size 696 million Yen)
Algeria, Guinea, Kiribati, Peru, St Vincent & the Grenadines, Suriname.

FY 2005 Fisheries Grant Aid recipients:
5 countries  
Total amount 3,208 million Yen (average grant size 642 million Yen)
Algeria, Nicaragua, Palau, St Kitts and Nevis, Samoa.

FY 2004 Fisheries Grant Aid recipients:
8 countries  
Total amount 4,696 million Yen (average grant size 587 million Yen)
Antigua and Barbuda, Benin, Cameroon, Fiji, Kiribati, Senegal, Solomon Islands.

FY 2003 Fisheries Grant Aid recipients:
5 countries  
Total amount 2,371 million Yen (average grant size 474 million Yen)
Antigua and Barbuda, Benin, Gabon, Morocco, St Vincent & the Grenadines.

FY 2002 Fisheries Grant Aid recipients:
8 countries + 1 organisation  
Total amount 8,015 million Yen (average grant size 890 million Yen)
Cape Verde, Dominica, Grenada, Guinea, Mauritius, Morocco, Panama, Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center (SEAFDEC), Vietnam.

FY 2001 Fisheries Grant Aid recipients:
12 countries  
Total amount 10,252 million Yen (average grant size 854 million Yen)
Antigua and Barbuda, Cape Verde, Dominica, Gambia, Guinea, Mauritania, Morocco, Palau, St Kitts, St Lucia, Senegal, Tunisia.

FY 2000 Fisheries Grant Aid recipients:
14 countries  
Total amount 9,455 million Yen (average grant size 675 million Yen)
Antigua and Barbuda, Dominican Republic, Gabon, Indonesia, Madagascar, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Micronesia, Oman, St Kitts, Senegal, Seychelles, Sri Lanka, Tanzania.

FY 1999 Fisheries Grant Aid recipients:
11 countries  
Total amount 7,995 million Yen (average grant size 726 million Yen)
Cape Verde, Gambia, Grenada, Kiribati, Mauritania, Micronesia, Morocco, Mozambique, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Tanzania.

FY 1998 Fisheries Grant Aid recipients:
13 countries  
Total amount: 8,117 million Yen (average grant size 624 million Yen)
Cape Verde, Dominica, Egypt, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea, Mauritania, Micronesia, Morocco, Mozambique, Palau, St Lucia, St Vincent and the Grenadines.
FY 1997 Fisheries Grant Aid recipients:
11 Countries  Total amount 1,867 million Yen (average grant 970 million Yen)
   Antigua and Barbuda, Egypt, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, India, Jamaica, Malawi, Morocco, Mozambique, St Lucia, Tunisia.

FY 1996 Fisheries Grant Aid recipients:
10 countries  Total amount 8,759 million Yen (average grant 875 million)
   Egypt, Eritrea, Ghana, Honduras, Micronesia, Morocco, Palau, Peru, Tonga, Viet Nam.

FY 1995 Fisheries Grant Aid recipients:
19 countries  Total amount 9,326 million Yen (average grant 490 million Yen)
   Chile, Dominica, Eritrea, Grenada, Ivory Coast, Kiribati, Madagascar, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Micronesia, Morocco, Palau, St Lucia, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Suriname, Tuvalu, Vietnam.

FY 1994 Fisheries Grant Aid recipients:
22 countries  Total amount 10,148 million Yen (average grant 461 million Yen)
   Benin, Chile, Dominica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Kiribati, Madagascar, Mauritania, Mauritius, Micronesia, Morocco, Nicaragua, St Lucia, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Vietnam.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>PROJECT NAME</th>
<th>YEN AMOUNT</th>
<th>USD EQUIVALENT</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BENIN</td>
<td>Procurement of material and Equipment for Fishing (Phase II)</td>
<td>382 million</td>
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<td>CHILE</td>
<td>Construction of Marine Product Market in the Metropolitan Area</td>
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<td>DOMINICA</td>
<td>Coastal Fisheries Development Project</td>
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<td>ECUADOR</td>
<td>Construction of Papallacta National Andes Fish Farming Center</td>
<td>459 million</td>
<td>4.67 million</td>
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<td>EL SALVADOR</td>
<td>Promotion of Fisheries Complex Project</td>
<td>327 million</td>
<td>3.33 million</td>
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<td>GHANA</td>
<td>Rehabilitation of Tema Outer Fishing Harbour</td>
<td>691 million</td>
<td>7.04 million</td>
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<td>GRENADA</td>
<td>St George’s Artisanal Fisheries Complex</td>
<td>299 million</td>
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<td>GUINEA, REPUBLIC OF</td>
<td>Development of Small-scale Fisheries</td>
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<td>GUINEA-BISSAU</td>
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<td>IVORY COAST</td>
<td>Renovation of San Pedro Fishing Port</td>
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<td>KIRIBATI</td>
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<td>224 million</td>
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<td>MADAGASCAR</td>
<td>Development of Shrimp Culture</td>
<td>717 million</td>
<td>7.3 million</td>
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<td>MAURITANIA</td>
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<td>714 million</td>
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<td>116 million</td>
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<td>864 million</td>
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<td>NICARAGUA</td>
<td>Internal Development of Artisanal Fisheries in the Northern Atlantic Autonomous Region</td>
<td>398 million</td>
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<td>SEYCHELLES</td>
<td>Coastal Fisheries Development</td>
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<td>SOLOMON ISLANDS</td>
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<td>Construction of Fishing Port Facilities at Vung Tan</td>
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## FY 1995 FISHERIES GRANT AID AGREEMENTS

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**FY 1996 FISHERIES GRANT AID AGREEMENTS**

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<td>Project for Construction of Sekondi Fishing Port</td>
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<td>HONDURAS</td>
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<td>Construction of Vessel for the Investigation of Fisheries and Oceanography</td>
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<td>TONGA</td>
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## FY 1997 FISHERIES GRANT AID AGREEMENTS

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<td>ANTIGUA &amp; BARBUDA</td>
<td>Construction of Fish Landing &amp; Distributing Facilities in St John's</td>
<td>1280 million</td>
<td>11.19 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>EGYPT</td>
<td>Project for development of Maadia Fishing Port</td>
<td>582 million</td>
<td>5.08 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>GHANA</td>
<td>Construction of Sekondi Fishing Port</td>
<td>806 million</td>
<td>7.04 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>GUINEA-BISSAU</td>
<td>Construction of Small-scale Fisheries Facilities</td>
<td>731 million</td>
<td>6.39 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>INDIA</td>
<td>Project for Construction of Dredger for Fishing Ports</td>
<td>1248 million</td>
<td>10.91 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAMAICA</td>
<td>Development of Small-scale Fisheries</td>
<td>364 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>MALAWI</td>
<td>Construction of the Dept. of Aquaculture &amp; Fisheries Science, Bunda College of Agriculture</td>
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<td>6.70 million</td>
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<td>MOROCCO</td>
<td>Construction of Ocean Fisheries training Center in Larache</td>
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<td>MOZAMBIQUE</td>
<td>Improvement of Facilities for Repair and Maintenance of Fishing Vessels</td>
<td>770 million</td>
<td>6.73 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>ST LUCIA</td>
<td>Construction of Vieux Fort Fishery Complex</td>
<td>1015 million</td>
<td>8.87 million</td>
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<td>SENEGAL</td>
<td>Improvement of the Central Fish Market in Dakar</td>
<td>728 million</td>
<td>6.36 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEYCHELLES</td>
<td>Improvement of Victoria Artisanal Fishing Port</td>
<td>452 million</td>
<td>3.95 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TUNISIA</td>
<td>Construction of Fisheries Research Vessel</td>
<td>841 million</td>
<td>7.35 million</td>
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</table>
## FY 1998 FISHERIES GRANT AID AGREEMENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>PROJECT NAME</th>
<th>YEN AMOUNT</th>
<th>USD EQUIVALENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CAPE VERDE</td>
<td>Construction of Mindelo Fishing Port</td>
<td>705 million</td>
<td>5.01 million</td>
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<td>DOMINICA</td>
<td>Rehabilitation of Roseau Fishery Facility</td>
<td>510 million</td>
<td>3.62 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>EGYPT</td>
<td>Project for Improvement of Maadia Fishing Port</td>
<td>544 million</td>
<td>3.86 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>GHANA</td>
<td>Construction of Sekondi Fishing Port</td>
<td>892 million</td>
<td>6.34 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRENADA</td>
<td>Construction of Fish Market of Melville Street</td>
<td>605 million</td>
<td>4.3 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GUINEA, REPUBLIC OF</td>
<td>Development of Artisanal Fishery</td>
<td>899 million</td>
<td>6.39 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAURITANIA</td>
<td>Development of Artisanal Fishery Villages</td>
<td>608 million</td>
<td>4.32 million</td>
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<td>MICRONESIA</td>
<td>Improvement of the Facilities for Artisanal Fishery Support Stations in Kosrae State</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOROCCO</td>
<td>Development of Fishing Village of Souira Kdima</td>
<td>549 million</td>
<td>3.90 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOZAMBIQUE</td>
<td>Rehabilitation of Maputo Fishing Port</td>
<td>423 million</td>
<td>3.0 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>PALAU</td>
<td>Development of Fishing Community in Peleliu State</td>
<td>368 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>ST LUCIA</td>
<td>Construction of Vieux Fort Fisheries Complex</td>
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<td>7.16 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>ST VINCENT &amp; THE GRENADINES</td>
<td>Construction of Fishery Center</td>
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## FY 1999 FISHERIES GRANT AID AGREEMENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>PROJECT NAME</th>
<th>YEN AMOUNT</th>
<th>USD EQUIVALENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CAPE VERDE</td>
<td>Project for Construction of Mindelo Fishing Port</td>
<td>671 million</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAMBIA</td>
<td>Improvement of Fisheries products distribution center</td>
<td>398 million</td>
<td>3.79 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>GRENADA</td>
<td>Construction of Melville Street Fish Market</td>
<td>356 million</td>
<td>3.39 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>KIRIBATI</td>
<td>Construction of fisheries complex</td>
<td>648 million</td>
<td>6.18 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAURITANIA</td>
<td>Expansion of Nouadhibou Fishing Port</td>
<td>688 million</td>
<td>6.56 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>MICRONESIA</td>
<td>Construction of Takatik Fishing Port in Pohnpei State</td>
<td>746 million</td>
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<td>MOROCCO</td>
<td>Fisheries project at Souira Kdima</td>
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<td>10.62 million</td>
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<td>MOZAMBIQUE</td>
<td>Rehabilitation of Maputo Fishing Port (Phase II)</td>
<td>1133 million</td>
<td>10.8 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>SENEGAL</td>
<td>Construction of Fisheries Research Vessel</td>
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<td>9.65 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRI LANKA</td>
<td>Improvement of Tangara Fisheries Facilities</td>
<td>389 million</td>
<td>3.71 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TANZANIA</td>
<td>Dar Es Salaam Fish Market (Phase I of II)</td>
<td>840 million</td>
<td>8.01 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>COUNTRY</td>
<td>PROJECT NAME</td>
<td>YEN AMOUNT</td>
<td>USD EQUIVALENT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANTIGUA &amp; BARBUDA</td>
<td>Promotion of small-scale fisheries</td>
<td>857 million</td>
<td>7.92 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOMINICAN REPUBLIC</td>
<td>Development of Coastal Fisheries</td>
<td>594 million</td>
<td>5.49 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GABON</td>
<td>Rehabilitation of Fisheries Center</td>
<td>721 million</td>
<td>6.66 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>INDONESIA</td>
<td>Expansion of Sumarang Fisheries training</td>
<td>632 million</td>
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<td>MADAGASCAR</td>
<td>Rehabilitation of Majunga Fish Market</td>
<td>702 million</td>
<td>6.49 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>MARSHALL ISLANDS</td>
<td>Development of Jaluit Atoll Fishing Village</td>
<td>407 million</td>
<td>3.76 million</td>
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<td>MAURITANIA</td>
<td>Project for the Extension of the National School of Maritime and Fisheries Studies</td>
<td>973 million</td>
<td>9.0 million</td>
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<td>MICRONESIA</td>
<td>Construction of Takatik Fishing Port in Pohnpei State</td>
<td>59 million</td>
<td>545,796</td>
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<tr>
<td>OMAN</td>
<td>Construction of Fisheries Products Quality Control Center</td>
<td>683 million</td>
<td>6.31 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ST KITTS &amp; NEVIS</td>
<td>Construction of Basseterre Fisheries Complex</td>
<td>381 million</td>
<td>3.52 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>SENEGAL</td>
<td>Construction of Fisheries Complex at Kayar</td>
<td>1209 million</td>
<td>11.18 million</td>
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<td>SEYCHELLES</td>
<td>Coastal Fisheries Development</td>
<td>576 million</td>
<td>5.32 million</td>
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<td>SRI LANKA</td>
<td>Tangara Fisheries Complex</td>
<td>472 million</td>
<td>4.36 million</td>
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<td>TANZANIA</td>
<td>Construction of Dar es Salaam Fish Market</td>
<td>789 million</td>
<td>7.29 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TUVALU</td>
<td>Construction of Inter-Island Vessel for Outer Island Fisheries Development</td>
<td>901 million</td>
<td>8.33 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>COUNTRY</td>
<td>PROJECT NAME</td>
<td>YEN AMOUNT</td>
<td>USD EQUIVALENT</td>
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<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANTIGUA &amp; BARBUDA</td>
<td>Rehabilitation of Artisanal Fishery</td>
<td>798 million</td>
<td>6.14 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAPE VERDE</td>
<td>Extension of Praia Fisheries Port</td>
<td>980 million</td>
<td>7.08 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOMINICA</td>
<td>Rehabilitation of Roseau fisheries complex</td>
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<td>GAMBIA</td>
<td>Improvement of Artisanal Coastal Fisheries in the Kombo South District</td>
<td>882 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>GUINEA, REPUBLIC OF</td>
<td>Construction of Fisheries Research Vessel</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAURITANIA</td>
<td>Extension of National School of Maritime and Fisheries Studies</td>
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<td>4.64 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOROCCO</td>
<td>Construction of Specialised Center for Seafood Products</td>
<td>1121 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>PALAU</td>
<td>Improvement of Fishery Infrastructure in Kayangel State</td>
<td>487 million</td>
<td>3.75 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>ST KITTS &amp; NEVIS</td>
<td>Construction of Basseterre Fisheries Complex</td>
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<td>4.36 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ST LUCIA</td>
<td>Improvement of Coastal Fisheries Development</td>
<td>1318 million</td>
<td>10.14 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SENEGAL</td>
<td>Construction of Kapolack Central Fish Market</td>
<td>712 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>TUNISIA</td>
<td>Professional training center for fisheries of Mahadia</td>
<td>789 million</td>
<td>6.07 million</td>
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</table>
### FY 2002 FISHERIES GRANT AID AGREEMENTS

<table>
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<th>COUNTRY</th>
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<th>YEN AMOUNT</th>
<th>USD EQUIVALENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CAPE VERDE</td>
<td>Extension of Praia Fisheries Port</td>
<td>513 million</td>
<td>4.09 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOMINICA</td>
<td>Improvement of Marigot Fish Landing Facilities</td>
<td>1663 million</td>
<td>13.27 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRENADA</td>
<td>Improvement of Fish Marketing for Grenville</td>
<td>1401 million</td>
<td>11.18 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GUINEA, REPUBLIC OF</td>
<td>Construction of K nien fish market Conakry</td>
<td>810 million</td>
<td>6.55 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAURITIUS</td>
<td>Upgrading and Renovation of the Management and Training Facilities for Artisanal Fisheries</td>
<td>779 million</td>
<td>6.47 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOROCCO</td>
<td>Development of Sidi Hsaine Fisheries Village</td>
<td>515 million</td>
<td>4.33 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PANAMA</td>
<td>Project for Small-Scale Fisheries Development</td>
<td>449 million</td>
<td>3.78 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOUTHEAST ASIAN FISHERIES DEVELOPMENT CENTER (SEAFDEC)*</td>
<td>Construction of a Fisheries Research and Training Vessel</td>
<td>1012 million</td>
<td>8.42 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>VIETNAM</td>
<td>Construction of Marine Culture Research and Development Center in Nha Trang</td>
<td>873 million</td>
<td>6.99 million</td>
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</table>

* The Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center (SEAFDEC), is “an autonomous intergovernmental body established as a regional treaty organization in 1967 to promote fisheries development in Southeast Asia.” Japan and 9 other countries (Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam) are members. In December 2003 Japan hosted in Tokyo the “Seminar on Japan-ASEAN Cooperation to Promote Sustainable Fisheries through SEAFDEC”. The Seminar was, the Japan Whaling Association reports, “attended by over 70 high-ranking fisheries officials of Japan and ASEAN, including Fisheries Ministers from Malaysia and Indonesia.” Also according to the JWA, Kyoichi Kawaguchi, at the time Deputy Director General of the JFA, told reporters: “It was a great achievement that we could gain understanding on the whaling issue after our efforts to convince them over the past years. Now the whaling issue has entered the framework of SEAFDEC. In the future, we would like to invite them to join the International Whaling Commission.” On 1st June 2006 Cambodia became a new member of the IWC.

On March 31st 2004 a 3.5 billion Yen (USD 33 million) loan was granted to Indonesia for the “rehabilitation and improvement of Jakarta’s fishing port project”, one of the very few occasions that loan aid, rather than grant aid, has gone to a fisheries-related project.

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231 JWA News, No. 9, April 2004.
## FY 2003 FISHERIES GRANT AID AGREEMENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>PROJECT NAME</th>
<th>YEN AMOUNT</th>
<th>USD EQUIVALENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANTIGUA &amp; BARBUDA</td>
<td>Construction of Fisheries Center</td>
<td>168 million</td>
<td>1.52 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>BENIN</td>
<td>Development of Fishing Port</td>
<td>762 million</td>
<td>6.5 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>GABON</td>
<td>Development of Artisanal Fisheries Center at Lambarene</td>
<td>467 million</td>
<td>4.2 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOROCCO</td>
<td>Development of Fisheries Village at Sidi Hsaine</td>
<td>219 million</td>
<td>1.85 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>ST VINCENT &amp; THE GRENADINES</td>
<td>Re-modelling of New Kingstown Fish Market</td>
<td>755 million</td>
<td>6.45 million</td>
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</table>
## FY 2004 FISHERIES GRANT AID AGREEMENTS

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<th>PROJECT NAME</th>
<th>YEN AMOUNT</th>
<th>USD EQUIVALENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANTIGUA &amp; BARBUDA</td>
<td>Construction of Fisheries Center</td>
<td>753 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>BENIN</td>
<td>Development of Fisheries Port at Cotonou</td>
<td>287 million</td>
<td>2.80 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAMEROON</td>
<td>Development of Artisanal Fisheries Center</td>
<td>400 million</td>
<td>3.81 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>FIJI</td>
<td>Redevelopment of Fisheries Lami Jetty</td>
<td>577 million</td>
<td>5.61 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>GABON</td>
<td>Development of Artisanal Fisheries Center at Lambaréné</td>
<td>315 million</td>
<td>2.84 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>KIRIBATI</td>
<td>Kritimati Island coastal fisheries development</td>
<td>739 million</td>
<td>7.18 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>SENEGAL</td>
<td>Construction of Fisheries Center at Lompoul</td>
<td>652 million</td>
<td>6.18 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOLOMON ISLANDS</td>
<td>Rehabilitation of the domestic tuna fishery</td>
<td>973 million</td>
<td>9.24 million</td>
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</table>
## FY2005 FISHERIES GRANT AID AGREEMENTS

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<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>PROJECT NAME</th>
<th>YEN AMOUNT</th>
<th>USD EQUIVALENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALGERIA</td>
<td>Project for the reinforcement of training equipment for the Institute of Fisheries and Aquaculture Technology of Algiers</td>
<td>106 million</td>
<td>1.01 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NICARAGUA</td>
<td>Project for the Installation of Fisheries Facilities in San Juan del Sur</td>
<td>1197 million</td>
<td>11.11 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>PALAU</td>
<td>Project for the Improvement of North Dock of Peleliu State</td>
<td>581 million</td>
<td>5.02 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAINT KITTS AND NEVIS</td>
<td>Project for Artisanal Fisheries Development</td>
<td>617 million</td>
<td>5.56 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAMOA</td>
<td>Project for the Renovation and extension of Apia Fisheries Wharf and related facilities</td>
<td>707 million</td>
<td>6.29 million</td>
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</table>
## FY 2006 FISHERIES GRANT AID AGREEMENTS

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<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>PROJECT NAME</th>
<th>YEN AMOUNT</th>
<th>USD EQUIVALENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALGERIA</td>
<td>Reinforcement of Training Facilities for the Institute of Fisheries and Aquaculture Technology of Algiers</td>
<td>488 million</td>
<td>4.20 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REPUBLIC OF GUINEA</td>
<td>Extension of artisanal fisheries port of Boulbinet</td>
<td>405 million</td>
<td>3.48 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIRIBATI</td>
<td>Improvement of fisheries-related roads in South Tarawa</td>
<td>1285 million</td>
<td>11.03 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERU</td>
<td>Amplification and Modernisation of artisanal fish-landing site of Talara [1st grant]</td>
<td>298 million</td>
<td>2.56 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Amplification and Modernisation of artisanal fish-landing site of Talara [2nd grant]</td>
<td>1022 million</td>
<td>8.77 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ST VINCENT &amp; THE GRENADINES</td>
<td>Construction of Owia Fishery Center</td>
<td>555 million</td>
<td>4.79 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SURINAME</td>
<td>Construction of small-scale fisheries center in Paramaribo</td>
<td>817 million</td>
<td>7.01 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ANNEX 3: Japanese Grant Aid and Technical Cooperation to the six OECS countries

Antigua and Barbuda
Commonwealth of Dominica
Grenada
St Kitts and Nevis
St Lucia
St Vincent and the Grenadines

All figures are from official ODA statistics published by the Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs showing Exchanges of Notes per Fiscal Year. Technical Cooperation figures are not identified by category so it is not possible to know what portion of these sums is fisheries-related.

The shaded area in each table represents the years in which each country has supported Japan’s position in the IWC. This is determined by the voting record of each Annual Meeting of the IWC.

- o -

In addition, the website of the Japanese Embassy in Trinidad and Tobago, which serves all six OECS countries as well, occasionally publishes lists of projects that received funding under the Grant Assistance for Grassroots Human Security programme but showing only the sum total of grants provided under this scheme, and only in U.S. Dollars. These projects are therefore not included in the following tables.

These are by definition small-scale grants, usually of 10 million Yen (approximately US$1,000), and are awarded to non-profit organizations including NGOs and government institutions. Given the nature of these grants they do not require the signing of formal Exchanges of Notes and thus are not included in the list of grant aid projects per Fiscal Year provided on the Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs website.

Antigua and Barbuda is the only one of the six OECS countries not to have received assistance under this programme to date. Summary details of these grants are provided on the following page. Being such small amounts they alter the final percentages of total aid represented by the grant aid for fisheries only very slightly; in all cases the percentage remains above 95%.

Summary of grants provided under the Grant Assistance for Grassroots Human Security programme [with totals granted under the Grant Aid for Fisheries scheme included for comparison]:

ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA
None.
[Grant Aid for Fisheries: US$35 million.]

DOMINICA
[Grant Aid for Fisheries: US$ 51 million.]

GRENADA
19 projects during the years 1997-2005. Of these, 15 grants were awarded in 2005 as part of efforts to help Grenada recover from the devastation caused by Hurricane Ivan in September 2004. Total amount: US$ 1,329,630. Grenada also received US$125,000 in Emergency Relief Aid from Japan in 2004. [Grant Aid for Fisheries: US$ 34 million.]

ST KITTS AND NEVIS

ST LUCIA

ST VINCENT/GRENADINES
SUMMARY OF JAPANESE GRANT AID (EXCEPT ‘GRASSROOTS HUMAN SECURITY ASSISTANCE’) AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION TO ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA 1985-2006

All figures shown in millions of Yen.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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## SUMMARY OF JAPANESE GRANT AID (EXCEPT ‘GRASSROOTS HUMAN SECURITY ASSISTANCE’) AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION TO COMMONWEALTH OF DOMINICA 1985-2006

All figures shown in millions of Yen.

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## SUMMARY OF JAPANESE GRANT AID (EXCEPT ‘GRASSROOTS HUMAN SECURITY ASSISTANCE’) AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION TO GRENADA 1985-2006

All figures shown in millions of Yen.

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**OVERALL TOTAL** 3894 MILLION YEN

**TOTAL FISHERIES** 3840 MILLION YEN  Not known

% of total = fisheries 98.6%  Not known
SUMMARY OF JAPANESE GRANT AID (EXCEPT ‘GRASSROOTS HUMAN SECURITY ASSISTANCE’) AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION TO ST KITTS AND NEVIS 1985-2006

All figures shown in millions of Yen.

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SUMMARY OF JAPANESE GRANT AID (EXCEPT ‘GRASSROOTS HUMAN SECURITY ASSISTANCE’) AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION TO ST LUCIA 1985-2006

All figures shown in millions of Yen.

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OVERALL TOTAL 5724 MILLION YEN
TOTAL FISHERIES 5644 MILLION YEN

% of total = fisheries 98.6%
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The full text of the Code of Conduct can be found of the FAO website: www.fao.org.

6 - GENERAL PRINCIPLES

6.1 States and users of living aquatic resources should conserve aquatic ecosystems. The right to fish carries with it the obligation to do so in a responsible manner so as to ensure effective conservation and management of the living aquatic resources.

6.2 Fisheries management should promote the maintenance of the quality, diversity and availability of fishery resources in sufficient quantities for present and future generations in the context of food security, poverty alleviation and sustainable development. Management measures should not only ensure the conservation of target species but also of species belonging to the same ecosystem or associated with or dependent upon the target species.

6.5 States and subregional and regional fisheries management organizations should apply a precautionary approach widely to conservation, management and exploitation of living aquatic resources in order to protect them and preserve the aquatic environment, taking account of the best scientific evidence available. The absence of adequate scientific information should not be used as a reason for postponing or failing to take measures to conserve target species, associated or dependent species and non-target species and their environment.

6.6 Selective and environmentally safe fishing gear and practices should be further developed and applied, to the extent practicable, in order to maintain biodiversity and to conserve the population structure and aquatic ecosystems and protect fish quality. Where proper selective and environmentally safe fishing gear and practices exist, they should be recognized and accorded a priority in establishing conservation and management measures for fisheries. States and users of aquatic ecosystems should minimize waste, catch of non-target species, both fish and non-fish species, and impacts on associated or dependent species.

7 - FISHERIES MANAGEMENT

7.5 Precautionary approach.

7.5.1 States should apply the precautionary approach widely to conservation, management and exploitation of living aquatic resources in order to protect them and preserve the aquatic environment. The absence of adequate scientific information should not be used as a reason for postponing or failing to take conservation and management measures.

7.5.2 In implementing the precautionary approach, States should take into account, inter alia, uncertainties relating to the size and productivity of the stocks, reference points, stock condition in relation to such reference points, levels and distribution of fishing mortality and the impact of fishing activities, including discards, on non-target and associated or dependent species, as well as environmental and socio-economic conditions.
7.6.9 States should take appropriate measures to minimize waste, discards, catch by lost or abandoned gear, catch of non-target species, both fish and non-fish species, and negative impacts on associated or dependent species, in particular endangered species. Where appropriate, such measures may include technical measures related to fish size, mesh size or gear, discards, closed seasons and areas and zones reserved for selected fisheries, particularly artisanal fisheries. Such measures should be applied, where appropriate, to protect juveniles and spawners. States and subregional or regional fisheries management organizations and arrangements should promote, to the extent practicable, the development and use of selective, environmentally safe and cost effective gear and techniques.